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Abstract. This collected volume gives a concise account of the most rel-
evant scientiﬁc results of the COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the new
complex geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evalua-
tion”, a four-year project supported by COST (European Cooperation in
Science and Technology). It is divided into three parts reﬂecting the dif-
ferent perspectives under which complex spatial economic systems have
been studied: (i) the Macro perspective looks at the interactions among
international or regional trading partners; (ii) the Meso perspective con-
siders the functioning of (ﬁnancial, labour) markets as social network
structures; and, ﬁnally, (iii) the Micro perspective focuses on the strate-
gic choices of single ﬁrms and households. This Volume points also at
open issues to be addressed in future research.
Keywords: COST Action IS114 · European Union · Economic Geog-
raphy · Financial Markets · Strategic Decisions and Interactions · Com-
plexity
1 The COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the New
Complex Geography of Economic Systems: Models,
Tools and Policy Evaluation”
Inspired by the New Economic Geography (NEG) approach, initiated by Paul
Krugman and Masahita Fujita in the 1990s, the main objective of the COST
Action 1104 “The EU in the new complex geography of economic systems:
c© The Author(s) 2018
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models, tools and policy evaluation (GeComplexity)” has been to approach the
study of EU, more generally, economic systems from a multi-layered perspective
featuring interconnected spatial structures. At each layer, diﬀerent types of deci-
sions and interactions take place: interactions among international or regional
trading partners at the macro-level; the functioning of (ﬁnancial, labour) markets
as social network structures at the meso-level; and ﬁnally, the strategic choices of
single ﬁrms and households at the micro-level. Within these structures, the spa-
tial distribution of economic activities is evolving through time following complex
patterns determined by economic, geographical, institutional and social factors.
To study these structures, during its four years life time (March 2012–September
2016), the Action has built successfully an interdisciplinary approach. It has fur-
ther developed advanced mathematical, computational and empirical methods
and tools for analysing complex nonlinear systems, including macro and micro
models, nonlinear dynamical systems, social networks, game theoretical models
and agent based models.
This leads to the second objective of the Action: building multiregional mod-
els that integrate real world features; mapping the geography of the ﬁnancial and
banking networks; understanding ﬁrms’ strategic choices on location and R&D
cooperation and competition. More generally highlighting the pervasiveness of
networks structures at the various levels of aggregation.
To achieve these objectives, several activities have been performed. Twenty-
three meetings of which four major events – including a Final Conference – and
several workshops have taken place. Researches from twenty-six European coun-
tries and across the world and from an EU Commission research institution (the
Joint Research Centre, JRC, Seville) have contributed with an interdisciplinary
expertise: economists, regional economists, applied economists, mathematicians,
physicists. These activities lead to several scientiﬁc outcomes including more
than 140 articles in leading journals, Special Issues (four published and two as
an expected outcome of the Final Conference), three collected volumes, multiple
book chapters and working papers.
The Action has evolved into a very active network not only through several
meetings but also via more than eighty Short Term Scientiﬁc Missions (STSMs).
A high percentage of STSMs have been allocated to Early Stage Researchers
(ESRs). Moreover, three Training School have been speciﬁcally designed to build
the capacity of PhD students and young scholars. Dissemination has been con-
ducted also via the Action Website http://www.gecomplexity-cost.eu and a Dis-
cussion Paper Series edited by COST Members and indexed in REPEC.
This book gives a concise account of the most relevant scientiﬁc results of
the GeComplexity Cost Action and points at open issues to be addressed in
future projects. The Volume is divided into three parts reﬂecting the diﬀerent
perspectives under which complex spatial economic systems have been studied.
2 The Macro Perspective - Economic Geography
The chapter by Commendatore, Hammer, Kubin and Petraglia provides
a non-technical overview of new economic geography models dealing with policy
Introduction 3
issues. The Chapter begins by describing the main ingredients of the NEG app-
roach and illustrating the basic mechanism at work centred on the interplay of
agglomeration and dispersion forces. As suggested by Krugman (1991), trade
integration leads to spatial concentration of economic activity altering the bal-
ance in favour of the agglomeration forces. The authors consider various policy
measures including alternative categories of public expenditure, international tax
competition, unilateral actions of protection/liberalisation, and trade agreements.
The implications of public intervention in two-region NEG models are discussed
by unfolding the impact of policy measures on agglomeration/dispersion forces.
Results are described and contrasted to those obtained in standard non-NEG the-
oretical models. Paradigmatic examples are the non-neutrality of home-bias pub-
lic procurement for the determination of a country’s pattern of specialization; the
presence of taxable agglomeration rents leading to a “race to the top” rather than a
“race to the bottom”within a tax competition game between countries; the impos-
sibility to exploit a potential comparative advantage to avoid deindustrialization
in poorer countries when agglomeration eﬀects are at work.
The high degree of abstraction limits the applicability of NEG models to real
world policy issues. The authors discuss in some detail two extensions of NEG
models to reduce this applicability gap: the cases of multi-regional frameworks
and ﬁrm heterogeneity.
The applicability gap is addressed by Commendatore, Kubin and
Sushko by studying a three-region economy in a NEG model. By using lin-
ear (and not iso-elastic) demand functions, the model is able to account for
trade patterns between pairs of regions allowing for unilateral, bilateral and no
trade regimes. Thus, the proposed framework is suitable to study how changes
in parameters that are typical for NEG models, such as trade costs and regional
market size, not only shape the regional distribution of economic activity, but
also at the same time determine the emergence of trade links between regions.
To focus the analysis, the authors study in more detail three speciﬁc trade
patterns frequently found in the EU trade network. First, they consider three
autarkic regions belonging to an economy at its ﬁrst stages of development. For
this set-up, instances of coexisting stable long-run equilibria (multi-stability) are
found, which cannot occur in a two-region framework, stressing the importance
of initial advantage in the process of industry concentration; then following the
improvement of transport infrastructures between two regions, the possibility
that these regions trade with each other (but only with each other) is introduced.
As trade costs fall, the region with a larger initial endowment of the mobile factor
starts exporting to the closer region and attracts the industrial sector. However,
in contrast to the two-region case, some of the industry locates in the more
remote region, ﬁnding shelter from competition; and, ﬁnally, even the remote
region closes its distance with one of the other two regions, which increases its
centrality in the trade network. However, centrality does not necessarily translate
into a locational advantage.
More generally, the authors ﬁnd a surprising plethora of long-run equilibria
each involving a speciﬁc regional distribution of economic activity and a spe-
ciﬁc pattern of trade links. This implies that a variation in trade costs shapes
simultaneously industry location and the conﬁguration of the trade network.
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Basile and Mı´nguez propose a critical review of parametric and semi-
parametric spatial econometric models. They focus on the capability of each
class of models to ﬁt the main features of spatial data, namely spatial depen-
dence (or weak cross sectional dependence, due to spatial spillover eﬀects),
strong cross-sectional dependence (due to unobserved common factors), spatial
heterogeneity, nonlinearities, and time persistence. They also provide a brief dis-
cussion of the existent software developed to estimate most of the econometric
models described in the chapter.
They start by summarizing the broad literature on parametric spatial autore-
gressive models, which is still the dominant paradigm in spatial econometrics.
Within this literature, it is possible to distinguish between ﬁrst-generation spa-
tial econometric models (essentially developed to handle cross-sectional data)
which focus on modeling spatial dependence through diﬀerent alternative lin-
ear speciﬁcations, and second-generation spatial econometric models, developed
during the last decade, more speciﬁcally, static and dynamic spatial panel data
models which prove to be particularly useful to control for unobserved spatial
heterogeneity and time persistence. A natural extension of the last class of mod-
els, proposed during the last few years, consists of the combination of spatial
panel data models and common factor models in order to disentangle strong and
weak (spatial) cross-section dependence.
In spite of these important advances in the literature, it is important to
recognize that any parametric model is limited to speciﬁc forms of spatial vari-
ation of the parameters, while they are not able to capture more general forms
of model mis-speciﬁcations, such as spatial parameter heterogeneity and non-
linearities. Thus, semiparametric spatial econometric models appear as more
ﬂexible estimation frameworks. The authors dedicate the second part of their
Chapter to this category of models, distinguishing between (mixed)-GWR mod-
els based on kernel methods, and models based on penalized spline smoothers.
Three recent contributions are of particular relevance in this context. First, com-
bining kernel smoothing methods and standard spatial lag models, a new class of
data generating processes (DGP) within the GWR literature (Mixed Geograph-
ically Weighted Regression Simultaneous AutoRegressive Models) provides an
important framework to account for both spatial dependence and nonstation-
arity of the parameters. Second, combining penalized regression spline methods
with standard cross-section spatial autoregressive models, another class of DGP
allows the researchers to simultaneously control for spatial spillover eﬀects, non-
linearities, spatially autocorrelated unobserved heterogeneity, and spatial non-
stationarity of the parameters. Finally, semiparametric models for longitudinal
data, which include a non-parametric spatio-temporal trend, a spatial lag of
the dependent variable, and a time series autoregressive noise, represent a valid
alternative to parametric methods aimed at disentangling strong and weak cross-
sectional dependence. Natural directions in which these methods can be extended
are speciﬁcations suitable for the analysis of dynamic frameworks.
The last chapter by Commendatore and Kubin concludes Part I of the
Volume. The authors summarise the work carried out during the lifetime of the
Action by the Working Group whose main task was to build multiregional NEG
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models. The authors list the main results, point at the questions left open and
suggest topics for future research. What emerges from the discussion is that the
predictions of NEG models are highly sensitive to their speciﬁcation: diﬀerent
assumptions concerning, for example, the geographical structure of the economy
or even the functional form of consumer’s preferences lead to diﬀerent long-run
spatial distributions.
3 The Meso Perpective - Financial Markets
Bougheas, Harvey andKirman explore the relationship between systemic risk
and the behavior of aggregate credit. The two most severe macroeconomic crises
of the last 100 years, namely, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great
Recession that commenced at the close of the ﬁrst decade of the current century,
were preceded by extreme events in ﬁnancial markets in general and the banking
system in particular. In a recent study, Schularick and Taylor (2012) have empir-
ically identiﬁed a historical link between the level of aggregate credit in the econ-
omy and macroeconomic performance. They argue that aggregate credit can be a
powerful predictor of economic crises, especially, rare catastrophic events.
Their aim is to provide a microfoundational explanation for the above rela-
tionship. In this work the focus in on the behavior of aggregate credit. In partic-
ular, the authors analyze the dynamics of aggregate bank credit in an economy
where all ﬁnancial transactions are intermediated through the banking system.
Viewing the ﬁnancial system as a network of banks that are connected through
their ﬁnancial obligations to each other, they examine how the impact of shocks
on the asset side of the banking balance sheets may disrupt the supply of aggre-
gate credit.
In their model, banks are unable to completely diversify their loan portfolios
and thus they can become insolvent. This will be the case when the total loan
repayments (from both entrepreneurs and other banks) are insuﬃcient to cover
their obligations to their depositors and other banks. In order to clear the bank-
ing system when some banks become insolvent the authors apply the method
suggested by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). Insolvencies can propagate through the
banking network. When one bank is unable to meet its obligations to another
bank, the latter bank might itself become insolvent even if it would have remained
solvent had its loans to the originally failed bank been repaid. The bankruptcy
resolution process terminated when there are no insolvent banks left. The num-
ber of bank failures will depend on (a) the distribution of initial losses across the
banking system, and (b) the structure of the ﬁnancial network (see, for example,
Acemoglu et al. 2015).
As long as the liquidation of assets held by insolvent institutions does not
depress the market values of these assets the total systemic losses by the end
of the resolution process will be equal to the initial losses due to the inability
of entrepreneurs to repay their loans. However, as Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
have argued during systemic episodes, exactly because there are many failing
institutions, the market value (liquidation value) of the assets can drop below
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their corresponding book values (ﬁre sales). This drop in asset prices forces other
institutions to reevaluate their own assets thus potentially causing new rounds
of failures.
In the model, when the authors do not allow for ﬁre sales, the value of
aggregate credit provided by the banking network follows a random walk. This
is because the capacity of the banking network to provide credit each period
depends on the availability of reserves which in turn depends on the performance
of aggregate loans the period before. Given that shocks are normally distributed
each period it follows that aggregate lending activity follows a random walk.
When they introduce ﬁre sales, systemic losses can be much greater than initial
losses thus introducing fat tails on the lower end of the distribution of aggregate
credit. Under the supposition that aggregate credit is positively correlated with
aggregate output their approach might be useful for explaining two features of
business cycles: (a) the asymmetry in booms and busts (Acemoglu and Scott
1991), and (b) macroeconomic fat tails Acemoglu et al. 2017).
The chapter by Schmitt, Tuinstra and Westerhoﬀ reviews the literature
on market interactions and policy measures. In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis
that hit the global economy almost ten years ago many economists and pol-
icy makers realized that the strong links between individual markets played an
important role in allowing the crisis to spread globally, or may even have been
at the core of the emergence of the crisis. This has spawned a literature that
deals both with the eﬀect that interactions between markets have on market
stability, and with the policy measures that may be implemented to counter the
instabilities that potentially arise from these interactions. In this chapter, the
authors review a small part of that literature.
That individual markets may lead to instability has been recognized for
some time already. Classic textbook examples are the cobweb model under na¨ıve
expectations (see Ezekiel 1938) or the Cournot oligopoly model under best reply
dynamics (see Theocharis 1959). More recently the development of the theory of
nonlinear dynamical systems has led to an increased attention for the possibil-
ity of market instability. Some early and important applications of this theory
are Grandmont (1985) and Bullard (1994) on overlapping generations models,
Chiarella (1998), Hommes (1994) and Brock and Hommes (1997) on cobweb mar-
kets, Day and Huang (1990), Lux (1995) and Brock and Hommes (1998) on ﬁnan-
cial markets and Puu (1991) and Kopel (1996) on Cournot duopoly models. Lab-
oratory experiments with paid human subjects suggest that instability is indeed
likely to occur in some of these market environments (see e.g. Hommes, Sonne-
mans, Tuinstra and van de Velden, 2005 and Heemeijer, Hommes, Sonnemans
and Tuinstra 2009).
In the last decade, the interaction between markets has been identiﬁed as
an additional route to market instability. Dieci and Westerhoﬀ (2009, 2010), for
example, ﬁnd that two stable cobweb markets may become unstable when they
are linked. Tuinstra, Wegener and Westerhoﬀ (2014) show that this increased
instability may result in counterintuitive policy prescriptions: increasing import
tariﬀs between interacting markets may decrease allocative eﬃciency at the
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steady state equilibrium, but may be welfare enhancing nevertheless. This is
because they weaken the link between markets and thereby stabilize consump-
tion and production patterns. Even in the absence of na¨ıve price expectations and
cobweb dynamics linking two markets may lead to instability, as demonstrated
by Schmitt, Tuinstra and Westerhoﬀ (2017a, 2017b). They study a stylized model
of market interaction, where ﬁrms may migrate between two regions on the basis
of proﬁtability between these regions. If ﬁrms are suﬃciently sensitive to these
proﬁt diﬀerences this may lead to unstable dynamics. Following the insights
from Schmitt and Westerhoﬀ (2015, 2017), the papers by Schmitt, Tuinstra and
Westerhoﬀ (2017a, 2017b) investigate how the introduction of proﬁt taxes may
dampen the proﬁt diﬀerences between the two markets and thereby stabilize
the dynamics. Schmitt, Tuinstra and Westerhoﬀ (2017b) discuss the scenario
where each region is overseen by an independent local government or regulatory
authority. Optimally, these two regulators coordinate their proﬁt taxes in such a
way that markets are stable and total welfare is maximized. However, Schmitt,
Tuinstra and Westerhoﬀ (2017b) argue that, if regulators are only (or mainly)
interested in welfare in their own region, each of them will may have the incentive
to decrease the proﬁt tax, which can destabilizes markets.
The last chapter of Part II by Bougheas and Kirman oﬀers a number of
suggestions for future research, ﬁrst, for exploring the link between the network
structure of the banking system and aggregate credit and, second, the relation-
ship between systemic risk in ﬁnancial markets and macroeconomic fat tails.
4 The Micro Perspective - Strategic Decisions
and Interactions
Colombo and Dawid oﬀer an innovative approach to the issue of location
decisions and R&D spillovers and provides ample opportunity for further devel-
opments. The authors assume that ﬁrms are forward looking and base their loca-
tion decisions on sophisticated (Markov) strategies that determine their R&D
investments. In particular, the authors consider a diﬀerential game based on a
standard Cournot model with three ﬁrms. Firms 2 and 3 are located in an indus-
trial cluster and at t = 0, ﬁrm 1 has the choice to either co-locate in the cluster
or instead locate in isolation. The diﬀerence between these two choices is that
each ﬁrm in the cluster receives knowledge spillovers from all the other ﬁrms in
the cluster whereas if located in isolation, ﬁrm 1 receives no spillovers but also
does not need to worry about outgoing spillovers. The ﬁrms choose production
quantities and their R&D investments that increase their knowledge stocks. In
the model, absorptive capacity plays a crucial role: a ﬁrm’s current knowledge
stock determines its absorptive capacity which, in turn, determines how much
of incoming spillovers the ﬁrm can absorb to increase its own knowledge stock.
The ﬁrms located in the cluster face ﬁxed costs of congestion each period and all
ﬁrms try to maximize their discounted proﬁts. The authors characterize Markov-
Perfect Equilibria of this game for various scenarios. One of their insight is that
the relation between ﬁrm 1’s location choice and ﬁrm 1’s initial knowledge stock
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depends on the characteristics of absorptive capacity (exogenous and constant
versus endogenous and proportional to knowledge stock). In case of a constant
absorptive capacity, ﬁrm 1 prefers to locate in the cluster if its initial knowledge
stock is small. However, if absorptive capacity is endogenous, then ﬁrm 1 locates
in the cluster if its initial knowledge stock is large. As a consequence, the authors
conclude that a deeper understanding of ﬁrms’ location decisions requires a thor-
ough investigation of the associated characteristics of the spillover mechanisms.
The chapter by Kopel, Manasakis, and Petrakis studies competition
between a local ﬁrm that invests in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and
a multinational ﬁrm that enters the foreign market either via exports or for-
eign direct investments. As a modeling framework the authors use a multi-stage
game which is more standard in the International Business literature. In stage
1, the government of the foreign country sets the tariﬀ; in stage 2, the multina-
tional home ﬁrm decides whether to serve the foreign country’s market through
exports or FDI; ﬁnally, in stage 3, the local ﬁrm invests in CSR and the two ﬁrms
set their quantities for the markets. The game is solved by backward induction
and the solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash. The authors derive results
on the interaction between the optimal mode of entry of the (multinational)
enterprise and the local ﬁrm’s investment in CSR. They further look at the
eﬀects on consumer welfare, ﬁrm proﬁts, and total welfare. This paper brings
together two important topics, namely the role of multinational enterprises in
globalized markets and the impact of ﬁrms’ corporate social responsibility. With
the introduction of Directive 2014/95/EU on the disclosure of non-ﬁnancial and
diversity information, the European Commission expressed its view on CSR as
an extended corporate governance policy. The Directive introduces enhanced
reporting requirements on social, environmental and governance issues. During
the process of the development of Directive 2014/95/EU, concerns were raised
that due to this regulation European ﬁrms will have a competitive disadvan-
tage against their international rivals. An important issue is, therefore, if CSR
enhances or diminishes the competitiveness of European ﬁrms against their inter-
national rivals. This is particularly crucial, since the ﬁeld of international trade
and CSR policies is still under-researched (e.g. Kitzmuller and Shimshack 2012).
Bischi, Kopel, Lamantia, and Radi work within an evolutionary setting
which is rarely used in the literature on location decisions of multinational ﬁrms.
The authors study a population of ﬁrms that can either manufacture in their
home country or oﬀ-shore production to a foreign country. The two locations are
structurally diﬀerent as the home country has higher unit production costs but
higher internal knowledge spillovers whereas the foreign country has lower unit
costs but also smaller internal knowledge spillovers. Additionally, (i) technology
know-how developed in one country can potentially be transferred to the other
country and be used for reducing costs, and (ii) ﬁrms located in the foreign
country face congestion costs that are increasing in the manufacturing activity
occurring in this country. The ﬁrms’ location decisions are based on a simple
(myopic) comparison of unit production costs taking into account current within-
country spillovers, cross-border spillovers, and congestion costs. An evolutionary
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choice mechanism based on an exponential replicator equation determines the
share of ﬁrms that switch from one location to the other. From a modeling
point of view, this chapter diﬀers from the approaches taken in the previous
two chapters of this section of the book since location strategies are spread in a
population of ﬁrms via an evolutionary mechanism that captures some myopic
decision rule instead of forward-looking rational decision calculus. The authors
present a variety of scenarios and characterize long run location patterns for
oﬀ-shoring and on-shoring and how these activities depend on spillovers and
congestion costs. Such a framework can be used to generate robust predictions
which can then be tested empirically.
Lastly, Bischi and Kopel brieﬂy reviews the research activity carried out
by the Working Group on ‘Social and Industrial Interactions’. The main focus
of this group has been on the behaviour of economic agents at the micro-level.
Concerning ﬁrms locational choices, and especially referring to multinationals,
the authors notice that the trend that has lead many ﬁrms to oﬀ-shoring their
main activities is, recently, reversing. Moreover, the authors stress that environ-
mental, social and governance dimensions are becoming more and more relevant
issues. Finally, they suggest as main avenues for future research the study on
corporate social responsibility strategies of multinational enterprises and their
global value chains.
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Abstract. This paper provides a non-technical overview of NEG models deal-
ing with policy issues. Considered policy measures include alternative categories
of public expenditure, international tax competition, unilateral actions of
protection/liberalisation, and trade agreements. The implications of public
intervention in two-region NEG models are discussed by unfolding the impact of
policy measures on agglomeration/dispersion forces. Results are described in
contrast with those obtained in standard non-NEG theoretical models. The high
degree of abstraction limits the applicability of NEG models to real world policy
issues. We discuss in some detail two extensions of NEG models to reduce this
applicability gap: the cases of multi-regional frameworks and ﬁrm heterogeneity.
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1 Policy Issues in NEG Models: A General Discussion
1.1 NEG Models in a Nutshell
In his seminal contribution,Krugman (1991) presented an intriguing andmost stimulating
argumentation: even if countries were identical, an uneven distribution of economic
activity may emerge endogenously. The central mechanism is the following: Assume two
identical regions that produce a homogenous agricultural commodity and differentiated
manufacturing commodities. Markets for manufactured goods are monopolistically
competitive (in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz set up with decreasing average costs in
production and a love for variety utility function); trading commodities between regions is
possible, but involves trade costs (that do not occur when selling commodities in the local
market). In that environment, ﬁrms that have access to a larger local market have higher
proﬁts and are able to pay higher wages. Higher factor rewards, in turn, attract
factor migration towards this region (or trigger more intense capital formation).
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If migration is combined with a relocation of commodity demand, the local market size
increases, which leads to even more migration – agglomeration is the result of a
self-reinforcing factor migration process (or in some model variants of a self-reinforcing
process of capital formation or ﬁrm entry). In models in which the mobile factor are
workers, this so-called market size effect is enhanced by a price index effect. Variety
loving consumers buy all commodity variants – irrespective of whether they are produced
locally or imported. Therefore, the respective consumer price index is lower in the region
inwhichmore variants are produced locally (that do not involve transport costs), i.e. in the
region with more ﬁrms. Workers thus migrate to the bigger region not only because ﬁrms
are able to pay higher wages, but also because of the lower consumer price index.
A competition effect works against these two agglomerative forces: with more ﬁrms in a
market, themarket niche of a single ﬁrmmay shrink, even if the overall market size in that
region has increased.
In more recent model variants, the competition effect may be enhanced via a
variable mark-up – with more ﬁrms in the local market, the mark-up, which each single
entrepreneur may charge, is reduced. Note that the last effect requires a departure from
the standard Dixit-Stiglitz modelling of monopolistic competition. In these models, the
CES utility function (giving rise to iso-elastic demand functions) is replaced by a
log-linear utility function (that gives rise to linear demand functions implying varying
mark-ups for monopoly pricing).
NEG models typically show that the competition effect dominates for high trade
costs and an even regional distribution of economic activity emerges. Instead,
agglomeration forces prevail for lower trade costs and a core-periphery pattern of
economic activity appears. Given the symmetry of regions, agglomeration can appear
in either of the two regions. In many models, both types of equilibrium co-exist as
(locally) stable ﬁxed points for intermediate levels of trade costs. In that case, small
shocks may trigger a self-reinforcing process leading from a symmetric industry dis-
tribution to a core-periphery pattern. The direction of the small shock determines which
region gets the core. In more technical terms: both types of equilibria have their own
basin of attraction and small shocks can push the economy from one basin of attraction
into the basin of attraction of another equilibrium. Thus, history matters for the
long-run evolution of economic activity, which is an often-reiterated theme of NEG
(see Krugman 1992). Another implication of the multiplicity of coexisting equilibria is
that an economic evolution may not be reversible and hysteresis phenomena occur in
the spatial pattern of economic activity.
The change in the locally available quantities of productive factors is at the core of
each NEG model. Therefore, it is very common to classify models according to the
mobility assumptions (see Baldwin et al. 2003; Brakman et al. 2001). We will use this
classiﬁcation also in this chapter:
Core-periphery model (CP, see Krugman 1991): Workers are mobile between
regions but not between sectors. Since worker spend their income locally, demand is
mobile as well.
Footloose entrepreneur model (FE, see Forslid 1999; Ottaviano 2001; and Forslid
and Ottaviano 2003): Entrepreneurs (with their knowledge capital) are mobile between
regions (but not between sectors). Entrepreneurs spend their income locally; therefore,
demand is mobile as well.
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Footloose capital model (FC, see Martin and Rogers 1995): Manufactured goods
require entrepreneurial knowledge capital (blueprints). While capital is mobile between
regions in search of the highest nominal reward, it is assumed that the capital earnings
are remitted back to the owner who is regionally immobile. Hence, in that model class,
factor mobility does not lead to a relocation of demand, which considerable simpliﬁes
the analytics, at the cost of losing some of the core features of a NEG model.
Constructed capital model (CC, see Baldwin 1999): There is no factor mobility
between regions. However, capital is accumulated (constructed), possibly at different
rates in both regions, which also may lead to agglomeration.
Vertical linkages model (VL, see Venables 1996; and Krugman and Venables
1995): This model class introduces input-output relations. Workers are not mobile
between regions, but between sectors. They may move out of agriculture into newly
created input ﬁrms, which may lead to a different regional industrial development and
to agglomeration.
1.2 Policy in NEG Models: Fundamental Questions and the Applicability
Gap
The highly abstract model construction with initially identical regions is the sparkling
core of Krugman’s argument. Even at this very abstract level, policy issues immedi-
ately emerge. Multiple equilibria with varying stability properties beg the question
whether they are equivalent, viewed through the lens of a social welfare function. In
addition, a typical NEG model involves several inefﬁciencies: most obvious, monop-
olistic price setting leads to socially inferior outcomes; in a context of imperfect
competition, any change in the locally available amount of productive factors involves
pecuniary externalities that are welfare relevant. There is a small strand of literature that
addresses such questions explicitly: Ottaviano and Thisse (2001), Ottaviano et al.
(2002), Ottaviano and Thisse (2002), Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), and more recently
Pflüger and Südekum (2008) and Grafeneder-Weissteiner et al. (2015). We would like
to point out two interesting results of this strand of literature: a ﬁrst result relies on the
possible multiplicity of equilibria. Those papers show the possibility of
over-agglomeration, i.e. a situation in which decentralized market processes without
policy intervention lead to agglomeration, while the symmetric equilibrium exhibits a
higher social welfare. The papers take this as a basis for regional redistributive policy,
either in the form of restrictions on factor mobility (in order to prevent agglomeration)
or in the form of interregional transfers to compensate the periphery. A second result
focusses on the stability properties: Given the monopolistic set up, the symmetric,
stable equilibrium may quite well be inefﬁcient and policy interventions can increase
the social welfare (in the symmetric equilibrium). However – and this is the interesting
result – these optimal policy interventions may change the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium that becomes unstable; thus, an allegedly optimal policy
intervention may lead to unintended agglomeration.
A related policy topic that already emerges at a very abstract level are distributive
issues, which actually are pervasive in NEG models. The utility level of the immobile
workers left behind in the periphery is lower than the utility level of the workers in the
core region. In such a situation, using a social welfare function is not without problems.
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Charlot et al. (2006) point out that a simple utilitarian social welfare function actually
reflects indifference to inequality and the authors suggest using a more general CES
speciﬁcation that allows reflecting various attitudes towards inequality. Charlot et al.
(2006) show that the attitude towards inequality heavily influences the result; however,
over-agglomeration is a possibility also in their framework.
Leaving these fundamental policy questions aside, prototype NEG models with two
initially identical regions are often used to assess the impact of various policy measures –
including tariffs, free-trade agreements, customs unions, taxes, subsidies, and public
expenditures on items such as infrastructure, transport systems, and R&D – on the
regional distribution of economic activity. We review this literature in the following
sections. Each section start with the analysis for two regions and, subsequently, we
discuss whether the two regions’ results carry over to a multi-regional framework (for the
latter see Commentatore et al. 2015).
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the extreme degree of abstraction limits
the applicability of NEG models to real world policy issues and that NEG models were
extended in various directions to reduce this applicability gap: Many NEG models
allow for different country sizes. The admittedly simplistic representation of geography
in NEG is a highly disputed issue and several extension are found in the literature.
Most recently, some NEG models include ﬁrm heterogeneity. We explicitly discuss the
last two issues and start with extensions concerning geography.
It was Krugman (1993) who borrowed from Cronon’s famous book “Nature’s
Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West” (see Cronon 1991) the notions of “ﬁrst
nature” and “second nature”. First nature regional differences are exogenous to eco-
nomic activity, e.g. endowment with natural resources, geographical location – cen-
trality, location at the sea, at a river, in the mountains – and geopolitical factors (see
also Venables 2006; Roos 2005). First nature asymmetries can easily explain an
asymmetric regional distribution of economic activity. However, the main achievement
of the New Economic Geography is to show that even when starting with ﬁrst nature
identical regions, endogenous economic – i.e. second nature – processes may bring
about a very uneven regional distribution of economic activity. In typical NEG models,
ﬁrst nature geography plays a minimal role. Regions are separated by (symmetric)
transportation or trade costs (see also the discussion in Østbye 2010). In the unfolding
of the NEG paradigm over the last decades, some contributions do bring back ﬁrst
nature differences and study their interaction with second nature agglomeration pro-
cesses (for overviews see Fujita and Mori 2005 and Venables 2006). In the next
paragraphs, we present two possibilities found in the literature for incorporating ﬁrst
nature differences into NEG models and discuss whether the basic NEG mechanisms
are still relevant.
The ﬁrst approach consists of assuming differences in trade costs, conveying ﬁrst
nature advantages to some regions. Krugman (1993) and Ago et al. (2006) analyse
three (or more) regions located on a line, which gives a locational advantage to the
middle region. Fujita and Mori (1996) also analyse a multi-region model in which some
locations have a ﬁrst nature locational advantage (e.g. a port functioning as transport
hub). Østbye (2010) analyses a two region model in which one region has a ﬁrst nature
advantage because of trade links with an outside region. Differences in the trade costs
change the strength of the various agglomeration and dispersion forces. A centrally
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located region has an advantage in accessing markets. However, it is also subject to a
stronger competition effect. The papers typically show that second nature forces may
dominate ﬁrst nature advantages. Krugman (1993) and Ago et al. (2006) show that
agglomeration may not occur at the geographical center, instead intense competition in
the middle region can force manufacturing to move out and agglomeration occurs in
more peripheral regions. The typical NEG theme of irreversibility and regional hys-
teresis resonates in the results found in Fujita and Mori (1996): A region that became
the core because of ﬁrst nature advantages may continue to be core even if it had lost its
ﬁrst nature advantage. An example for this is a natural port that functioned as transport
hub and that lost this ﬁrst nature advantage due to innovations in the transport system.
A second approach to model ﬁrst nature disparities is to specify productivity dif-
ferences between the regions (possibly due to regional differences in the endowment
with natural resources), i.e. to introduce Ricardian (comparative or absolute) advan-
tages into a NEG framework.
NEG models typically show that for high trade costs both agglomeration (such as
market access and price index effect) and dispersion forces (such as the competition
effect) are strong. In addition, they typically show that for high trade costs dispersion
forces dominate and that an equal regional distribution of economic activity emerges.
Instead, for low trade costs, both forces are weaker and agglomeration forces dominate,
which leads to a core-periphery pattern of economic activity. Comparative advantages
add another dispersion force, since each region attracts industry that uses its speciﬁc
comparative advantage, the strength of which does not vary with trade costs. Therefore,
for low trade costs both NEG forces are weak and comparative advantage dominates,
and this leads to a dispersed industry structure. Instead, for intermediate and high trade
costs NEG forces dominate. In particular, for intermediate trade costs NEG agglom-
eration forces shape the regional distribution of industry and its regional specialization
(and thus trading) pattern may not follow comparative advantages. For high trade costs,
NEG dispersion forces lead to an equally distributed industry, perhaps biased towards
comparative advantage (see e.g. Picard and Zeng 2010; Forslid and Wooton 2003, see
also the related contributions by Ricci 1999; Bagoulla 2006; Matsuoka and Kikuchi
2012; Pflüger and Tabuchi 2016; and Commendatore et al. 2017). In an interesting
related paper, Matsuyama and Takahashi (1998) analyse a two regions model that also
includes Ricardian advantages into a NEG perspective. The authors show that allowing
for factor migration may overturn the comparative advantage structure; in addition,
they explicitly address the above mentioned welfare issues and show that in some cases
agglomeration may be socially undesirable.
After having discussed the representation of geography in NEG models, we turn to
another direction of increasing the degree of realism: The “new new economic geog-
raphy” (NNEG, see Ottaviano 2011) loosens the symmetry assumption by introducing
ﬁrm heterogeneity á la Melitz (2003), i.e. introducing ﬁrms that differ wrt productivity.
This not only allows asking under which conditions ﬁrms or workers chose to
agglomerate or disperse across space, but also if more or less productive ﬁrms behave
differently in this process.
Baldwin and Okubo (2006) are the ﬁrst to integrate part of the Melitz framework
into the FC model. Firm heterogeneity is introduced by different marginal costs for
each ﬁrm and these differences follow a Pareto distribution. Furthermore, switching
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regions is associated with a quadratic cost function. While the regions are symmetric in
tastes and technology, one region is assumed larger in terms of the number of ﬁrms and
workers. As in the FC model, there is a tendency for ﬁrms to move towards the larger
region, which is governed by agglomeration forces. Probably not surprising, the most
productive ﬁrms move ﬁrst. They can bear the costs associated with moving most
easily. Therefore, there is a maximum marginal cost that drives the relocation of ﬁrms
from the smaller to the larger market. As trade gets freer, more ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
relocate to the larger region. The introduction of heterogeneity does not alter the break
and sustain points derived in the standard FC model. However, measured in terms of
the number of ﬁrms, relocation costs combined with differences in productivity act as a
dispersion force as fewer ﬁrms are able to relocate to the larger market. This leads to a
selection effect meaning that only particular ﬁrms agglomerate in the equilibrium.
While the FC model is rather simple but lacks some features of other NEG models,
Okubo (2009) shows how ﬁrm heterogeneity works in the still tractable footloose
capital vertical linkages model (FCVL). Symmetric regions additionally allow for the
possibility of endogenous asymmetry. Similar to the former paper, Okubo (2009) ﬁnds
that ﬁrm heterogeneity has a moderating effect on the relocation process. In this model,
there is a stepwise agglomeration process. The most productive ﬁrms that already
exported from the smaller region relocate ﬁrst and stay (net-) exporters. Second, there
are ﬁrms that sold only locally but become exporters once they relocate to the larger
region. Finally, there are ﬁrms that only sold locally in the smaller market and that stay
a local seller in the larger market. The existence of the last type of ﬁrm in the larger
region lowers the strength of the agglomeration forces and increases the strength of the
dispersion force, the agglomeration process is gradual and only partial. The author also
shows that a decrease in the ﬁxed costs that are associated with exporting strengthens
the agglomeration forces making full agglomeration a possibility. What is more, he
argues that in his model, trade integration leads to a divergence in welfare with the
individuals in the larger market being better off.
In a linear setup, Okubo et al. (2010) focus on the role of competition and its
relationship to location choice of differently productive ﬁrms. Their results indicate that
efﬁcient and inefﬁcient ﬁrms move away from each other similar to the analysis dis-
cussed above. At some point of trade integration, all productive ﬁrms are in the larger
market, while all less productive ﬁrms remain in the smaller market shielding them-
selves from competition. However, deeper market integration makes it harder for
high-cost ﬁrms to avoid competition and the agglomeration advantages exceed the
competition effect. So there might be a non-monotonic relation between trade inte-
gration and the sorting of ﬁrms.
By employing a version of the FE model, Ottaviano (2012) demonstrates how ﬁrm
heterogeneity affects the relative strength of agglomeration and dispersion forces.
Entrepreneurs ﬁrst develop blue prints that are needed for production. Only after
observing their productivity do ﬁrms decide whether to use them in order to produce.
The blue prints depreciate at the end of the period. Similar to the papers before, the
model exhibits partial agglomeration when trade barriers fall. The authors pay partic-
ular attention to the different effects that a variation of the scale and the shape
parameters of the (Pareto) distribution has on the ﬁrm selection at the equilibrium.
18 P. Commendatore et al.
Baldwin and Okubo (2014) update their previous work by including entry and exit
of ﬁrms as well as ﬁxed market entry costs, so-called “beachhead costs”. Firms are also
able to relocate after their initial location choice or vice versa, they might enter or exit a
market after they have relocated.
Incorporating ﬁrm heterogeneity into NEG models introduces new and interesting
variations of the classic NEG mechanisms. There is still agglomeration and dispersion
across space driven by the respective forces. However, agglomeration can be gradual
and not every ﬁrm is equally likely to move to the larger markets. Thus, in equilibrium,
not only the number of ﬁrms may be different between regions, but also the distribution
of their productivities. This is relevant for welfare analyses. The presence of ﬁrm
heterogeneity may therefore also alter some policy implications of NEG models.
2 Public Spending: Productivity and Demand Effects
NEG scholars have studied the impact of different categories of public expenditure on
industrial location within different variants of NEG frameworks. The non-exhaustive
survey covered in this section uses the typical distinction between unproductive and
productive public spending to classify these models and elaborates on the main
channels through which public intervention influences industrial location. In the ﬁrst
case, the government provides an additional channel to the “market-access” effect, via
the so-called “demand” effect. Tax revenues are spent in consumption goods, thus
ﬁnancing an additional source of local demand for manufactured goods and magnifying
the “market-access” effect. On the other hand, the so-called productive categories of
public spending affect ﬁrms’ location via a “productivity” effect exerted on the supply
side of the economy. Investment in R&D, transportation and other types of
productivity-enhancing infrastructures affect production in the manufacturing sector via
their positive impact on factors’ productivity.
The ﬁrst group of works, which includes Trionfetti (1997 and 2001) and Brülhart
and Trionfetti (2004), contradict the standard result obtained by Baldwin (1970, 1984)
in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework according to which home-bias public procurement is
neutral for the determination of a country’s pattern of specialisation. Trionfetti (1997)
adds public expenditure to a standard two-country/two-region CP model. To focus on
the “pure” demand effect of public expenditure, this author makes two important
simplifying assumptions excluding other effects, which could arise from alternative
uses of public resources or from taxation policies: The government spends all tax
revenues on manufactured goods, which are destroyed after the purchase. Moreover,
the income of the mobile factor, i.e. manufacturing workers’ income, is not taxed.
The additional public demand for manufactured goods increases local demand. This
creates a new demand-linked effect in the model, which can, under certain conditions,
dominate all the others and, acting as a dispersion force, may lead to a stable equi-
librium with partial spatial concentration and no catastrophic agglomeration. A crucial
result is that, by allocating a larger amount of public expenditure to the domestic
manufacturing good, for a given level of the expenditure of the other government, a
government can enlarge the share of the domestic industry: public expenditure exerts a
“pull” effect on the location of industry. Trionfetti (1997) also briefly considers the
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effects of different intergovernmental transfer schemes (pure transfers, tied aid and joint
expenditure) showing that these effects depend on how public expenditure is allocated
between sectors and domestic and foreign goods.
The above reported result of public expenditure favoring dispersion over agglom-
eration emerges independently from the employed variant of NEG framework. Trion-
fetti (2001) and Brülhart and Trionfetti (2004) accommodate for government
procurement in the VL version of the CP model (Krugman and Venables 1995). The
differentiated manufacturing good is used as an intermediate input by the manufacturing
sector itself as well as by national governments for the provision of public services.
When public procurement is home-biased, industrial agglomeration cannot occur. One
or three long-run equilibria may exist depending on the parameter settings. If countries
are identical, the central equilibrium is symmetric and can be either stable or unstable. In
the latter case, the industrial sector partially agglomerates in one country (the one with
the larger initial endowment of the mobile factor), with the second country keeping
some industry: public expenditure exerts a “spread” effect on industry. In Trionfetti
(2001), it is also shown that home-biased public procurement may reduce inequalities
and, under speciﬁc circumstances, be welfare improving. Brülhart and Trionfetti (2004)
put forward an empirical analysis aiming to validate the main predictions of their model
concerning the “pull” and “spread” effects of home-biased public procurement.
The group of models dealing with the effects of productivity-enhancing public
spending includes, among others, Brakman et al. (2002 and 2008) where the FE model is
extended in order to include a government sector, which directly produces public goods
that may enhance regional competitiveness. Public goods – produced under a constant
returns of scale (CRS) technology that uses only variable human capital – are “pro-
ductive” in that they reduce both ﬁxed and variable costs of manufacturing ﬁrms1.
Brakman et al. (2008) assume that the amount of public capital is ﬁxed; whereas in
Brakman et al. (2002), public capital is a share of the overall capital. Another difference
between the two models is that in the latter one public goods also affects the individuals’
utility function. Two important features of these analyses are as follows. First, the
provision of public goods is ﬁnanced by a uniform income tax. A tax levied also on the
mobile factor acts as a spreading force. Second, the effect of public goods on factors’
productivity is entirely local, reinforcing agglomeration. The main conclusions of these
works are: When equal amounts of public goods are provided in the two regions, an
increase of such provision perturbates the equilibrium between agglomeration and
dispersion forces, thus fostering agglomeration if sufﬁciently large. When the provision
of public goods in the two regions is asymmetric, numerical evidence shows that the
attractiveness of locations is influenced by their endowments of public goods, con-
ﬁrming that the “pull” effect of public expenditure, as partial agglomeration occurs in the
region with the larger endowment of public goods. However, if in one of the two regions
public expenditure is more effective in reducing production costs or public capital is
more efﬁcient in the production of the public good, Brakman et al. (2002) show that even
1 The ﬁxed cost component embodies knowledge-intensive activities such as “R&D, marketing and
management”; whereas both ﬁxed and variable costs are affected by the quality of social and
economic infrastructures.
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if this region has a lower endowment of public or private inputs it could still attract the
larger share of the manufacturing industry. Finally, when cost reduction is sufﬁciently
large to offset the tax increase necessary to ﬁnance its production public expenditure
may also have a positive impact on the overall number of ﬁrms of the economy.
The ﬁrst group of models, focussing on the demand effect, deliberately abstract
from the productivity effect: Typically, public expenditure affects industrial location
through demand, while any impact on factors’ productivity is neglected as public
intervention is not assumed to affect the production function in the manufacturing
sector. In the same manner, scholars dealing with the productivity effect deliberately
abstract from the demand effect. The contributions by Commendatore et al. (2008,
2009 and 2010) are at the crossroads between these two groups of models as they
suggest to jointly study the interplay between the demand and productivity effects of
public policy in the same framework.
The framework chosen by Commendatore et al. (2008) is a two-region CC model
with mobile capital, which extends the FC model allowing for the endogenous
construction/depreciation of capital goods. In the model the asymmetric regional dis-
tribution of the immobile factor (labour) between the North (the “rich” or “advanced”
region) and the South (the “poor” or “backward” region) translate into different market
sizes. The overall economy is composed of four sectors: agriculture, manufacturing,
investment sector and government sector. In the investment sector the mobile factor
(capital) is produced under perfect competition with a CRS technology involving the
use of labour. Capital is used in ﬁxed amounts both by the government (as the only
production factor with a CRS technology) and in manufacturing (coupled with the
variable labour input). A central (national) government produces a local public good,
which enhances labour productivity in the investment and manufacturing sectors.2 In
this framework the authors address two main questions revealing a possible trade-off
between overall efﬁciency and regional equity: how the provision and the ﬁnancing of
productive public investments impact on the overall stock of private capital and on its
distribution across the regions.
An increase in the provision of productivity-enhancing public capital does not
always increase the overall private capital as the regional and sectoral distribution of the
public investments matters. The “productivity” effect tends to increase private capital,
while a “crowding-out” effect between public and private investments works in the
opposite direction. Assuming that the investment sector agglomerates where its pro-
duction is less costly and that the provision of the public good occurs in the other region,
the overall capital stock will unambiguously decline due to the “crowding-out effect”.
On the other hand, if the provision of public goods occurs in the region where the
investment good sector is located and the productivity gain in that sector is sufﬁciently
large to overcome the “crowding out” effect, the overall capital stock will increase.
Concerning the effect on the allocation of private capital between the regions, the
long-run outcome depends on the combined impact of the two possible effects of public
2 As in Brakman et al. (2002) the overall capital stock is composed of public and private capital. On
the other hand, differently from that contribution, local public goods (public expenditure in research,
innovation and education) do not enter in agents’ utility.
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expenditure on manufacturing production: the “productivity effect” – a larger provision
of public services in one region, by lowering the labour input requirement, attracts ﬁrms
to that region; and the “demand effect” – the tax rise necessary to ﬁnance such provision,
by contracting private expenditure for manufactures, induces a non-favorable change in
the relative market size, driving away ﬁrms from that region. The relevant policy
conclusion is that a central government whose aim is to reduce regional inequalities, can
choose a suitable ﬁnancing scheme for public expenditure that could weaken the
demand effect inducing ﬁrms to relocate in the backward region. The demand effect will
be negligible if also taxpayers residing in the advanced region contribute on the basis of
their income to the ﬁnancing. Finally, it is also possible that the provision of public
goods in the South could, even in the presence of the “crowding-out” effect, increase the
local level of private capital or could improve welfare in that region.
These results are in general conﬁrmed in the much simpler FC setting without
investment sector considered by Commendatore et al. (2009), where it is shown that the
provision of a productivity-enhancing local public good may redistribute the industrial
activity, counterbalancing differences in market sizes between regions. Furthermore, it
is also conﬁrmed that the process of agglomeration in the larger region following
market integration could be slowed down or even overturned by increasing sufﬁciently
the provision of productive public expenditure.
Commendatore et al. (2010) relax the assumption of pure local effects of productive
public expenditure within a FC framework. Focusing on the case of R&D public
expenditure, the authors explore how knowledge creation and diffusion across regions
impinges upon the processes of spatial agglomeration and dispersion. The
productivity-enhancing effect of public expenditure takes place by lowering ﬁxed costs
in the manufacturing sector, so that the number of ﬁrms may vary even if the number of
capital units is given. Hence, public policy can impact on the endogenous number of
ﬁrms as well. Two possible scenarios are studied. In the ﬁrst scenario, knowledge
spillovers – in the form of new ideas generated in public universities and research
institutions – are (perfectly) global beneﬁtting all ﬁrms independently of their location.
In this scenario, public policy is able to affect the number of ﬁrms as a lower number of
these units is required for each variety of the manufactured good: an increase in public
expenditure unambiguously increase the total number of varieties. On the other hand,
public policy is unable to affect the regional distribution of capital units. However, if
the productivity effect is weak, the demand effect can reduce the dimension of the
industrial sector in the region that ﬁnances public expenditure. In the second scenario,
knowledge spillovers are (partially/perfectly) local. The impact of knowledge on
productivity gains is spatially limited depending on its local speciﬁcity and on the
absorbing capacity of ﬁrms, so that knowledge generated by R&D activities beneﬁts
ﬁrms, which are located in the region where public expenditures occurs. In this sce-
nario, as in Commendatore et al. (2008 and 2009), both productivity and demand
effects play a role in determining the equilibrium regional shares of capital as well as
the number of varieties produced in each region. Moreover, it is shown that the rela-
tionship between the overall number of ﬁrms and public expenditure could be
non-monotonic. These results hold in the dispersed equilibrium, when the at least some
industry is located in both regions. In an agglomerated equilibrium, when industrial
sector is concentrated only in one region, the total number of ﬁrms always increases
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with public expenditure except in the case of perfectly local spillovers when industry is
agglomerated in the region where the R&D activities do not occur. This conclusion
reveals a trade-off between efﬁciency and equity, which typically emerges in models
where the appropriability of knowledge has a spatial dimension.
Recently, so-called new economic geography and growth (NEGG) models intro-
duce a R&D sector to explain the dynamic processes giving rise to spatial agglomer-
ation and growth. This strand of NEG literature – which jointly considers the spatial
and the temporal dimension of the economic development – is mainly based on the
endogenous growth models of the Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990)
type. NEGG models abandon the typical NEG assumption of a ﬁxed stock of resources,
bringing to the fore the trade-growth relationship (Martin and Ottaviano 1999; Baldwin
et al. 2003; Fujita and Thisse 2002; Dupont 2007; Cerina and Mureddu 2012; and for
reviews Baldwin et al. 2003, Chap. 7; Baldwin and Martin 2004; Cerina and Pigliaru
2007; and Breinlich et al. 2014). The main engine of growth is technological change
due to R&D investments and the spatial diffusion of knowledge plays a fundamental
role. Moreover, once it is taken into account that knowledge spillovers may exhaust
their effect with distance, NEGG models predict a potential trade-off between accu-
mulation and territorial cohesion, giving rise to uneven growth. This extends to the
very long-run the government dilemma over the choice between efﬁciency and equity.
A paradigmatic example of a NEGGmodel exploring how public policy may impact
on agglomeration and growth is the dynamic version of the FC model put forward by
Martin and Rogers (1995) and (1998, 1999) and reformulated in Baldwin et al. (2003,
Chap. 17). As in Martin and Rogers (1995), in Martin (1998, 1999) public policy may
improve intra-regional transport infrastructure – facilitating domestic trade (transport
infrastructures, law and contract enforcement and network communications) – and
inter-regional/international transport infrastructures – facilitating trade between regions
(international communication and transportation system). Moreover, in the presence of
partially local spillovers, better transport infrastructures may improve inter-regional
knowledge transfer. Envisaging a more advanced region (North) where the investment
sector is located and a backward region (South), it is possible to single out the effects of
speciﬁc policies and study how they can mitigate/exacerbate the trade-off between
equity and efﬁciency: (i) a persistent income transfer to the South reduces income
inequality and favours dispersion of the economic activity at the cost of a lower growth
rate of the overall economy; (ii) an investment in local (intra-regional) infrastructures in
the South may reduce spatial equity at the cost of a larger north-south and
capitalists-workers income inequality and a smaller rate of growth of the overall
economy; (iii) an investment in (inter-regional) infrastructures favours agglomeration in
the North but reduces income inequalities and enhances the growth of the overall
economy. Finally, (iv) policies aiming to increase the spatial diffusion of knowledge
(such as, investment in telecommunication infrastructures, in internet access or in
human capital, and so on) does not suffer the trade-off between equity and efﬁciency.
Indeed, such a policy may reduce both spatial and income inequalities in correspon-
dence of a higher rate of growth of the whole economy.
A limit shared by all the above discussed analyses is that they only consider
economies composed of two regions, not allowing for third-region (indirect) effects and
complex feedbacks emerging in a multi-region framework or on the role of geography
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(characterizing the accessibility of regions or their endowments of immobile factors or
natural resources, and so on) shaping this framework. Indeed, in the words of Desmet
and Rossi-Hansberg (2010, p. 44): “[t]he focus on a small number of locations does not
allow this literature to capture the richness of the observed distribution of economic
activity across space, thus restricting the way these models are able to connect with the
data”. Thus, according to these authors, the assumption of a small number or regions
represents the greatest weakness of NEGG (and a fortiori NEG) models. In various
contributions, these authors (see Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg 2009, 2010 and 2014) put
forward a theory of spatial development in which space, and therefore the number of
locations, is represented as a continuum. Behrens et al. (2007) put forward a study on a
spatial network composed of nine regions with a speciﬁc geography (part of the network
has a tree structure and another a circular structure), clarifying that it is not easy (excepts
for speciﬁc network conﬁgurations) to derive clear-cut general analytic results and
therefore to develop the welfare analysis necessary to formulate policy recommenda-
tions. In their speciﬁc set-up standard results related to preferential trade agreements
(which have a global impact over the network) should be better speciﬁed taking into
account changes in transport infrastructures (whose impact has a more local nature).
The richness of results delivered in multi-region frameworks dealing with the
importance of different public policies can be exempliﬁed by referring to the attempts
made in the three regions case. Baldwin et al. (2003, Chap. 17) consider an economy
where three regions are allocated equidistantly on a line representing a hub-and-spoke
economy, where the central region is poor and the two at the borders are rich. They
show that the result according to which an increase in interregional infrastructures
favors agglomeration in the rich region (Martin and Rogers 1995; Martin 1998 and
1999) is overturned depending on the balancing between the “home market” effect
favoring the two rich regions and the “central place” effect giving an advantage to the
poor region.
Forslid (1994) conﬁrms that results, which hold in a two-region context cannot
always be applied when three regions are considered. This author extends the standard
static FC model by introducing three (advanced, intermediate, and poor) regions with
different size evaluating how different policies may counterbalance the effects of trade
integration. With no policy intervention, at initial stages economic integration leads to
deindustrialization in the smaller region (with both the larger and the indeterminate
gaining industry) and at later stages to full agglomeration in the larger region (with the
intermediate region losing all industry). Relocation of governmental agencies to the
periphery, i.e. to one of the smaller regions, could counteract this process. However, if
only public capital is transferred to the smaller region, if integration is not complete the
reduction of private capital stock in the intermediate region is larger than the stock of
governmental capital shifted to the smaller region, thus the net gain for the two
peripheral regions following the policy is negative. Relocating public employees as
well may advantage both the large and the intermediate region when integration is not
too strong. Instead, relocating government capital in the intermediate region may lead
to an equal capital distribution between the larger and the intermediate region.
Investment in transport infrastructures reducing distance between the larger region and
the other two strongly favours the ﬁrst, which becomes a hub, whereas the smaller
peripheral region suffers an acceleration of deindustrialization. The same would apply
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to the smaller region by reducing its distance with the intermediate region. The latter
gains all the industry with trade liberalization. Finally, regional subsidies to capital
granted to the smaller region ﬁnanced by a proportional nation-wide labour income tax.
This may lead, with partial liberalization, to the disappearance of the industry in the
smaller region. However, the smaller region may rapidly reindustrialize when inte-
gration progress further.
Such a paradoxical result on the effect of subsidies to poor regions also applies to
the case of two asymmetric regions studied by Dupont and Martin (2006) in a static FC
model. These authors study the effects of four types of subsidy schemes in a static FC
model with two asymmetric regions (again labelled North and South), the ﬁrst couple
designed to encourage ﬁrms relocation to the poor region and the second couple to
boost production in that region:
(i) a subsidy proportional to (operating) proﬁts granted to ﬁrms located in the South
ﬁnanced by a national income tax. This subsidy program determines a shift of
the industry to the South (ﬁrms relocate where subsidies to proﬁt are supplied)
but a worsening of income distribution between workers and capitalists (proﬁt
rise in both regions but a larger number of capital owners lives the North);
(ii) a subsidy to proﬁts granted to ﬁrms located in the South ﬁnanced by a local
income tax. The signs of the effects just mentioned are the same but the mag-
nitudes are different: the relocation of ﬁrms to the South is smaller and the effect
upon and income inequality is larger;
(iii) a subsidy to production (and thus to employment) in the South ﬁnanced by an
economy-wide taxation. Higher competition in the labour market induces a rise
in wages, income inequalities are reduced and relocation to the South is more
pronounced compared to the two previous schemes;
(iv) a subsidy to production in the South ﬁnanced by local taxation. Since taxes (and
higher wages) are paid locally, there is no ﬁscal transfer from the North to the
South. Higher proﬁts are repatriated to the North reproducing the same effects of
a subsidy to proﬁts ﬁnanced locally.
3 Tax Competition and Agglomeration
A key conclusion of the traditional tax competition literature is that tax competition
leads to a loss of industrial capital to competing countries. This conclusion is based on
the following mechanism. Given that capital owners are interested in their after-tax
income, assuming that they are taxed according to source principle (i.e. according to
the rules speciﬁc to the country where income is generated), the comparison of
international tax rates will affect and distort international capital allocation.3
3 A well-known result from the public ﬁnance literature is that capital income taxation according to the
source principle may lead to a distortionary allocation of capital across countries. Thus, the residence
principle, which does not affect capital owners location decisions, is preferable. However, as shown
by Commendatore and Kubin (2016) in a NEG framework, once one allows for a different sectoral
composition between private and public expenditures, the difference between the two taxation
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Producers will move to whichever country has the lowest tax rates and countries will
experience falling tax rates in the attempt to attract or hold on productive activities in
order to raise local tax revenues. This is in a nutshell the well-known result of the “race
to the bottom” of competing governments: countries that try to set a lower tax rate than
their neighbors may end up taxing capital income not at all.4
As recalled by Andersson and Forslid (2003), key features of tax competition
models are: the coexistence of immobile workers and mobile capital, and the question
to what extent public goods can be ﬁnanced by means of taxes on mobile capital. The
“race to the bottom” conclusion will imply that taxation of the mobile factor will be
distorted downwards compared with a situation where all factors are immobile, thus
leading to an inefﬁcient provision of public goods. In this perspective, co-ordination or
harmonization of international tax policies is an issue. Typically, tax harmonization
entails a shift from a non-cooperative tax game to a cooperative tax game, and Pareto
improvement from the government’s perspective follows by deﬁnition (Baldwin and
Krugman 2004).
NEG scholars have shown that this result does not hold in the presence of signiﬁcant
agglomeration economies and goods market integration, and have formally demon-
strated that tax competition over mobile productive factors is affected by industrial
agglomeration. The general argument rests on the result that increased economic inte-
gration leads imperfectly competitive ﬁrms (capital owners) to beneﬁt from agglom-
eration rents that can be taxed. Baldwin et al. (2003) show that such rents arise in a wide
range of NEG models. This will allow a country to raise its tax without losing capital
and/or its industrial base, thus leading to a “race to the top” rather than a “race to the
bottom”. As argued by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), wealthier countries offer capital
favourable external economies and, within limits, this allows them to hold on to mobile
factors of production even while levying higher tax rates than less advanced nations.
However, should the tax rate get too high, the results could be catastrophic: “not only
will capital move abroad, but because that movement undermines agglomeration
economies it may be irreversible” (Baldwin and Krugman 2004, p. 2).
NEG models with public spending (see previous section) often assume some sort of
taxation for the ﬁnancing of public services; however, in that literature, governments
typically do not engage in tax competition. In the following, we review models of tax
competition involving typical NEG features such as imperfect competition, trade costs
and agglomeration rents and thus departing from traditional tax competition analyses.
(Footnote 3 continued)
schemes is less clear-cut. Taxation on the basis of the residence principle is not neutral and may lead to
capital relocation; whereas depending on how tax revenues are allocated between manufactured and
agricultural goods, the corresponding change in the market size may reduce the distortionary effect of
taxation according to the source principle.
4 As summarized by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), the standard tax-competition literature works with
a one period model featuring a single good produced by two factors. Labour is immobile between
locations and capital is mobile. Trade costs are zero, ﬁrms face perfect competition and constant
returns, so there is no trade among regions and capital faces smoothly diminishing returns. Typically,
governments choose the capital tax rate in a Nash game. The standard approach is to compare
equilibrium tax rates with no capital mobility and with perfect capital mobility. The standard result is
such that equilibrium taxes are sub-optimally low.
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While the tax competition and agglomeration literature shares the common
assumption of mobile capital, NEG models with tax competition have originally
explored the case of labour mobility. Accordingly, seminal models can be classiﬁed
according to whether they work under the assumption of labour (Ludema and Wooton
2000, Andersson and Forslid 2003) or capital/entrepreneur mobility (Kind et al. 2000;
Baldwin and Krugman 2004; Ottaviano and Ypersele 2005; Borck and Pflüger 2006).
Regardless differences in the mobility assumption – and other technical aspects – a
general feature, as opposed to traditional tax competition outcomes, is that results
depend on the degree of production agglomeration. Typically, when the mobile factor
is concentrated, the associated the taxable rents imply that taxes will remain high
without inducing relocation, provided that – in general – the international tax gap is
smaller than the agglomeration rent.
Ludema and Wooton (2000) were the ﬁrst to recognize the lack of theoretical work
on the link between the two related issues arising from deeper economic integration:
the erosion of ﬁscal autonomy experienced by integrating countries brought about by
more mobile tax bases; and the spatial agglomeration of economic activity driven by
divergent economic structures and incomes across the integrating countries. In moti-
vating their interest in bringing together the two issues in a NEG framework, the
authors explain the additional mechanism induced by international tax competition by
which economic integration can have distributional consequences, thus providing the
general rational at the core of the subsequent literature. That is, while agglomeration
alters the distribution of income across countries, tax competition influences the dis-
tribution of income across factors. In Ludema and Wooton (2000) words, “if immobile
factors compete to create or maintain a core by offering low (or negative) taxes to
mobile manufacturing labor, they run the risk that much of the potential gain to having
a core is dissipated in the process. If so, then agglomerative forces coupled with the tax
competition may impoverish immobile factors, regardless of location” (Ludema and
Wooton 2000, p. 333). For this reason, the question to be addressed is whether eco-
nomic integration, by strengthening agglomerative forces, will intensify tax competi-
tion and will thus result in lower equilibrium taxes or not.
In order the answer to this question, Ludema and Wooton (2000) modify the
Krugman (1991) model in two aspects. First, manufacturing ﬁrms are quantity-setting
(Cournot) oligopolists, as opposed to the monopolistic competition approach com-
monly taken in NEG models. This departure allows obtaining closed-form solutions,
while preserving all of the relevant characteristics of Krugman's model. Second,
manufacturing workers are assumed to be imperfectly mobile. This assumption enables
to study the effects of economic integration on the intensity of tax competition under
two notions of international integration modelled as either an increase in factor mobility
or as a reduction in trade costs on goods. They conclude that integration interpreted as
decreasing trade costs reduces the intensity of tax competition, thus restoring rather
than eroding ﬁscal autonomy. On the other hand, integration interpreted as increased
labor mobility has mixed effects.
Andersson and Forslid (2003) use the Forslid and Ottaviano (1999) version of the
Krugman (1991) model to study the effects of taxes on skilled and unskilled workers on
the location of manufacturing production. In the model, proportional taxes on immobile
unskilled workers and mobile skilled workers ﬁnance country-speciﬁc public goods.
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The authors study the impact of taxes on the stability of a dispersed equilibrium and
ﬁnd that it depends on the relationship between taxes on mobile labor and taxes on
immobile labor. In particular, a small tax redistribution from mobile to immobile
workers makes the dispersed equilibrium unstable, causing a catastrophic agglomera-
tion where all skilled workers end up in one country. In line with Ludema and Woodon
(2000), once the agglomeration is established and the related agglomeration rents arise,
taxes on mobile workers are not generally driven down to some minimum in the “core”
country as predicted by traditional tax competition.
As opposed to Ludema and Wooton (2000) and Andersson and Forslid (2003),
Kind et al. (2000) investigate how spatial agglomeration of economic activity affects
the outcome of capital tax competition in a NEG framework with mobile capital, thus
obtaining results directly comparable with those obtained in the traditional literature on
capital tax competition. They show that the outcome of tax competition depends on the
interaction between two forces of agglomeration: trade costs and pecuniary externali-
ties. The analysis considers the two alternative scenarios of capital (and ﬁrms) either
concentrated in one single location or evenly distributed between two countries. When
capital is concentrated in one single country, a government may be able to exploit the
locational rents created by agglomeration forces through a positive source tax and this
in turn will lead to an increase in national welfare. This result is in line with the
conclusion of Ludema and Woodon (2000) as it shows that increased economic inte-
gration achieved via lower trade costs allows a country to raise its tax on mobile capital
without losing productive resources. Indeed, since agglomeration makes capital
effectively immobile due to pecuniary externalities, the host country gains from setting
its source-tax on capital above that of the other country, thus increasing its welfare per
capita. In the opposite case of industrial activities evenly spread across countries, the
equilibrium outcome is such that both countries provide a subsidy of equal size to
capital.
Perhaps the most well-known contribution in this ﬁeld is the one by Baldwin and
Krugman (2004), which challenges the idea that the integrating nations should agree on
common tax rates in order to avoid the “race to the bottom” and undermine their
relatively generous welfare states. Its popularity is probably due to two reasons. First,
the policy implication it carries on the desirability of tax harmonization. Second, the
capability it has to explain observed corporate tax differentials in integrating regions
such as European Union in terms of external economies due to agglomeration forces.
The results of Baldwin and Krugman (2004) are obtained within the solvable variant of
the model of Krugman (1991) due to Forslid (1999), where the two otherwise identical
countries have different tax rates. Entrepreneurs are the mobile factor, while workers
are immobile. Agglomeration forces imply that the real reward of entrepreneurs
includes a location speciﬁc agglomeration rent. That is, entrepreneurs located in the
country that initially has the core strictly prefer to locate there and would thus be
willing to bear a higher tax in order to be there. There exists a bell-shaped relationship
between agglomeration rents (and tax rates that entrepreneurs are willing to pay) and
trade openness. Indeed, when trade is impossible, ﬁrms cannot serve both markets from
a single location and agglomeration is not possible. At the opposite extreme, when
trade is completely free, location is irrelevant and agglomeration is useless. Hence, the
importance of agglomeration is greatest (the tax rate the entrepreneurs is higher)
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at intermediate values of openness (where agglomeration is both feasible and useful).
This implies that size of the locational rent is a bell-shaped function of the level of
integration, so the tax gap ﬁrst widens before narrowing as integration increases. From
the policy perspective, the model delivers a result in sharp contrast with the traditional
tax competition literature: harmonization makes one or both countries worse off when
agglomeration forces are present.
Interestingly, Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) contribute to the tax competition
and agglomeration literature by exploring three related issues. First, the distortions
induced by tax competition on the international allocation of capital and, as a conse-
quence, on the inefﬁcient international specialization in production. Second, the sub-
sequent inefﬁciencies caused to the pattern of international trade. Third, the impact of
these inefﬁciencies on the gap in economic development among countries. According to
the authors, the extant literature on tax competition and agglomeration – with the partial
exception represented by Baldwin and Krugman (2004) – lacks a detailed welfare
analysis able to reach a conclusion on the desirability of tax competition. Accordingly,
they propose a full-fledge global welfare analysis in a general equilibrium model in
which two countries compete for monopolistically competitive ﬁrms à la Ottaviano et al.
(2002). Results are obtained using as a benchmark the free market outcome that yields a
home market effect: the larger country hosts a more than proportionate share of ﬁrms.
Unless trade costs are low enough, such an outcome is shown to be inefﬁcient because it
leads too many ﬁrms to concentrate in the larger country. In the tax competitive out-
come, the location of ﬁrms is less concentrated than the free market one. When trade
costs are large enough to make it inefﬁcient for all ﬁrms to cluster in a single country, tax
competition for mobile ﬁrms is efﬁciency-enhancing with respect to the free market
outcome. This result is reversed as trade costs fall and clustering becomes efﬁcient.
Finally, under both free market and tax competition, the inefﬁciencies in international
specialization and trade flows vanish when trade costs are low enough. Otherwise, only
international tax coordination can implement the efﬁcient spatial distribution of ﬁrms.
All these results lead to conclude that “the policy attitude towards tax competition
should depend on the degree of trade integration…at the initial stages of an integration
process, forbidding tax competition without agreeing on tax coordination is a bad idea. It
is much less so at later stages, when the free market and the harmonization outcomes
tend to coincide” (Ottaviano and van Ypersele 2005, p. 45).
The models discussed above deal with variants of CP models with either symmetric
equilibria or equilibria with complete agglomeration. Borck and Pflüger (2006) take
one step forward and study whether the “race to the top” result suggested by previous
work generalizes to a NEG framework, which features stable locational equilibria with
only partial agglomeration of ﬁrms in one of two countries. The model draws on
Pflüger (2004)5 and shows that, in addition to the extreme outcome of complete
agglomeration, a tax differential may arise as an equilibrium of the tax game between
the two countries even when there is only partial agglomeration. In particular, in the
5 Pflüger (2004) develops a model that deviates from the standard CP model in two respects. First, it is
assumed that the ﬁxed cost in the manufacturing sector consists of a separate internationally mobile
factor (Forslid 1999; Forslid and Ottaviano 2003). Second, the Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility is
replaced by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility speciﬁcation.
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case with partial agglomeration, the partial core can maintain a positive tax gap even
though no agglomeration rent accrues to the mobile factor.
4 Trade: Unilateral Protectionism and Trade Agreements
This section reviews trade policy implications of theoretical NEG models. We discuss
unilateral actions of protection and liberalisation that aim at industrialisation, as well as
trade agreements.
The most basic, symmetric NEG models yield a counter-intuitive result when it
comes to unilateral protection. Import substitution in the form of unilateral protection
always beneﬁts the protecting region or nation (see for example Baldwin et al. 2003,
Chap. 12).6 This so-called “price-lowering-protection” (PLP) mechanism works
because the price-lowering inflow of ﬁrms into the home market exceeds the more
direct price-increasing effect of protectionism.7 Therefore, it seems that unilateral
protection is one strategy to gain welfare and attract industry. There are, however, some
qualiﬁcations to be made.
The ﬁrst one is the introduction of relocation costs. When it is costly for ﬁrms to
change location, then unilateral protection has different impacts on the price index
depending on (i) the costs of relocation, (ii) the trade openness of the respective nations
and (iii) the relative strengths of agglomeration forces in the respective nations. The
higher the costs for relocating, the more an unilateral protection will raise the price
index because the offsetting inflow of ﬁrms does not take place. The level of relocation
costs that prohibits the PLP is lower the easier it is to export to the foreign country and
the stronger are the agglomeration forces in the home market. A second qualiﬁcation to
the PLP is the fact that a country has to be large enough for ﬁrms to have an incentive
to relocate there. If the market size is too small, then unilateral protection will always
raise the price index. Third, as long as factor endowments are assumed identical, there
is no place for a comparative advantage (CA) story. Introducing such a
Heckscher-Ohlin CA alters the PLP. Baldwin et al. (2003) assume different ﬁxed costs
across regions in order to model that. CA leads to a third effect of unilateral protection
on the price index, the so-called “negative variety effect”. Asymmetric trade barriers
now have a negative effect on the total number of ﬁrms. While there exists no analytical
solution to the model anymore, the authors are able to derive results for a special case.
They ﬁnd that the PLP does not work when CA is strong enough.
As Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 297) point out, the PLP clearly is an artefact of the
speciﬁc model assumptions: “The notion that unilateral protection always lowers the
domestic price level by enticing industry to relocate is certainly one of the most
outlandish policy implications of simple economic geography models.” They use the
6 This chapter is in parts based on Puga and Venables (1997), Puga and Venables (1999) and Baldwin
(1999). The political economy side of the discussion can for example be found in Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007).
7 Unilateral protection – represented as an increase in trade costs only in one direction – increases the
price consumers have to pay for imported commodities, which involve a welfare loss similar to the
one in standard models without factor mobility.
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vertical linkages version of the FC model to show that unilateral liberalisation can lead
to industrialisation. On the one hand, liberalisation may lower the costs of imported
intermediate goods, which in turn makes the liberalising country more attractive for
ﬁrms. On the other hand, if it decreases the costs of shipping ﬁnal goods to this country,
it would make it less attractive as a location for ﬁrms. Hence, in order to attract some
industry, a country would have to liberalise the intermediate goods market without
affecting the ﬁnal goods market. However, they also show that an across-the-board
liberalisation could have a similar effect if the liberalising country is small and the other
markets are relatively large and open.
What about comparative advantage? It can be shown that in models of economic
geography, smaller, poorer countries might well be without industry despite the pos-
sible CA due to lower wages compared to the richer country. The presence of
agglomeration effects can dominate any trade or location patterns that would result
from CA. If this is the case, the effect is stronger, (i) the stronger are agglomeration
forces, (ii) the more expensive trade is, (iii) the smaller the market of the smaller
country, and (iv) the higher possible trade barriers imposed by richer industrialised
countries against manufacturing goods from smaller poorer countries. All of the
analysis above is based on the FC or the FCVL model that do not feature an
endogenous market size (because capital income is remitted back to the – regionally
immobile – capital owners). Allowing for an endogenous market size and thus intro-
ducing circular causality strengthens the argumentation.
A further topic in this discussion is tariffs and quotas. While they might be equiv-
alent in the simpler trade model, they are not in NEG models. Tariffs and quotas might
lead to relocation into the protecting country due to the “price-lowering-protection”
(PLP) effect. However, the locational equilibrium differs between quotas and tariffs,
which is due to the different recipients of the trade rents. A tariff is collected by the
protecting nation (and paid out to its residents) while a quota shifts the trade rent to the
exporting ﬁrm. Thus, the operating proﬁt for a ﬁrm exporting under a quote is larger than
for a ﬁrm that exports under a tariff. This in turn leads to a situation where ﬁrms
exporting to the protecting nation are more likely to stay where they are. This also means
that ﬁrms in the protecting nation (and the other for that matter) are more likely to lobby
for quotas than for tariffs. This is because higher proﬁts from a tariff would be driven to
zero by ﬁrms that enter the protecting nation. A quota, therefore, has a smaller effect on
the PLP because of less movement of ﬁrms and an increasing effect on proﬁts in both
trading regions.
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develop a model with ﬁrm heterogeneity to focus on
the interplay of market size, ﬁrm productivity and ﬁrm location. Unilateral liberalisa-
tion of a country leads to a decrease in competition in the liberalising country and an
increase in the other country, which is driven by the cost cut-off that determines if a
ﬁrm is productive enough to produce in a given country. The cut-off increases due to
the liberalisation. The change in competition means a welfare loss for the liberalising
country and a welfare gain in the other country. This result only holds in the long run
when ﬁrms enter markets, while the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed in the short run. In the
short run an unilateral liberalisation ﬁrst leads to a decrease of the cost cut-off resulting
in a pro-competitive effect. The increase in varieties that are exported dominates the
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exit of local producers. To summarize, unilateral liberalisation ﬁrst leads to an increase
and then a decrease in welfare.
What the above discussion makes clear is that the welfare implications from more
traditional trade models can be altered and even reversed when we consider NEG
features such as the mobility of factors. While the price lowering protection effect is
able to reverse the classical welfare implications, it very much depends on the speciﬁc
model assumptions.
The second topic that we would like to review in this section on trade policy
concerns the economic effects of preferential trade agreements. The standard analysis
uses a Heckscher Ohlin model with two countries that form a union and a third, outside
country. The union countries reduce mutual tariffs while maintaining the outside tariff,
which leads to more specialisation within the union, creates additional trade between
the countries of the union and diverts trade from the outside country to the countries
inside the union. In a NEG perspective, the focus shifts from different countries
(characterised by comparative advantages) to similar/identical countries and, in par-
ticular, factor mobility is possible. It turns out that – while the Heckscher-Ohlin results
are still visible – NEG forces substantially alter the results. Note that for these questions
multi-regional NEG models are indispensable. This stream of literature explicitly
compares models with iso-elastic and with linear demand functions, where the latter –
as pointed out above – introduces an additional dispersion force via a variable mark-up.
An early account is found in Baldwin et al. (2003, Chap. 14), which is mainly
based and expands on Puga and Venables (1997). The authors present a multiregional
footloose capital model in which demand functions are iso-elastic and capital is mobile
between all countries. Reducing internal tariffs, i.e. reducing internal trade costs,
improves market access for manufacturing ﬁrms inside the union and factor rewards
increase, which in turn attracts factors from the outside country to move into the union.
A production shifting effect occurs: the manufacturing sector inside the union grows
(due to factor migration). If countries inside the union are of different size, NEG
agglomerative processes may lead to a core-periphery pattern with all the industry
ending up in the bigger country. In addition, the authors explicitly address welfare
issues: they show that welfare in the union increases, whereas it declines in the outside
country. Monfort and Nicolini (2000) construct a two-country core-periphery model
each of which consists of two regions, in which factor mobility occurs only within
countries. The authors show that also in this model set up deeper integration inside both
countries may trigger agglomeration processes. Interestingly, the authors ﬁnd similar
results for external trade liberalisation (similar also Monfort and Van Ypersele 2003).
In a related paper, Commendatore et al. (2016) also use a footloose capital model with
two countries inside a union and one outside country and two production sectors:
agriculture that produces a homogenous commodity and manufacturing that produces
differentiated commodities. In contrast, the demand functions are linear; and factor
mobility occurs only within the union. Reducing internal trade costs again increases
manufacturing factor rewards inside the union (via a better market access), which leads
to a higher employment in manufacturing sector within the union. It is interesting to
note that the manufacturing sector grows even if ﬁrm migration from the outside
country is not possible. It grows because it attracts additional workers from the agri-
cultural sector in each of the union countries. In this sense, the union specialises in
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manufacturing and – as a mirror image – the outside country specializes in agriculture.
It leads to higher exports of the union, and to higher trade within the union. Integration,
thus, leads to specialization, trade creation and trade diversion. These effects are similar
to a Heckscher-Ohlin perspective. However, further reducing the trade costs may lead
to a predominance of agglomeration forces within the union causing a core-periphery
pattern of industrial activity. Competition is stronger in the newly formed core and –
given the linear demand functions – ﬁrms react by reducing the price and further
increasing the output. Specialization of the union in the manufacturing sector is rein-
forced, and trade creation and trade diversion become stronger. Thus, NEG forces
corroborate and modify the static Heckscher Ohlin assessment of integration areas.
Another stream of papers shifts the focus from internal integration to external trade
liberalisation, i.e. to a reduction of trade costs between the union and the outside
country. These studies stress that the impact w.r.t. regional inequalities in the union
depends upon model speciﬁcations (see Brülhart 2011). A ﬁrst group of models
incorporates iso-elastic demand functions and thus constant mark-ups. The models
typically assume that productive factors are mobile only within a country, but not
between countries. A reduction of external trade costs increases market access for both
countries within the union, agglomeration forces are strengthened, whereas competition
from the other union country becomes less important. Thus, agglomeration force
dominate and external trade liberalisation leads to internal agglomeration (see Paluzie
2001; Brülhart et al. 2004; Crozet and Koenig Soubeyran 2004; Commendatore et al.
2014). Finally, in a quite comprehensive study Zeng and Zhao (2010) study the
interaction of internal integration, external liberalization and the degree of international
factor mobility. They show that international factor mobility may actually reverse the
results obtained with internationally immobile productive factors. A second group of
models introduces additional dispersion forces: Krugman and Elizondo (1996) take into
account that factor migration leads to an increase in land rentals and commuting costs;
Behrens (2011) uses linear demand functions, which imply lower mark-ups if more
competitors operate in the markets. This additional dispersion force may actually
reverse the result: External liberalisation leads to internal dispersion instead of
agglomeration. In a related paper, Behrens et al. (2007) study the interaction of a
reduction in international and intranational trade costs. They show that “lower intra-
national transport costs foster regional divergence when international trade costs are
high enough, whereas lower international trade costs promote regional convergence
when intranational transport costs are high enough” (Behrens et al. 2007, p. 1297).
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Abstract. This chapter draws attention to a speciﬁc feature of a NEG
model that uses linear (and not iso-elastic) demand functions, namely its
ability to account for zero trade. Thus, it represents a suitable framework
to study how changes in parameters that are typical for NEG models,
such as trade costs and regional market size, not only shape the regional
distribution of economic activity, but at the same time determine the
emergence of additional trade links between formerly autarkic regions.
We survey some related papers and present a three-region framework
that potentially nests many possible trade patterns. To focus the analy-
sis, we study in more detail three speciﬁc trade patterns frequently found
in the EU trade network. We start with three autarkic regions; then we
introduce the possibility that two regions trade with each other; and,
ﬁnally, we allow for one region trading with the other two, but the lat-
ter are still not trading with each other. We ﬁnd a surprising plethora
of long-run equilibria each involving a speciﬁc regional distribution of
economic activity and a speciﬁc pattern of trade links. We show how a
reduction in trade costs shapes simultaneously industry location and the
conﬁguration of the trade network.
Keywords: Two-dimensional piecewise smooth map · Multistability ·
Basin of attraction · New Economic Geography model · Three-region
models · Trade patterns
1 Introduction
In this chapter, we address the questions of what determines the creation of trade
links between regions, and their direction, and how the presence of a trade link
may interfere with the distribution of the manufacturing activity across space.
Indeed, it easy to infer that the presence of a trade link may aﬀect the processes
of agglomeration or dispersion of such activity and, in turn, the degree of spatial
concentration of industry has a bearing on the formation of trade links by increas-
ing/reducing the accessibility of a region for outside ﬁrms. As is well-known, the
c© The Author(s) 2018
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interplay between agglomeration and dispersion forces and how it shapes the
spatial economic landscape is at the core of the new economic geography (NEG)
literature.
The NEG approach, originating from Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman
and Venables (1999) (see Baldwin et al. (2003), for a review), aims to explain
what determines the distribution of industrial activities across space. Its main
building blocks are Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, increasing returns,
CES preferences over industrial varieties and isoelastic demands, multiplica-
tive/iceberg trade costs and a dynamic mechanism based on factor migration (for
example, in Krugman’s seminal Core-Periphery model, this factor is undiﬀerenti-
ated labour; NEG model variants consider other factors such as physical capital
or skilled workers/entrepreneurs). Mainly dealing with two-region economies, the
predictions of NEG models depend on the balance between agglomeration and
dispersion forces. Most NEG models involve two forces, related to market access
and consumers’ prices, that have agglomeration eﬀects; and a third force, related
to local competition, that has a dispersion eﬀect. Which of these forces domi-
nate, depends on trade costs: in a standard NEG set-up, high trade costs favours
dispersion and low trade costs agglomeration. At intermediate trade costs, long-
term dispersion or agglomeration of the industry may prevail, depending on its
initial distribution of this sector between the regions. In the analytic perspec-
tive, this translates into coexistence of dispersion and agglomeration equilibria.
A slight change in the initial distribution of economic activities may induce a
catastrophic change from dispersion to agglomeration, switching from an equilib-
rium to another with completely diﬀerent properties. For the present question it
is important to note that – given the speciﬁc model set-up – ﬁrms always export,
except when trade costs are inﬁnite. This implication is at odds with empirical
observations, where ﬁnding zero trade is quite common.
Ottaviano et al. (2002) propose an alternative model in which ﬁrms may not
export even when trade costs are ﬁnite. Their model set up involves quadratic
preferences, implying a linear demand (elasticity depends on prices and market
fundamentals), segmented markets and additive trade costs. In Ottaviano et al.
(2002) the local competition eﬀect is reinforced by a variable mark-up. In a
two-region framework, they show the following results: high trade costs imply
dispersion; low trade costs imply agglomeration; and after a speciﬁc threshold
for trade costs the economy may experience an abrupt change from dispersion to
agglomeration. However, there is no coexistence of dispersion and agglomeration
stable equilibria. Notice that Ottaviano et al. (2002) assume that trade costs are
always suﬃciently low to allow for bilateral trade between the regions.
Within the same framework, Behrens (2004) examines the opposite case by
assuming trade costs suﬃciently high that interregional trade never occurs. This
author shows that even when regions are fully autarkic, agglomeration is still
possible. Depending on the size of the immobile demand (ﬁxing the size of the
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demand that could shift),1 dispersion, agglomeration or partial agglomeration
are possible long-run outcomes. A large immobile local demand reinforces the
dispersion forces and higher prices in autarky weakens the agglomeration ones,
so that stable coexisting partial agglomeration equilibria are possible. More-
over, by reducing the size of immobile demand a smooth process from dispersion
to agglomeration takes place. In a later paper, Behrens (2005) examines the
case of intermediate trade costs, showing that, depending on the initial indus-
try distribution across space and on trade costs, diﬀerent trade patterns may
emerge between two regions: autarky, unilateral or bilateral trade (alternatively,
no trade, one-way trade or two-way trade). This author addresses also the inter-
play between patterns of trade and of regional distribution of economic activity.
He shows that unilateral trade favours agglomeration forces over dispersion forces
leading to the concentration of industry in the region that, in an initial stage,
has the larger share of industry.2
Ago et al. (2006) consider an economy where three regions takes a speciﬁc
hub-and-spoke conﬁguration: they are aligned with the central region positioned
at the same distance from the two peripheral ones. Dealing with the case of
linear demand,3 the authors show that in an economy with an intermediate size
of the manufacturing a reduction in trade costs intially leads to a reduction
in the share of the mobile factor located in the central region; subsequently, it
leads to an increase; ﬁnally, when trade costs are suﬃciently low, the mobile
factor is fully agglomerated in the central region. Instead, when the size of the
manufacturing sector (shifting demand) is relatively large compared to the agri-
cultural sector (immobile demand) by reducing trade costs the share of industry
in the central region shrinks and the mobile factor moves to the peripheral ones
(ﬁnally agglomerating in one of them). In the linear framework, the competi-
tion eﬀect is more intense, thus, ﬁrms have a move to the peripheral regions to
1 More speciﬁcally, Behrens (2004) considers the size of the immobile factor, agricul-
tural workers. However, taking into account that agricultural workers receive the
same wage independently of their location, in our discussion we can safely refer to
these agents demand.
2 Okubo et al. (2014) consider the emergence of diﬀerent trade patterns between two
regions with diﬀerent exogenous population sizes. They assume that the mobile
factor is physical capital (separated from owner), this eliminates the agglomeration
self-reinforcing eﬀect linked to demand shifting.
3 Indeed the main purpose of Ago et al. (2006) paper is to compare the two alternative
NEG approaches. Their main conclusion is that moving from autarky to trade, the
central region enjoys a locational advantage in the CES framework; whereas, in the
linear demand framework, the apparently better location translates into a second
nature disadvantage due to enhanced competition.
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protect themselves from such competition.4 Moreover, conﬁning their analysis
to a neighbourhood of the symmetric equilibrium, Ago et al. (2006) shows what
patterns of trade may emerge, following a reduction in trade costs, given the
speciﬁc geography assumed.
Finally, Commendatore et al. (2017) consider a three-region developing econ-
omy with poor infrastructure. A speciﬁc geography is assumed: two regions are
relatively close to each other, whereas the third one is remote and diﬃcult to
access. Two stages of development are considered: in the ﬁrst stage trade costs
are so high that none of the regions trade; in the second stage, the ﬁrst two
regions improve their integration by lowering trade costs. Depending on the
degree of integration and on the distribution of the industrial activity across the
regions, diﬀerent trade patterns may emerge (no trade, one-way trade or two
way trade), but they only involve the two more integrated regions.
In this chapter we extend and/or integrate these contributions. We repre-
sent a small trade network, formed by three regions, aiming to: (i) highlight
how distance and trade costs may determine the existence of a trade link and
its direction; (ii) examine the long-term consequences of trade integration on
the emergence/disappearance of trade links and on the distribution of economic
activities across space; (iii) explore how the spatial distribution of economic
activities and the presence/absence of trade links are interrelated. Given the
large number of possible trade structures, we only consider three examples, rep-
resenting three frequently realized trade patterns in the EU trade network (see
Basile et al. (2016)): three regions in autarky; two regions engaging in trade with
each other, with a third region in autarky; a hub and spoke economy but with
a diﬀerent structure from that suggested by Ago et al. (2006).
We structure the paper as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the basic economic
framework, introducing three examples modelling trade network structures fre-
quently realized in real world economies. In Sect. 3, we presents the short-run
equilibrium solutions for these models. In Sect. 4, we move on to the discussion
of the properties of the long-run equilibria and their economic interpretation.
Section 5 concludes.
4 We found few other contributions dealing with multiregional economies which
employes Ottaviano et al. (2002) framework. Behrens (2011) and Commendatore
et al. (2016) consider a two-country 3-region model where factor migration is lim-
ited to the two regions belonging to the same country. Tabuchi et al. (2005) focus
on cities rather than regions, allowing for “urban costs”. Moreover, they do not
study the emerging of diﬀerent trade patterns (ﬁrms export to any city). Finally,
Furusawa and Konishi (2007) explore the formation of free trade networks. They
assume a given distribution of the industrial activity (conﬁning their analysis to the
short-run) and, in a network formation game setting, show how trade agreements
are formed.
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2 The Model
2.1 Basic Set-Up
The economy is composed of three regions (labelled r = 1, 2, 3) distributed asym-
metrically across space; two sectors, Agriculture (A) and manufacturing (M).
The ﬁrst characterized by perfect competition, constant returns and production
of a homogeneous good and the second by monopolistic competition, increas-
ing returns and production of a diﬀerentiated good; two factors of production,
unskilled labour or simply labour (L) and skilled labour or entrepreneurial activ-
ity (E). Regions have the same endowment of labour. Workers are immobile,
whereas entrepreneurs are allowed to migrate across regions.
2.2 Production
In the A-sector one unit of labour gives one unit of output. In the M -sector
production requires use of one entrepreneur as ﬁxed component plus η units of
labour for each additional unit of output. The total cost of production (TC)
corresponds to:
TC = πi + wηqi,
where πi represents the operating proﬁts and the remuneration of an entre-
preneur, w the wage rate, η the labour input requirement and qi the quantity
produced of variety i.
Due to increasing returns and absence of economies of scope, each ﬁrm pro-
duces a single variety. Following the assumption that only one entrepreneur is
required to activate production, the number of entrepreneurs (E) is equal to the
number of ﬁrms and to the number of varieties (N). Denoting by Λr the share
of entrepreneurs located in region r, the number of varieties produced in that
region is:
Nr = λrN = λrE,
where 0 ≤ λr ≤ 1,
3∑
r=1
λr = 1 and r = 1, 2, 3.
2.3 Utility
The representative consumer’s (unskilled or entrepreneur) preferences are quasi-
linear (see Ottaviano et al. 2002), composed of a quadratic part deﬁning the
choice across the n varieties of the M -good and a linear component for the
consumption of the A-good:
U = α
n∑
i=1
ci −
(
β − δ
2
) N∑
i=1
c2i −
δ
2
(
N∑
i=1
ci
)2
+ CA (1)
where ci is the consumption of variety i and CA the consumption of the agricul-
tural good. The parameters are interpreted as follows: α > 0 is the intensity of
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preference over the M -varieties, δ > 0 the degree of substitutability across those
varieties and the diﬀerence β − δ measures the taste for variety; where α > 0
and β > δ > 0.
The budget constraint is
n∑
i=1
pici + pACA = y + pACA (2)
where pi is the price of variety i including trade costs, pA is the price of the agricul-
tural good, y is the consumer’s income andCA is her endowment of the agricultural
good, suﬃciently large to allow for positive consumption in equilibrium.
2.4 Trade Costs
The cost of trading varieties of the M -good from r to s (or in the opposite
direction from s to r) is Trs (= Tsr); Trs > 0 for r = s and Trr = 0, with
r = 1, 2, 3. Trade costs separate the regions. Diﬀerent combinations are possible,
we will consider here three examples and leave to future research more general
cases:
1. In the ﬁrst example, all regions are in autarky: we assume that trade cost are
suﬃciently high that no trade can occur between the regions, independently
of other factors (esp. the distribution of the economic activity across the
regions). In this example, we assume that the cost of trading the M -varieties
is very large and, for the sake of simplicity, it is the same for all the regions:
T12 = T13 = T23 = T  0. The speciﬁc value that T should take will be
detailed below.
2. In the second example, only regions 1 and 2 may trade with each other, while
region 3 is still in autarky. In this example, we assume T12 = T − ε and
T13 = T23 = T , where 0 < ε < T (this implies T12 < T13 = T23). One-way
trade from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 1 or two-way trade between 1 and 2 can occur
for ε suﬃciently close to T .
3. In the third example, the three regions are positioned along a ‘Hub and spoke’
structure. Region 1 is the central and regions 2 and 3 are peripheral. In
this example, we consider a special case: trade costs between region 1 and
2 and so small that these two regions are always engaged in bilateral trade
independently of other factors (esp. the distribution of the economic activity
across space); region 1 and 3 may trade as well; whereas no trade between 2
and 3 can occur. With respect to the other two examples, region 3 is getting
closer to region 1 but is still too far from region 2. In this example, we
assume T12 = τ , T13 = and T23 = T , where 0 < ψ < T and where τ is
suﬃciently small to allow always for two-way trade between 1 and 2 (this
implies T12 = τ ≤ T − ψ < T ). The speciﬁc value that τ should take will be
detailed below. One-way trade from 1 to 3 or from 3 to 1 or two-way trade
between 1 and 2 can occur for ε suﬃciently close to T .
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3 Short-Run Equilibrium
In a short-run equilibrium, the distribution of entrepreneurs across space is given.
All markets are in equilibrium. We choose the agricultural good as the numeraire.
From perfect competition in the A-sector, it follows: pA = w = 1.
To determine the short-run equilibrium solutions related to the M -sector, we
proceed as follows.
Maximizing the utility (1) subject to the constraint (2), we obtain the ﬁrst
order conditions for i = 1, ...N :
∂U
∂ci
= α − (β − δ)ci − δ
N∑
i=1
ci − pi = 0
from which
pi = α − (β − δ)ci − δ
N∑
i=1
ci .
Solving this system for ci, we obtain the individual linear demand function for
each variety i:
ci = max[0, a − (b + cN)pi + cP ] (3)
where P =
N∑
i=1
pi is the price index and
a =
α
(N − 1)δ + β , b =
1
(N − 1)δ + β , c =
δ
(β − γ)[(N − 1)δ + β] .
Moreover, ci > 0 for pi < p˜i = a+cPb+cN , p˜i representing the cut-oﬀ price below
which demand for variety i is positive.
The representative consumer’s indirect utility corresponds to
V = S + y + CA
where S is the consumer’s surplus:
S = U −
N∑
i=1
pici − CA = a
2N
2b
+
b + cN
2
N∑
i=1
p2i − aP −
c
2
P 2
The consumer’s demand originating from region s(= 1, 2, 3) for a good pro-
duced in region r(= 1, 2, 3), dropping the subscript i because of symmetric ﬁrm
behaviour, is:
crs = max [0, a − (b + cN)prs + cPs]
where prs is the price of a good produced in region r and consumed in region s;
and
Ps =
3∑
k=1
Nkpks =
3∑
k=1
λkEpks (4)
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is the price index in region s(= 1, 2, 3). As before crs > 0 if and only if prs < p˜r =
a+cPs
b+cN , where p˜r is the cut-oﬀ price above which demand is positive (r, s = 1, 2, 3).
Taking into account that L1 = L2 = L3 = L3 , with segmented markets, the
operating proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in r(= 1, 2, 3) is:
πr =
3∑
s=1
(prs − η − Trs)qrs
(
L
3
+ λsE
)
(5)
In a short-run equilibrium, demand is equal to supply in each segmented
market s(= 1, 2, 3): qrs = crs. From proﬁt maximization, recalling that N = E
and that ﬁrms consider the price index as given, the ﬁrst order conditions for
r, s = 1, 2, 3 follow:
∂πr
∂prs
= [a + (η + Trs)(b + cE) + cPs − 2prs(b + cE)]
(
L
3
+ λsE
)
= 0
Taking into account trade costs and letting p˜r > η for r = 1, 2, 3, to allow for
positive production in the local market, proﬁt maximizing prices correspond to:
prr =
a + cPr + η(b + cE)
2(b + cE)
=
1
2
(p˜r + η) (6)
which is the price that ﬁrms quote in the market where they are located; and to
prs =
{
a+cPs+(η+Trs)(b+cE)
2(b+cE) =
1
2 (p˜s + η + Trs) if Trs < p˜s − η
p˜s if Trs ≥ p˜s − η
(7)
which is the price that a ﬁrm located in region r quotes in region s, with r, s =
1, 2, 3 and r = s.
Using the demand and the price functions, we can write:
qrr = (b + cE)(prr − η) (8)
which is the quantity sold in the local market; and
qrs =
{
(b + cE)(prs − η − Trs) if Trs < p˜s − η
0 if Trs ≥ p˜s − η (9)
which is the quantity that a ﬁrm located in region r sells in region s, with
r, s = 1, 2, 3 and r = s.
According to (7) and (9), if a ﬁrm located in r quotes in the market s a price
larger than the reservation price consumers living in s are prepared to pay, the
export from region r to region s is zero. The boundary conditions for trade, as
reported in these expressions, are crucial in the following analysis to determine
the patterns of trade between the regions.
The indirect utility for a r-entrepreneur is
Vr = Sr + πr + CA
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where
πr =
3∑
s=1
(prs − η − Trs)qrs
(
L
3
+ λsE
)
is the equilibrium proﬁt for a r-ﬁrm, and
Sr =
a2E
2b
+
b + cE
2
3∑
s=1
λsEp
2
sr − aPr −
c
2
P 2 (10)
is the consumer’s surplus of the entrepreneur.
3.1 Short-Run Solutions
3.1.1 Model 1. All Autarkic Regions
In this set-up, we assume that the three regions are equidistant, with T12 = T13 =
T23 = T and suﬃciently far away in terms of trade costs that trade cannot take
place for any of the possible distributions of economic activity. When no region
is trading, the condition Trs ≥ p˜s − η holds for all r,s, with r, s = 1, 2, 3 and
r = s. It corresponds to:
Trs = T ≥ p˜s − η = 2(a − ηb)2b + cλsE .
This expression can be alternatively written as
λs ≥ 2(a − ηb − bT )
cET
= λ.
No trade occurs for any distribution of the economic activity across the
regions when:
T ≥ a
b
− η or λ ≤ 0,
which is what we assume in the ﬁrst set-up.5
From (4)–(9), taking into account the linear demand non-negativity con-
straint, we derive the equilibrium short-run proﬁt for a ﬁrm located in region r,
which sells in the local market6:
πr = πnor = (p
no
rr − η)2(b + cE)
(
L
3
+ λrE
)
= πnorr
Finally, taking also into account (10), we obtain the indirect utility of entre-
preneur resident in r:
Vr = V nor = S
no
r + π
no
r + CA = S
no
r + π
no
rr + CA.
5 For convenience, in the simulations we assume T = a
b
− η corresponding to the
minimum value of trade costs which ensures no trade for any distribution of the
industrial activity between the regions, λr.
6 More details on the short-run equilibrium solutions for the ﬁrst and the second model
can be found in Commendatore et al. (2017).
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3.1.2 Model 2. Allowing Trade only Between Regions 1 and 2
In the second set-up, trade costs between regions 1 and 2 are reduced, so that
trade between these two regions can take place. We assume T12 = T − ε, where
0 < ε ≤ T ,7 then trade may occur when ε is suﬃciently close to T . We also
assume T13 = T23 = T ≥ ab − η so that trade between regions 1 and 2 as well as
2 and 3 is still too costly leaving region 3 in autarky.
There are four diﬀerent scenarios depending on the ‘trade distance’ between
regions 1 and 2, that is on ε.
In the ﬁrst scenario, regions 1 and 2 still do not trade with each other: from
(4), (6), and (7), the condition of no trade Trs ≥ p˜s − η for r, s = 1, 2 and r = s
corresponds to:
Trs = T − ε ≥ 2(a − ηb)2b + cλsE
This expression can alternatively be expressed as:
λr ≥ λ˜ for r = 1, 2
where λ˜ = 2(a−ηb−bT+εb)cE(T−ε) .
The same results as before apply, thus the equilibrium short-run proﬁt for a
ﬁrm located in region r is πr = πnor and the indirect utility of an entrepreneur
resident in r is Vr = V nor .
In the second and third scenarios, unilateral or one-way trade occurs (from 1
to 2 in the second and from 2 to 1 in the third scenario). We consider these two
scenarios together. We have that Trs < p˜s−η and Trs ≥ p˜s−η holds for r, s = 1, 2
and r = s (i.e. for r = 1 and s = 2 in the second and for r = 2 and s = 1 in the
third scenario). From (4), (6), and (7), the conditions for unidirectional trade
from r to s are obtained:
Trs = T − ε < 2(a − ηb)2b + cλsE and Trs = T − ε ≥
2(a − ηb)
2b + cλrE
or, alternatively:
λ˜ ≥ λr and λ˜ < λs
with r = 1 and s = 2 in the second and r = 2 and s = 1 in the third scenario.
Letting r = 1 and s = 2 for the second and r = 2 and s = 1 for the third
scenario and k = 3 in both, from (4)–(9), the equilibrium short-run proﬁts for
the case of one-way trade from r to s are:
πr = πoutr = (b + cE)
[
(pnorr − η)2
(
L
3
+ λrE
)
+ (poutrs − η − Trs)2
(
L
3
+ λsE
)]
= πnorr + π
out
rs
7 When ε = 0 , T12 = T and we are back to the previous set up. As before, in the
simulation we ﬁx T = a
b
− η.
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πs = πins = (b + cE)(p
in
ss − η)2
(
L
3
+ λsE
)
= πinss
πk = πnok
where πoutr is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in r which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part πnorr is obtained by selling in the local market, which is not aﬀected
by its exports to s due to market segmentation, and the second part πoutrs by
selling in s; πins is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in s obtained only by selling in the
local market, which is aﬀected by the competition from the ﬁrms located in r;
and πnok is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in k obtained only by selling in the local
market, which is not aﬀected by competition from outside.
Finally, taking also into account (10), the indirect utilities for the case of
one-way trade from r to s are:
Vr = V outr = S
out
r + π
out
rr + CA = S
no
r + π
out
rr + CA
Vs = V ins = S
in
s + π
in
s + CA = S
in
s + π
in
ss + CA
Vk = V nok
where V outr is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in r, whose proﬁts
are higher compared to autarky; V inr is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur
located in s, whose proﬁts are lower and the surplus, Sins , is higher compared to
autarky; and V nok is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in k, which is
the same as in the previous model.
In the fourth scenario bilateral or two-way trade occurs. In this scenario
Trs < p˜s − η for r, s = 1, 2 and r = s. From (4), (6), and (7), the conditions for
unilateral trade between r and s are:
Trs = T − ε < 2(a − ηb)2b + cλsE for r = 1, 2 and r = s,
or, alternatively,
λr < λ˜ for r = 1, 2
From (4)–(9), the equilibrium proﬁts for the case of bilateral trade between
r and s are:
πr = πbilr = π
bil
rr + π
bil
rs for r = 1, 2 and r = s
πk = πnok for k = 3
where πbilr is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in r, which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part πbilrr is obtained by selling in the local market, which is not aﬀected
by its export towards s but is aﬀected by competition from the ﬁrms located in
s and the second part πbilrs by selling in s, with r = 1, 2 and r = s; and πnok , with
k = 3, is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in k, which has the same meaning as before.
Finally, taking also into account 10, the indirect utilities for the case of two-
way trade between r and s are:
Vr = V
bil
r = S
bil
r + π
bil
r + CA = S
bil
r + π
bil
rr + π
bil
rs + CA for r = 1, 2 and r = s
Vk = V
no
k for k = 3
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where V bilr is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in r. Even though her
proﬁts originated from the local market πbilrr are lower due to competition from
ﬁrms located in s, she is enjoying proﬁts by selling in region s, πbilrs . Moreover,
her surplus, Sbilr , is higher compared to when only local goods are available for
consumption, with r = 1, 2 and r = s. As before, the indirect utility of an
entrepreneur located in k is not changed, with k = 3.
3.1.3 Model 3. Hub and Spoke
In the third set-up, region 1 may trade with regions 2 and 3 but regions 2
and 3 do not trade with each other. We consider a special case of an ‘hub and
spoke’ structure: that is, we assume that trade costs between regions 1 and 2 are
suﬃciently low that bilateral trade between these two regions always occur, that
is, we set T12 = τ <
2(a−ηb)
2b+cE . We also assume prohibitive trade costs between 2
and 3:
T23 = T ≥ a
b
− η
Moreover, letting T13 = T − ψ and considering that T12 ≤ T13 ≤ T23, we have
that τ ≤ T − ψ ≤ T .
There are four possible scenarios, depending on ψ. In the ﬁrst scenario, no
trade between regions 1 and 3 occurs: Trk ≥ p˜k − η for r, k = 1, 3 and r = k.
From (4), (6), and (7), the condition corresponding to no trade between 1 and
3 corresponds to:
T13 = T − ψ ≥ max
(
2(a − ηb) + cEλ2T12
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
,
2(a − ηb)
2b + cλ3E
)
or to
λ1 ≥ λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2 and λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1
where λ = 2(a−ηb−bT13)cET13 =
2(a−ηb−bT+ψb)
cET13
.
The equilibrium proﬁts and indirect utilities correspond to those in the fourth
scenario of the second set-up. These are: πr = πbilr , πk = π
no
k , Vr = V
bil
r and
Vk = V nok for r = 1, 2, r = s and k = 3.
In the second and third scenarios. Unilateral trade occurs involving region
1 and 3 (from 1 to 3 in the second and from 3 to 1 in the third scenario). We
consider these two scenarios together. We have that Trk < p˜k−η and Trk ≥ p˜r−η
holds for r, k = 1, 3 and r = k (i.e. for r = 1 and k = 3 in the second and for
r = 3 and k = 1 in the third scenario).
From (4), (6), and (7), one-way trade from region 1 to region 3 occurs when:
2(a − ηb) + cEλ2T12
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
≤ T13 = T − ψ < 2(a − ηb)2b + cλ3E
or when
λ1 ≥ λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2 and λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1
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The short-run equilibrium proﬁts for the case of one-way trade from region
1 to region 3 are:8
π1 = π
bil, out
1 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil11 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pbil12 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)
+
+ (pout13 − η − T13)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)]
= πbil1 + π
out
13
π2 = π
bil, out
2 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil21 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pbil22 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)]
= πbil2
π3 = π
bil, out
3 = (b + cE)(p
bil, out
33 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)
= πbil, out33
where πbil, out1 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 1 which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part corresponds to the proﬁt obtained in the absence of the trade link
from 1 to 3 πbil1 – which is itself composed of two parts (see above) – and the
second part πout13 is obtained by selling in 3, which is not aﬀected by its exports
to 3 due to market segmentation; πbil, out2 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in region
2 which is equal to that in the fourth scenario of the second set-up; and πbil, out3
is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 3 obtained only by selling in the local market,
which is aﬀected by the competition from the ﬁrms located in 1.
Finally, taking also into account (10), the indirect utilities for the case of
one-way trade from region 1 to region 3 correspond to:
V1 = V
bil, out
1 = V
bil
1 + π
out
13
V2 = V
bil, out
2 = V
bil
2
V3 = V
bil, out
3 = V
in
3 = S
in
3 + π
in
33 + CA
where V bil, out1 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 1, whose proﬁts
are higher compared to the case when there are no trade links between 1 and 3;
V bil, out2 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 2, which the same
that the one obtained in the fourth scenario of the second set-up; and V bil, out3
is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 3, whose proﬁts are lower
and the surplus Sin3 is higher compared to the case of no trade links between 1
and 3.
From (4), (6), and (7), one-way trade from region 3 to region 1 occurs when:
2(a − ηb)
2b + cλ3E
≤ T13 = T − ψ < 2(a − ηb) + cEλ2T122b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
or when
λ1 < λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2 and λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1.
8 More details on the short-run equilibrium solutions for this model can be found in
the Appendix.
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The short-run equilibrium proﬁts for the case of one-way trade from region
3 to region 1 are:
π1 = π
bil, in
1 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in11 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pout12 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)]
= πbil, in11 + π
out
12
π2 = π
bil, in
2 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in21 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pout22 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)]
= πbil, in21 + π
out
22
π3 = π
bil, in
3 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in31 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pno33 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)]
= πbil, in31 + π
no
33
where πbil, in1 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 1 which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part πbil, in11 is obtained by selling in the local market, which is not
aﬀected by its exports towards 2 but is aﬀected by the competition from the
ﬁrms located both in 2 and in 3 and the second part πout12 by selling in 2; π
bil, in
2
is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in region 2 which is composed of two parts: the
ﬁrst part πbil, in21 is obtained by selling in 1 which is aﬀected by the competition
in that market not only from the local ﬁrms but also from the ﬁrms located
in 3 and the second part πbil22 obtained by selling in the local market, which is
not aﬀected by the exports towards 1 but it is aﬀected by competition from the
ﬁrms located in 1; and πbil, in3 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 3 composed of
two parts: the ﬁrst part πbil, in31 is obtained by selling in 1, which is aﬀected by
the competition in that market not only from the local ﬁrms but also from the
ﬁrms located in 2 and the second part πno33 , which is not aﬀected by the exports
towards 1.
Taking also into account (10), the indirect utilities for the case of one-way
trade from region 3 to region 1 corresponds to:
V1 = V
bil, in
1 = S
bil, in
1 + π
bil, in
1 + CA
V2 = V
bil, in
2 = S
bil
2 + π
bil, in
2 + CA
V3 = V
bil, in
3 = S
no
3 + π
bil, in
31 + CA
where V bil, in1 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 1, whose proﬁts
are lower and surplus is higher compared to when there are no trade links between
1 and 3; V bil, in2 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 2, whose
proﬁts are lower compared to when there are no trade links between 1 and 3;
and V bil, in3 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 3, whose proﬁts
are higher compared to the case of no trade links between 1 and 3.
Finally, in the fourth scenario bilateral trade between regions 1 and 3 occurs.
We have that Trk < p˜k − η for r, k = 1, 3 and r = k. From (4), (6), and (7),
bilateral trade between regions 1 and 3 occurs when:
T13 = T − ψ < min
(
2(a − ηb) + cEλ2T12
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
,
2(a − ηb)
2b + cλ3E
)
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or when
λ1 < λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2 and λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1.
The short-run equilibrium proﬁts for the case of bilateral trade between
regions 1 and 3 are:
π1 = π
bil, bil
1 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in11 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pout12 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)
+ (pout13 − η − T13)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)]
= πbil, in1 + π
out
13
π2 = π
bil, bil
2 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in21 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pout22 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ2E
)]
= πbil, in2
π3 = π
bil, bil
3 = (b + cE)
[
(pbil, in31 − η)2
(
L
3
+ λ1E
)
+ (pbil, out33 − η − T12)2
(
L
3
+ λ3E
)]
= πbil, in31 + π
bil, out
33
where πbil, bil1 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 1 which is composed of two parts:
the ﬁrst part πbil, in1 is what is obtained in the third scenario and the second
part πout13 by selling in 3; π
bil, bil
2 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in region 2 which
is the same as in the third scenario; and πbil, bil3 is the proﬁt of a ﬁrm located in 3
composed of two parts: the ﬁrst part πbil, in31 is obtained by selling in 1, which is
aﬀected by the competition in that market not only from the local ﬁrms but also
from the ﬁrms located in 2 and the second part πbil, out33 is obtained by selling
in the local market, which is aﬀected by the competition from the ﬁrms located
in 1.
Finally, taking also into account (10), the indirect utilities for the case of
bilateral trade between 1 and 3 correspond to:
V1 = V
bil, bil
1 = V
bil, in
1 + π
out
13
V2 = V
bil, bil
2 = V
bil, in
2
V3 = V
bil, bil
3 = V
bil, out
3 + π
bil, in
31
where V bil, bil1 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 1, which is equal
to the indirect utility enjoyed in the third scenario plus the proﬁts obtained by
selling in 3; V bil, bil2 is the indirect utility of an entrepreneur located in 2, which
is the same as in the third scenario; and V bil, bil3 is the indirect utility of an
entrepreneur located in 3, which is equal to that enjoyed in the second scenario
plus the proﬁts obtained by selling in 1.
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4 Definition of the Basic Dynamic Equations
The dynamics of the three NEG model variants presented above is described by
a two-dimensional (2D) system of diﬀerence equations, or map, Z:
Z :
(
λ1
λ2
)
→
(
Z1(λ1, λ2)
Z2(λ1, λ2)
)
, (11)
where
Zi(λ1, λ2) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if Fi ≤ 0,
Fi if Fi > 0, Fj > 0, Fi + Fj < 1,
Fi
Fi + Fj
if Fi > 0, Fj > 0, Fi + Fj ≥ 1,
Fi
1 − Fj if Fi > 0, Fj ≤ 0, Fi + Fj < 1,
1 if Fi > 0, Fj ≤ 0, Fi + Fj ≥ 1,
with i = 1, j = 2 for Z1(λ1, λ2) and i = 2, j = 1 for Z2(λ1, λ2) ,
Fr(λ1, λ2) = λr(1 + γΩr(λ1, λ2)), r = 1, 2 ,
Ωr(λ1, λ2) =
Vr(λ1, λ2)
λ1V1(λ1, λ2) + λ2V2(λ1, λ2) + (1 − λ1 − λ2)V3(λ1, λ2) − 1.
Due to the constraint on the regional shares of entrepreneurs, the map Z is piece-
wise smooth. In Z, the indirect utilities Vi(λ1, λ2), i = 1, 2, 3, of an entrepreneur
in regions 1, 2 and 3, respectively, are deﬁned according to the assumptions of
the considered models.
Independently on the speciﬁcation of the indirect utilities the following prop-
erties hold:
• All the relevant dynamics in the (λ1, λ2)-phase plane is trapped in a triangle
denoted S, whose borders:
Ib1 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ2 = 0}, Ib2 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ1 = 0}, Ib3 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ2 = 1 − λ1}
(12)
are invariant lines9 of map Z.
• A ﬁxed point of the map Z, which lies inside S, corresponds to a stationary
long-run equilbrium of the economy; the vertices of S are Core-periphery
(CP ) ﬁxed points/equilibria:
CP0 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, 0), CP1 : (λ1, λ2) = (1, 0), CP2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, 1), (13)
characterised by full spatial agglomeration of the industrial activity, with all
the entrepreneurs located in only one region.
• Any interior fixed point of Z, if it exists, is given by intersection of the curves
Ω1 = {(λ1, λ2) : Ω1(λ1, λ2) = 0} and Ω2 = {(λ1, λ2) : Ω2(λ1, λ2) = 0}. (14)
An interior (symmetric or asymmetric) equilibrium is characterised by posi-
tive shares of entrepreneurs in all regions (which can be equal or diﬀerent).
9 Recall that a set A is called invariant under a map F if F (A) = A.
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• Any border fixed point belonging to Ibi, i = 1, 2, if it exists, is an intersec-
tion point of Ωi and Ibi, while any border ﬁxed point belonging to Ib3 is an
intersection point of Ω1, Ω2 and Ib3. A border (symmetric or asymmetric)
equilibrium is characterised by positive shares of entrepreneurs in two regions
and no entrepreneurs in the third one. In the regions where entrepreneurs are
present they can be equally distributed (in a border symmetric equilibrium)
or unevenly distributed (in a border asymmetric equilibrium).
5 Long-Run Equilibria Properties in Model 1
Under the assumptions associated with Model 1 (when all the regions are in
autarky) the indirect utilities of an entrepreneur in regions 1, 2 and 3, respec-
tively, correspond to:
Vr(λr) = V nor (λr) , r = 1, 2 , (15)
V3(λ1, λ2) = V no3 (λ1, λ2) . (16)
and are deﬁned in Commendatore et al. (2017). This case generalizes the model
studied in Behrens (2004), where two regions in full autarky are considered. We
have examined in full detail the mathematical properties of the system (15)–
(16) in Commendatore et al. (2017). In this paper, we will focus more on the
economic meaning of some results.
First note that for Model 1 not only the borders of the trapping triangle S
but also its medians:
Im1 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ2 = 1 − 2λ1}, Im2 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ1 = 1 − 2λ2},
Im3 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ1 = λ2},
are invariant lines of map Z.
Besides the Core-periphery equilibria (see (13)), Model 1 can have also bor-
der symmetric/asymmetric equilibria, as well as interior symmetric/asymmetric
equilibria.
In the ﬁrst place, border symmetric (BS) equilibria always exist:
BS1 : (λ1, λ2) = (1/2, 0), BS2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, 1/2), BS3 : (λ1, λ2) = (1/2, 1/2) .
Considering the border asymmetric (BA) equilibria
BA1 : (λ1, λ2) = (p, 0) ∈ Ib1 , BA′1 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − p, 0) ∈ Ib1,
BA2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, p) ∈ Ib2 , BA′2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, 1 − p) ∈ Ib2,
BA3 : (λ1, λ2) = (p, 1 − p) ∈ Ib3 , BA′3 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − p, p) ∈ Ib3,
(17)
where
p =
1
2
− 1
6cE
√
(4b + cE)(36b + 3cE − 8cL) (18)
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we can state that the equilibria BAi and BA′i exist for
BTCP < L < PFBS , (19)
where
BTCP =
6b(3b + cE)
c(4b + cE)
and PFBS =
36b + 3cE
8c
. (20)
It is easy to check that PFBS − BTCP > 0, thus the range (19) is nonempty.
Concerning the interior asymmetric (IA) equilibria
IA1 : (λ1, λ2) = (k1, 1 − 2k1) ∈ Im1, IA′1 : (λ1, λ2) = (k2, 1 − 2k2) ∈ Im1,
IA2 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − 2k1, k1) ∈ Im2, IA′2 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − 2k2, k2) ∈ Im2,
IA3 : (λ1, λ2) = (k1, k1) ∈ Im3, IA′3 : (λ1, λ2) = (k2, k2) ∈ Im3,
(21)
where k1 and k2 are given by
k1,2 =
1
cE
(
1
6
Lc − b + 1
4
cE ∓ 1
12
√
24b (42b − 10Lc + 9cE) − c2(9E(4L − E) − 4L2)
)
,
(22)
we can state that the interior asymmetric equilibria IAi, i = 1, 2, 3, exist for
BTCP < L < FIA and E > E1 ,
and the interior asymmetric equilibria IA′i exist for
BTBS < L < FIA if E > E1 or BTBS < L < BTCP if 0 < E < E1 ,
where
FIA =
3
2c
(
20b + 3cE − 2
√
2 (6b + cE)
)
, BTBS =
6b(cE + 6b)
c(8b + cE)
, E1 =
2b(7 − 5√2)
c(2
√
2 − 3) ,
(23)
and where FIA = BTCP at E = E1. Moreover, it is easy to check that FIA −
BTCP > 0 (for E = E1), FIA − BTBS > 0, and BTCP − BTBS > 0, thus, the
existence ranges of IAi and IA′i are nonempty. In the (E,L)-parameter plane
the curves deﬁned by L = FIA and L = BTCP are tangent at E = E1.
Finally, the interior symmetric (IS) equilibrium
IS : (λ1, λ2) = (1/3, 1/3)
always exists. Moreover, for a suﬃciently small γ (namely, for γ ≤ 1+ 6b/cE) it
is stable for any L > TIS = 18b+cE4c .
To illustrate the existence and stability properties of the long-run equilibria,
we choose a, b, c, η and E parameter values similar to those used in Behrens
(2004):
a = 1/3, b = 1/3, c = 1/3, η = 0, E = 1.5 . (24)
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Fig. 1. Bifurcation curves related to ﬁxed points of map Z in the (E,L)-parameter
plane for a = 1/3, b = 1/3, c = 1/3.
We ﬁx also
γ = 10, CA = 1 (25)
and vary L as in Commendatore et al. (2017).
Figure 1 summarizes the properties of the long-run equilibria. In this Figure
we plotted the bifurcation curves L = BTBS , L = BTCP , L = TIS , L = FIA and
L = PFBS in the (E,L)-parameter plane for the values of the other parameters
as in (24) and (25). Crossing these curves the properties of the equilibria change.
In Fig. 1, the blue region is related to the coexisting attracting equilibria IS
and IAi, i = 1, 2, 3, while for the parameter values belonging to the yellow region
the attracting equilibrium IS coexists with the attracting equilibria CPi. Note
that the curve FIA is meaningful for E > E1 and that the curve BTCP intersects
the curve TIS at E = 2bc =: E2.
We now study how the properties of the equilibria of the dynamic system Z
changes for a ﬁxed E < E2, for example, for E = 1.5, by increasing L:10
• For 1 < L < BTBS there are three coexisting attracting CP equilibria, and
crossing L = BTBS (when a transverse ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of
BSi, i = 1, 2, 3, occurs), the ﬁxed points BSi become repelling and the saddle
ﬁxed points IA′i are born. Figure 2a (where the curves Ω1 and Ω2 given in
(14) are also shown) depicts the case that holds for BTBS < L < TIS . In this
Figure the basins of coexisting attracting CP equilibria – representing the set
of initial conditions leading to a long-run equilibrium – are coloured red, blue
and green (for CP0, CP1 and CP2, respectively). For the interval 1 < L < TIS ,
the size of invariant local demand, represented by the number of immobile
workers (L), is ‘small’, compared with the size of demand that potentially
could shift, represented by the number of entrepreneurs (E). A small initial
advantage of one region – i.e. an initial distribution of entrepreneurs in that
10 In Commendatore et al. (2017) we have explored an alternative path considering the
case E > E2 by setting E = 5.
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region slightly larger than in the other two – leads to full agglomeration of
the industrial activity in that region: the agglomeration forces overcome the
dispersion forces.
• Crossing L = TIS (where a ‘transcritical bifurcation’ of IS occurs at which
IS = IA′i) the ﬁxed point IS becomes attracting, so that, for TIS < L <
BTCP , there are four coexisting attracting ﬁxed points, IS and CPi (see
Fig. 2b, where the basin of attraction of IS is coloured in purple). For this
interval, the increase in L is suﬃcient to make the interior equilibrium locally
stable and attracting for initial distribution of the economic activity (i.e. for
shares of entrepreneurs) not too unequal. This particular type of coexistence
cannot occur in a two-region context and it represents a novel result with
respect to Behrens (2004).
• Crossing L = BTCP (where a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ occurs) the
CP equilibria become repelling while attracting ﬁxed points IAi and saddle
ﬁxed points BAi, BA′i appear (see Fig. 2c where the basins of attraction of
IA1, IA2 and IA3 are coloured in dark yellow, brown and light blue, respec-
tively). Thus, for BTCP < L < FIA, four coexisting attracting equilibria
Fig. 2. Attracting ﬁxed points of Z (Model 1) and their basins; curves Ω1 and Ω2 given
in (14) are also shown. Here L = 4.8 in (a), L = 4.9 in (b), L = 4.92 in (c), L = 5 in
(d), and the other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
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exist: the interior symmetric (IS) equilibrium and three interior asymmetric
equilibria (IA1, IA2, IA3). In this interval, the size of immobile local demand
is suﬃciently large so that all regions can keep the industrial sector, the rel-
ative dimension of which depends on the initial condition: it could be large
for one region (as in an asymmetric equilibrium) or of equal size for all three
(as in the symmetric equilibrium).
• Crossing L = FIA (where a ‘fold bifurcation’ occurs and at which IAi = IA′i)
the ﬁxed points IAi and IA′i disappear and the only attractor of map Z
is IS (see Fig. 2d). Finally, at L = PFBS a pitchfork bifurcation of BSi
occurs (at which BSi = BAi = BA′i); after this bifurcation the ﬁxed points
BSi become saddles. Thus, for L > FIA the only stable equilbrium is the
symmetric equilibrium. The size of the immobile demand is suﬃciently large,
compared to the potentially shifting demand, so that there is scope for ﬁrms
to locate in each region. Any initial condition involving positive shares of
entrepreneurs leads to the complete dispersion of the economic activity across
the three regions as dispersion forces overcome agglomeration forces.11
Note that this model does not involve trade between the regions and for this
reason it represents a useful reference point to be compared with the other two
models in order to isolate the eﬀects of trade on the long-run distribution of the
economic activity.
6 Long-Run Equilibria Properties in Model 2
Based on the results related to the full autarky case discussed in the previous
section, we now reduce the trade costs between regions 1 and 2 allowing uni-
and bilateral trade between these regions, but not with region 3. In such a case
the indirect utilities Vi(λ1, λ2) =: Vi, i = 1, 2, 3, of an entrepreneur in regions 1,
2 and 3, respectively, are deﬁned as follows:
if λ1 ≥ λ˜, λ2 ≥ λ˜ then V1 = V no1 (λ1), V2 = V no2 (λ2),
if λ1 ≥ λ˜, λ2 < λ˜ then V1 = V out1 (λ1, λ2), V2 = V in2 (λ1, λ2),
if λ1 < λ˜, λ2 ≥ λ˜ then V1 = V in1 (λ1, λ2), V2 = V out2 (λ1, λ2),
if λ1 < λ˜, λ2 < λ˜ then V1 = V bil1 (λ1, λ2), V2 = V
bil
2 (λ1, λ2),
V3 = V no3 (λ1, λ2),
(26)
11 A further condition required for the stability of IS is L < FIIS , where
FIIS = −E(a − bη)
2(b + cE)(3γb(18b + cE) + 2 (6b + cE) (9b + cE)) + 4CAb(6b + cE)
3
12b(a − bη)2(b + cE)(6b + cE(1 − γ))
At L = FIIS the symmetric equilibrium loses stability via a ‘ﬂip bifurcation’.
Above L = FIIS cycles of diﬀerent order emerge and even complex behavior. If
γ < 1 + 6b
cE
a ﬂip bifurcation never occurs. The analysis of the case L > FIIS is
presented in Commendatore et al. (2017).
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where V inr (λ1, λ2), V
out
r (λ1, λ2), V
bil
r (λ1, λ2) for r = 1, 2 are given in Commenda-
tore et al. (2017), V no1 (λ1), V
no
2 (λ2) and V
no
3 (λ1, λ2) are deﬁned as in Model 1.
The dynamic system (or map) Z is modiﬁed accordingly.
We have examined in full detail the mathematical properties of the system Z
modiﬁed to take into account 26 in Commendatore et al. (2017). In this paper,
as for the previous model, we will focus more on the economic meaning of some
results.
In our simulations, for convenience, we set T = ab −η, that is, at the minimum
value of trade costs which ensures no trade for any distribution of entrepreneurs
across the regions, it follows
λ˜ =
2b2ε
cE(a − bη − bε)
∣
∣
∣
∣
η=0,a=b=c
=
2ε
E(1 − ε) . (27)
Moreover, we ﬁx the parameter values as in (24)–(25), and vary L and ε in the
ranges
2 < L < 9, 0 < ε < T =
a
b
− η
∣
∣
∣
a=b, η=0
= 1 .
Similarly to Model 1, the borders Ibi, i = 1, 2, 3 (see (12)) of the trapping
triangle S are invariant lines of map Z, while among the medians of S only the
main diagonal Im3 = {(λ1, λ2) : λ1 = λ2} is invariant.
The straight lines λ1 = λ˜ and λ2 = λ˜, where λ˜ is given in (27), separate the
trapping triangle S into at most four regions, each of them characterized by a
diﬀerent trade pattern (see Fig. 3a):
• the region S0 = {λ1 > λ˜, λ2 > λ˜, λ1 + λ2 < 1} corresponds to no trade;
• the regions S1 = {λ1 > λ˜, 0 < λ2 < λ˜, λ1 + λ2 < 1} and S2 = {λ2 > λ˜,
0 < λ1 < λ˜, λ1 + λ2 < 1} are related to unilateral trade;
• the region S3 = {0 < λ1 < λ˜, 0 < λ2 < λ˜} is related to bilateral trade.
It is easy to see that in the trapping triangle S there are only regions S1, S2 and
S3 (and there is no ‘no trade’ region S0) for
1
2
< λ˜ < 1 or ε2 < ε < ε3
where
ε2 =
cE(a − bη)
b(cE + 4b)
, ε3 =
cE(a − bη)
b(cE + 2b)
, (28)
and S coincides to S3 for λ˜ > 1 or ε > ε3, that is, the trapping triangle S is
associated only with bilateral trade between regions 1 and 2.12
Compared with that associated with Model 1, the map Z considered in the
present section can have more ﬁxed points/equilibria. As an example, in Fig. 3b
black, gray and white circles indicate attracting, saddle and repelling equilibria,
respectively. Below we list diﬀerent kinds of the equilibria of Model 2. Recall
that for the region S0 the results obtained for the Model 1 are valid.
12 We have obtained ε2 and ε3 by equating λ˜ to 1/2 and to 1, respectively.
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Fig. 3. In (a): Partitioning of the trapping triangle S into the regions of no trade (S0),
unilateral trade (S1 and S2) and bilateral trade (S3); In (b): Attracting, saddle and
repelling ﬁxed points of map Z are shown by black, gray and white circles, respectively;
curves Ω1 and Ω2 are shown in red and blue, respectively. Here a = b = c = 1/3, η = 0,
E = 5, L = 5.8, ε = 0.2.
The map Z keeps always all CP equilibria (see (13)) and the border sym-
metric equilibrium BS3 : (λ1, λ2) = (1/2, 1/2). Instead, the interior symmetric
equilibrium, IS : (λ1, λ2) = (1/3, 1/3) is a ﬁxed point of Z as long as IS ∈ S0,
that is, if λ˜ < 1/3. This condition corresponds to ε < ε1, where
ε1 =
cE(a − bη)
b(cE + 6b)
. (29)
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As we shall see later, the equilibrium IS may disappear,13 or it could move
to region S3. In the later case, we denote it as IA3,b, where the index ‘b’ refers
to the bilateral trade region.
On the borders Ib1 and Ib2, map Z can have also border asymmetric (BA)
equilibria:
BA1 : (λ1, λ2) = (p1, 0), BA′′1 : (λ1, λ2) = (p2, 0), BA
′
1 : (λ1, λ2) = (p3, 0) ,
BA2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, p1), BA′′2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, p2), BA
′
2 : (λ1, λ2) = (0, p3) ,
where 0 < p1 < p2 < p3 < 1 are solved numerically (see Commendatore et al.
(2017)). The map Z can have, besides the CP equilibria, at most three equilibria
on each border Ibi, i = 1, 2. Note that for ε = 0 it holds that BA′′i = BSi with
p2 = 1/2.
We notice that the border asymmetric equilibria BAi, i = 1, 2, appear by
increasing L (via a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of the equilibrium CP0) at
L = BTCP0 =
6bE(a − bη)2(3b + cE)
cE (4b + cE) (a − bη)2 + (2b + cE)2 (bε)2 , (30)
and the border asymmetric equilibria BA′i, i = 1, 2, appear by increasing L (via
a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of the ﬁxed points CPi) at
L = BTCP1,2 =
6bE (a − bη)2 (3b + cE)
cE (4b + cE) (a − bη)2 − 4b2 (bε)2 . (31)
Note ﬁnally that for ε = 0 it holds BTCP0 = BTCP1,2 = BTCP , where BTCP
is deﬁned in (20).
As we shall see below an important diﬀerence in the properties of the border
asymmetric equilibria BAi and BA′i, i = 1, 2 compared to the previous model is
that, depending on parameters, they become attracting.
On the border Ib3, besides the equilibrium BS3, map Z can have four border
asymmetric (BA) equilibria:
BA3 : (λ1, λ2) = (p, 1 − p), BA′3 : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − p, p) ,
BA3,u : (λ1, λ2) = (l, 1 − l), BA′3,u : (λ1, λ2) = (1 − l, l) ,
where p is given in (18), the index ‘u’ refers to the unilateral trade regions, and
λ = l, 0 < l < λ˜, is solved numerically (see Commendatore et al. (2017)).
Map Z can have also the following interior asymmetric (IA) equilibria (see
Fig. 3b):
• IAi, IA′i, i = 1, 2, 3, belonging to S0 (see (21));
13 The disappearance of the equilibrium IS after a collision with the border point
(λ1, λ2) = (λ˜, λ˜) at ε = ε1, occurs via a so-called fold border collision bifurcation
(fold BCB for short) at which IS merges with another equilibrium, also disappearing
after the bifurcation.
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• IAi,u, IA′i,u, IA′′i,u, belonging to the unilateral trade regions Si, i = 1, 2;
• IA′3,b, IA′′3,b belonging to the bilateral trade region S3.
Concerning the properties of these equilibria, we start noticing that, by
increasing L and for ε < εt, the three couples, IA1-IA′2,u, IA2-IA
′
1,u and IA3-
IA′3,b, appear simultaneously (via a ‘fold border collision bifurcation’) at
L = BCIA =
3b2ε
(
(4b − cE)(a − bε − bη) + 4b2ε)− 6b (cE + 3b) (a − bε − bη)2
c(a − bε − bη) (2b2ε − (4b + cE)(a − bε − bη)) ,
(32)
where εt corresponds to the point where the curves L = BCIA and L = FIA are
tangent (see Fig. 4b).14
Moreover, the equilibria IAi, i = 1, 2, 3, disappear merging with IA′i (due to
a ‘smooth fold bifurcation’) at L = FIA deﬁned in (23). It can be shown that
for the considered parameter values FIA − BCIA < 0, thus, the existence range
of the ﬁxed points IAi is not empty.
Note that for εt < ε < ε1 the curve L = BCIA corresponds to the collision of
the equilibria IA′i, i = 1, 2, 3, with the related borders. As L = BCIA is crossed
by increasing L, their stability properties are preserved, but not their location
as IA′1 moves to S2, IA
′
2 to S1 and IA
′
3 to S3.
15
It can be also shown that, by increasing L, the interior ﬁxed point IA′′3,b
(belonging to the median Im3) appears at L = BTCP0 given in (30) (due to a
‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of CP0); the equilibrium IA′3 is born (due to
a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of the border symmetric equilibrium BS3 at
L = BTBS) for ε < ε2. The other conditions related to the existence and/or
stability of the equilibria mentioned above can be obtained numerically, as we
discuss below.
To investigate the inﬂuence of decreasing trade cost T12 on the dynamics
of the map, we begin with ε = 0, that corresponds to Model 1, and then we
increase gradually the value of ε. Complexity of bifurcation sequences associated
with equilibria in Model 2 is caused by multistability, when up to 8 attracting
equilibria may coexist (as, e.g., in Fig. 3b), and each of them follows its own way
to appear, disappear and interact with other equilibria.
In Fig. 4a, representing the (ε, L)-parameter plane for 2 < L < 9, 0 < ε < 1
and for the other parameters ﬁxed as in (24), (25), we summarize the proper-
ties of the attracting equilibria. Figure 4b shows an enlargement of the rectangle
indicated in Fig. 4a. In these ﬁgures the parameter regions associated with dif-
ferent coexisting attracting equilibria are colored diﬀerently, being separated by
14 Note also that crossing L = BCIA by decreasing L and considering the interval
ε < εt the equilibria IA1 and IA
′
2,u collide from the opposite sides with the border
deﬁned by λ1 = λ˜, and similarly the couple IA2-IA
′
1,u collides with the border
deﬁned by λ2 = λ˜, while the couple IA3-IA
′
3,b, belonging to the diagonal Im3,
collides with the border point (λ1, λ2) = (λ˜, λ˜). These collisions occur simultaneously
because of the symmetry of Z with respect to the main diagonal.
15 Details how the curve BCIA is obtained are provided in Commendatore et al. (2017).
Emerging Trade Patterns in a 3-Region Linear NEG Model: Three Examples 63
Fig. 4. (a) Bifurcation structure of the (ε, L)-parameter plane for 0 < ε < 1, 2 < L < 9;
(b) an enlargement of the window indicated in (a) with regions of diﬀerent coexisting
attracting ﬁxed points. The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
various bifurcation curves. In particular, we have drawn the bifurcation lines
L = FIA, L = BTBS , L = TIS associated with Model 1, the curves L = BTCP0,
L = BTCP1,2, L = BCIA deﬁned in (30)–(32), and the straight vertical lines
ε = εi, i = 1, 2, 3, deﬁned in (28), (29). The values L = BTCP , L = PFBS
valid for ε = 0 are also marked on the vertical axis. Recall that the stability
range TIS < L < FlIS of the equilibrium IS obtained for Model 1 is suitable
for Model 2 for ε < ε1; the curve L = BTBS is valid for ε < ε2 and corresponds
to the transverse border transcritical bifurcation of the equilibrium BS3; the
curve L = FIA (related to the ‘smooth fold bifurcation’ at which IAi = IA′i,
i = 1, 2, 3) is valid for 0 < ε < εt, where (ε, L) = (εt, FIA) correspond to the
point where the curves L = FIA and L = BCIA are tangent.
In Fig. 4b the bifurcation curves separating the regions of qualitatively dif-
ferent dynamics, besides those mentioned above, are obtained numerically, in
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particular, the curve L = FBA1,2 (related to a ‘fold bifurcation’ leading, by
increasing L, to the disappearance of the couples of the border equilibria BAi-
BA′′i , i = 1, 2); and the curve L = BTBA′1,2 (associated to a so-called ‘transverse
border transcritical bifurcation’ of the border equilibria BA′i, i = 1, 2, leading,
by increasing ε, to their stabilization and to the appearance of the saddle inte-
rior equilibrium IA′i,u). Accordingly, we have marked in the largest and more
visible regions of Fig. 4b the associated attracting equilibria that coexist in those
regions (for a description of the smaller regions of coexistence, as well as other
bifurcation curves, we refer to Commendatore et al. (2017)).
Below, we present several examples for diﬀerent values of L to illustrate
the eﬀects of lowering trade costs, determined by increasing ε, on the long-run
properties of the equilibria and on the patterns of trade. Moreover, we also
provide an economic interpretation of the results.
Fig. 5. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 2) and their basins for L = 4.8 and
ε = 0.1 in (a), ε = 0.14 in (b), ε = 0.15 in (c), ε = 0.3 in (d) (see the black circles in
Fig. 4b). The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
One of the simplest scenarios is illustrated in Fig. 5 where L = 4.8 and ε = 0.1
in (a), ε = 0.14 in (b), ε = 0.15 in (c) and ε = 0.3 in (d) (the corresponding points
in the parameters space are indicated in Fig. 4b by black circles). For ε = 0 there
are three coexisting attracting CP equilibria (see Fig. 2a). When it is close to 0,
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an increase of ε does not change abruptly the qualitative properties of the system
Z (see Fig. 5a).16 Its most relevant eﬀects occur in the subregions of S related
to unilateral trade, S1 and S2,17 the basin of attraction of the equilibrium CP0
shrinks, whereas those of the equilibria CP1 (in S2) and CP2 (in S2) expand.
This implies that when the initial distribution of entrepreneurs is suﬃciently in
favour of region 1 (in S1) or 2 (in S2), all the ﬁrms move in that region enjoying
additional proﬁts obtained by selling goods in the outside market (in region 2
or 1, respectively).
An abrupt change occurs when ε crosses the curve L = BTCP0 (associated
to a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of the equilibrium CP0) involving a loss of
stability and the consequent disappearance of the basin of attraction of CP0. This
also leads to the appearance of the attracting border equilibria BAi, i = 1, 2 and
of the saddle interior equilibrium IA′′3,b in the subregion of S related to bilateral
trade, S3, so that map Z has now four attractors, CP1, CP2, BA1 and BA2 (see
Fig. 5b). Compared with the equilibrium CP0, in the equilibria BAi, i = 1, 2,
trade costs are suﬃciently low to allow for the location of some industry in region
1 (at BA1) or in region 2 (at BA2). Firms in region 1 (at BA1) and 2 (at BA2) are
enjoying additional proﬁts by selling goods in the outside market (in region 2 or
1, respectively). In region 3, the size of the local market is suﬃciently large that
a large share of ﬁrms still ﬁnds convenient to locate there. Finally, being on the
borders, the equilibria BAi, i = 1, 2 are obviously characterised by a unilateral
trade pattern, even if along the transition path towards the equilibrium regions 1
and 2 may engage in bilateral trade for distributions of entrepreneurs positioned
in S3.18
Then, when the ε crosses the curve L = FBA1,2 (and a ‘fold bifurcation’
occurs at which BAi = BA′′i ) the equilibria BA1 and BA2 disappear, and the
remaining attractors are the ﬁxed point CP1 and CP2 (see Fig. 5c). Thus for ε
suﬃciently large (for trade costs suﬃciently low) all initial distributions lead to
an equilibrium in which the industrial sector is agglomerated in region 1 (or 2).
Bilateral trade between regions 1 and 2 is possible along the transition path,
however, only unilateral trade occurs in the long-run.
For larger values of ε the equilibria CP1 and CP2 continue to be the only
attractors of map Z and the economic interpretation is the same (see Fig. 5d).19
16 Notice that the basins of CP equilibria are bounded by the closure of the stable
invariant sets of the saddle ﬁxed points BA′′1 , BA
′′
2 and IA
′
3..
17 In regions S0 and S3 the long-run results are qualitatively similar to those that
apply for the case ε = 0. For initial conditions that start in region S3 bilateral trade
occurs during the transition path towards the equilibrium CP0.
18 There are also initial conditions belonging to the region S0 which leads to BA1 or
BA2. Along the corresponding transitions path there is a switch from a no trade
regime to a unilateral trade regime.
19 Concerning the analytical properties of the map Z, when ε is increased, the repelling
ﬁxed point IS, after undergoing a ‘persistence border colision’, when the curve ε =
ε1 is crossed, disappears together with the saddle ﬁxed point IA
′
3 when the curve
L = BCIA is crossed undergoing a ‘fold BCB’ (see Fig. 5d).
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Fig. 6. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 2) and their basins for L = 4.9 and
ε = 0.1 in (a), ε = 0.15 in (b) (see the gray circles in Fig. 4b). The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
Let now set L = 4.9 and consider the cases (a) ε = 0.1 and (b) ε = 0.15 (the
corresponding points in the parameter space are indicated in Fig. 4b by grey
circles). For ε = 0 the attracting equilibrium IS coexists with three attracting
CP equilibria (see Fig. 2b). Increasing ε at ﬁrst the curve L = BTCP0 is crossed
leading to the loss of stability of CP0 and to the appearance of the attracting
border equilibria BA1 and BA2. In Fig. 6a (where ε = 0.1) these equilibria
coexist with the attracting equilibria IS, CP1 and CP2. In S0 the results are
qualitatively similar to those that apply when ε = 0: IS is still characterised
by full autarky. However, there are initial distributions located in S1 and S2
(corresponding to short-run equilibria), leading to this equilibrium, for which
unilateral trade may occur.
By further increasing ε the equilibria BA1 and BA2 disappear when the
curve L = FBA1,2 is crossed (due to a ‘fold bifurcation’). After, map Z has three
attractors, IS, CP1 and CP2 (see Fig. 6b where ε = 0.15). Then, the equilibrium
IS disappears when the curve ε = ε1 is crossed (due to a ‘fold border collision
bifurcation’),20 so that the only attractors of map Z are the equilibria CP1 and
CP2. When CP1 and CP2 are the only stable equilibria, the properties of the
system and their economic interpretation are analogous to those corresponding
to Fig. 5d.
The change in the properties of the system observed when L = 4.92 by
increasing ε is a bit more complicated. To illustrate this case, we consider the
examples: (a) ε = 0.025 and (b) ε = 0.05 (the corresponding points in the
parameter space are indicated in Fig. 4b by red circles). For ε = 0 (see Fig. 2c) the
coexisting attracting equilibria are IS and IAi, i = 1, 2, 3. If ε is increased, the
equilibria BA′1 and BA
′
2 gain stability (due to a ‘transverse border transcritical
bifurcation’) when the curve L = BTBA′1,2 is crossed. After this bifurcation,
map Z has six attracting equilibria, IS, IAi, BA′1 and BA
′
2 (see Fig. 7a where
20 Before, when the curve L = BCIA is crossed, the saddle equilibria IA
′
i, i = 1, 2, 3
undergo a ‘persistence border collision’.
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Fig. 7. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 2) and their basins for L = 4.92 and
ε = 0.025 in (a), ε = 0.05 in (b) (see the red circles in Fig. 4b). The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25). The insets show the related parts enlarged.
ε = 0.025). Again, the most important changes occur in the regions related to
unilateral trade S1 and S2, where the border equilibria BA′1 (in S1) and BA
′
2
(S2) are now attracting (the basins of attraction of BA′1 and BA
′
2 are colored in
dark yellow and dark blue, respectively). Initial distributions that for ε = 0 were
in the basins of attraction of IA2 and IA1, for ε = 0.025 belong to the basins of
BA′1 and BA
′
2, respectively. Unilateral trade gives an incentive to entrepreneurs
to locate in region 1 (for initial distributions in the basin of BA′1) or region 2
(for initial distributions in the basin of BA′2) because of the additional proﬁts
obtained by selling goods in the outside market in region 2 or region 1.
Then after a sequence of bifurcations (which includes a ‘fold border collision
bifurcation’ of IAi occurring when the curve L = BCIA is crossed, and ‘trans-
verse border transcritical bifurcations’ of BAi and BA′′i , i = 1, 2) the attracting
equilibria are IS, BA′i, BAi and IA
′′
3,b (see Fig. 7b where ε = 0.05). The most
relevant eﬀects of the increase in ε is the appearance of the stable equilibrium
IA′′3,b in the region related to bilateral trade, S3, and the disappearance of the
interior asymmetric equilibria IAi, i = 1, 2, 3. Initial distributions that were lead-
ing previously to IA1 or IA2 are now attracted respectively by BA′2 or BA
′
1.
Concerning trade patterns, it is interesting to notice that a large set of initial
distributions characterised by full autarky may lead to a long-run equilibrium
in which unilateral (BA′2 or BA
′
1) or bilateral (IA
′′
3,b) trade prevails. Moreover,
transition paths characterised by a switch from a unilateral to a bilateral trade
regime are also possible.21
Further increasing ε leads to reverse pitchfork bifurcation of IA′′3,b which
loses stability merging with saddles IS1,b and IS2,b, then the ﬁxed points CP1
and CP2 are stabilized (due to a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’, when the
21 It is also possible a transition path starting from a unilateral trade regime in which
the share of entrepreneurs are positive in all regions ending to an equilibrium, BA1
or BA2, in which unilateral trade still prevails because region 2 or region 1 is empty
of entrepreneurs.
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Fig. 8. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 2) and their basins for L = 5 and
ε = 0.1 in (a), ε = 0.2 in (b) (see the white circles in Fig. 4b). The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
curve L = BTCP1,2 is crossed), and the properties of the system and their
interpretation become qualitatively similar to those holding for the case shown
in Fig. 6a.
Further examples are shown in Fig. 8 where L = 5 and (a) ε = 0.1 and
(b) ε = 0.2 (the corresponding points in the parameter space are indicated
in Fig. 4b by white circles). For ε = 0, IS is the only stable equilibrium (see
Fig. 2d). By increasing ε at ﬁrst the curve L = BTBA′1,2 is crossed leading to
the stabilization of the equilibria BA′1 and BA
′
2 (see Fig. 8a where ε = 0.1).
BA′1 and BA
′
2 belong to the regions of S related to unilateral trade, S1 and S2,
respectively, and are characterised by a large share of ﬁrms located in region 1
or 2 obtaining additional proﬁt by selling in the outside market in region 2 or
1 and by a small share of ﬁrms located in region 3, attracted by a suﬃciently
large local market.
For this example, it is interesting to notice that transition paths are possible
starting from a bilateral trade regime in S3 or from a unilateral trade regime in
S1 or S2 ending to the equilibrium IS in S0 in which full autarky prevails. This
is favoured by a relative large proportion of immobile local demand suﬃcient to
countervail the eﬀect of trade liberalization.
Crossing the curve L = BTCP1,2 leads to the disappearance of the equilibria
BA′1 and BA
′
2 and the stabilization of the equilibria CP1 and CP2 (due to a
‘border transcritical bifurcation’). Then (due to a ‘border collision bifurcation’)
at ε = ε1 the ﬁxed point IS disappears (see Fig. 8b where ε = ε1 = 0.2) after
which the only attractors of map Z are the ﬁxed points CP1 and CP2 and the
properties of the system and their interpretation become qualitatively similar to
those holding for the case shown in Fig. 5d.
7 Long-Run Equilibria Properties in Model 3
The economy in Model 3 takes a speciﬁc ‘hub and spoke structure. Indeed, for
the third set-up we assumed that trade costs between regions 1 and 2 are always
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suﬃciently low to establish bilateral trade (for this we let T12 <
2(a−ηb)
2b+cE ), while
trade costs between regions 2 and 3 are always suﬃciently high to impede trade
(so that T23 ≥ ab − η holds). We set T12 = τ , T13 = T − ψ and T23 = T , with
T = ab − η.
The related indirect utilities Vi(λ1, λ2) =: Vi, i = 1, 2, 3, of an entrepreneur
in regions 1, 2 and 3, respectively, are deﬁned as follows:
if λ1 ≥ Λ(λ2), λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil1 , V2 = V bil2 , V3 = V bil3 ,
if λ1 ≥ Λ(λ2), λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, out1 , V2 = V bil, out2 , V3 = V bil, out3 ,
if λ1 < Λ(λ2), λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, in1 , V2 = V bil, in2 , V3 = V bil, in3 ,
if λ1 < Λ(λ2), λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, bil1 , V2 = V bil, bil2 , V3 = V bil, bil3 ,
(33)
where
λ =
2 (a − ηb − bT13)
cET13
=
2bψ
cE
(
a
b − η − ψ
) ,
Λ(λ2) = λ − λ2T13 − T12
T13
= λ − λ2
a
b − η − ψ − τ
a
b − η − ψ
,
and V bili , V
bil, out
i , V
bil, in
i , V
bil, bil
i for i = 1, 2, 3 are deﬁned in Commendatore
et al. (2017).
In the simulations we ﬁx τ = 0.5 < 2(a−ηb)2b+cE
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= 47 ≈ 0.571 , and vary
the values of parameters L and ψ, where 0 < ψ < τ = 0.5, keeping the other
parameters ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
Let the straight lines λ2 = 1− λ − λ1 and λ1 = Λ(λ2) separating the regions
associated with diﬀerent indirect utilities be denoted as C1 and C2, respectively.
These lines can be written as
C1 : λ2 = −λ1 + 1 − 2bψ
cE
(
a
b − η − ψ
)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= −λ1 + 1 − 2ψ
E(1 − ψ) ,
C2 : λ2 = −λ1
a
b − η − ψ
a
b − η − ψ − τ
+
2bψ
cE
(
a
b − η − ψ − τ
)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= −λ1 1 − ψ1 − ψ − τ +
2ψ
E (1 − ψ − τ) .
Note that the slope of C2 in the (λ1, λ2)-phase plane is larger in modulus
than the slope of C1; the lines C1 and C2 intersect the trapping triangle S if
ψ < ab − η
∣
∣
(24)
= 1 (related to λ > 0) and ψ <
(
a
b − η
)
cE
2b+cE
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= 37 (related
to λ < 1).
Depending on the parameters the straight lines C1 and C2 may separate the
trapping triangle S into at most four regions denoted Si, i = 0, 3, where region
S0 is related to no trade between regions 1 and 3, regions S1, S2 correspond
to unilateral trade from region 3 to region 1, and from region 1 to region 3,
respectively, and region S3 is associated with bilateral trade between regions 1
and 3. In fact, there are ﬁve qualitatively diﬀerent cases:
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Fig. 9. Partitioning of the trapping triangle S into the regions S0 (no trade between
regions 1 and 3), S1 (one-way trade from region 3 to region 1), S2 (one-way trade from
region 1 to region 3) and S3 (two-way trade between regions 1 and 3). Here L = 4.8,
τ = 0.5 and ψ = 0.15 in (a), ψ = 0.23 in (b) and ψ = 0.3 in (c). The other parameters
are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
(1) if λ = 0, that holds for ψ = 0, then S = S0, i.e., the complete trapping
triangle S is associated with no trade between the regions 1 and 3, that is,
we are back to Model 2;
(2) if 0 < λ ≤ 1 − λ∗ where λ∗ = 2bψ
cE( ab −η−ψ−τ)
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
= 2ψE(1−ψ−τ) , then S =
∪2j=0Sj (see Fig. 9a), that is, in S there are ‘no trade’ and ‘unilateral trade’
regions while bilateral trade is not possible; this holds for 0 < ψ ≤ ψ1, where
ψ1 =
1
2(4b + cE)
(
(2b + cE)
(
2
(a
b
− η
)
− τ
)
−
−
√
(2b + cE)2
(
2
(a
b
− η
)
− τ
)2
− 4cE(4b + cE)
(a
b
− η
)(a
b
− η − τ
))
,
ψ1|(24) =
1 (2 + E)(2 − τ) −
√
4 (2 − τ)2 + Eτ2(4 + E)
2(4 + E)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
E=1.5, τ=0.5
≈ 0.175 ;
(3) if 1 − λ∗ < λ < 12 , then S = ∪3j=0Sj (see Fig. 9b), that is, all four types of
trade between regions 1 and 3 are possible; this occurs for ψ1 < ψ < ψ2,
where
ψ2 =
cE(a − bη)
b(4b + cE)
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
=
3
11
≈ 0.273 ;
(4) if 12 ≤ λ < 1, then S = ∪3j=1Sj (see Fig. 9c), that is, uni- and bilateral trade
are possible, but there is no ‘no trade’ region; that holds for ψ2 ≤ ψ < ψ3,
where
ψ3 =
cE(a − bη)
b(2b + cE)
∣
∣
∣
∣
(24)
=
3
7
≈ 0.429 ;
(5) if λ ≥ 1, that holds for ψ3 ≤ ψ ≤ τ, then S = S3.
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Similar to Models 1 and 2, for Model 3 the borders Ibi, i = 1, 2, 3 (see (12))
of the trapping triangle S are invariant lines of map Z. 22 The border equilibria
of Z are denoted BAi ∈ Ibi, with additional upper index ‘′’, or ‘′′’ to distinguish
between diﬀerent equilibria belonging to the same border.
Besides the CP equilibria (see (13)) and BA equilibria, map Z can have also
interior equilibria which we denote IAi ∈ Si.
Figure 10 summarizes the properties of the long-run equilibria. In Fig. 10a
we present the bifurcation structure of the (ψ,L)-parameter plane for 0 < ψ <
τ = 0.5, 2 < L < 9, and other parameters ﬁxed as in (24) and (25). In this
ﬁgure the regions of diﬀerent coexisting attracting equilibria are separated by
the curves L = BTCP0, L = BTCP1, L = BTCP2 obtained numerically and
related to border transcritical bifurcations of the equilibria CP0, CP1 and CP2,
respectively, as well as by the curve L = FBA2 associated with a fold bifurcation
of the border equilibria belonging to Ib2. Figure 10b shows an enlargement of
Fig. 10a.
To study the inﬂuence of decreasing trade cost T13, as a starting point we
consider the bifurcation structure observed for ψ = 0, which is associated with
Model 2 and corresponds to the cross-section at ε = 0.5 of the (ε, L)-parameter
plane shown in Fig. 4a (recall that for Model 3 it holds that T12 = τ, while for
Model 2 T12 = ab − η − ε, so ε = ab − η − τ ; for the considered parameter values
τ = 0.5 corresponds to ε = 0.5). Below we comment several transformations
of the basins of the attracting equilibria of map Z observed for ﬁxed L = 4.8,
L = 4.92, L = 5 and increasing ψ, when various bifurcation curves are crossed.
Fig. 10. (a) Bifurcation structure of the (ψ,L)-parameter plane for 0 < ψ < 0.5,
2 < L < 9, τ = 0.5; (b) an enlargement of the window indicated in (a) with regions of
diﬀerent coexisting attracting ﬁxed points. The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24)
and (25).
22 However, for the third model map Z has no symmetry, and on each border Ibi it is
reduced to a diﬀerent 1D map. In Commendatore et al. (2017), we have seen that
for model 1 and model 2 map Z is reduced on the borders Ib1 and Ib2 to the same
1D map, while on Ib3 the 1D map is symmetric with respect to x = 1/2..
72 P. Commendatore et al.
Let L = 4.8. For ψ = 0 map Z has attracting equilibria CP1 and CP2
(see the parameter point (ε, L) = (0.5, 4.8) in Fig. 4a, which belongs to the
region denoted CP1,2). For increasing ψ these equilibria at ﬁrst remain the only
attractors of map Z: in Fig. 11a (where ψ = 0.15) we show the basins of CP1 and
CP2 separated by the closure of stable invariant sets of the saddle ﬁxed points
IA0 ∈ S0 and BA′′3 ∈ Ib3, and in Fig. 11b where ψ = 0.3 the basins are separated
by the closure of the stable invariant set of BA′′3 . What can be noticed from
Figs. 11a and b is the progressive enlargement of the basin of attraction of CP1,
and the shrinking of that of CP2, compared with the case ψ = 0, as unilateral
trade from 1 to 3 is allowed and ﬁrms in 1 could obtain additional proﬁts by
exporting goods in 3 exploiting their location. Indeed, in correspondence of CP1
one-way trade from 1 to 2 and from 1 to 3 occurs; instead, in CP2 only one way
trade from 2 to 1 can take place. Interestingly, there are possible transition paths
in which diﬀerent trade patterns may occur, for example (looking at Fig. 11b)
bilateral trade between 1 and 2 and 1 and 3 may occur for distributions of
entrepreneurs in the partition S3. However, at some point trade links are severed
as all the industrial activity agglomerates in only one region.
Fig. 11. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 3) and their basins for L = 4.8,
τ = 0.5 and ψ = 0.15 in (a), ψ = 0.3 in (b), ψ = 0.47 in (c), ψ = 0.5 in (d). The other
parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
A qualitative change is observed at ψ ≈ 0.469 as the curve L = FBA2 is
crossed, see Fig. 10b (giving rise to a ‘fold bifurcation’) and a couple of border
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equilibria, attracting BA2 and saddle BA′′2 , appear. These are shown in Fig. 11c
where basins of the attracting equilibria CP1, CP2 and BA2 are plotted for
ψ = 0.47. Recall that for ψ > ψ3 ≈ 0.43, it holds that S = S3, that is, trade costs
are suﬃciently small that bilateral trade between 1 and 3 always occur for all
distributions of entrepreneurs within S. The equilibrium BA2 is quite interesting,
since it is characterized by trade from 2 to 1 and from 3 to 1. Thus, initial
distributions of entrepreneurs that largely favour region 3 lead to a long-run
equilibrium where the hub region has no manufacturing sector and it is importing
from the two spoke regions. By further increasing ψ the curve L = BTCP0 is
crossed, and as a result the ﬁxed point BA2 disappears merging with the ﬁxed
point CP0 that gains stability (due to a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’, see
Fig. 11d where the basins of CP1, CP2 and CP3 are shown for ψ = 0.5). The
economic interpretation is that when trade costs between 1 and 3 become close
to that between 1 and 2, regions 2 and 3 become more symmetric and the basins
of attraction of the CP equilibria CP2 and CP3 are similar: initial distributions
of entrepreneurs that favour region 2 or region 3, that is one of the spoke regions,
lead to CP2 or CP3, respectively. Notice also that the basin of attraction of CP1
is much larger being region 1 the hub.
Fig. 12. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 3) and their basins for L = 4.92,
τ = 0.5 and ψ = 0.15 in (a), ψ = 0.3 in (b), ψ = 0.49 in (c), ψ = 0.5 in (d). The other
parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
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For L = 4.92 the sequence of bifurcations at ﬁrst is similar to the one
described above: Starting from the attracting ﬁxed points CP1 and CP2 coexist-
ing for ψ = 0 (the parameter point (ε, L) = (0.5, 4.92) in Fig. 4a also belongs to
the region CP1,2, as in the previous example), by increasing ψ these ﬁxed points
remain the only attractors (see Fig. 12a and b where ψ = 0.15 and ψ = 0.3,
respectively). As before it is possible to observe a progressive change in the size
of the basins of attraction of CP1 (enlarging) and CP2 (shrinking). By further
increasing ψ (after a ‘fold bifurcation’) a border attracting equilibrium BA2
and a saddle equilibrium BA′′2 are born (see Fig. 12c where ψ = 0.49). Com-
paring Figs. 11c and 12c, we see that, by increasing the immobile local demand
L (intensifying the dispersion forces), BA2 is characterised by a larger share
of entrepreneurs located in region 2 (a smaller share located in region 3) and
by a larger basin of attraction. Finally, by further increasing ψ the ﬁxed point
CP2 loses stability and the stable border equilibrium BA′2 is born (via a ‘border
transcritical bifurcation’, see Fig. 12d where ψ = 0.5). As before, by reducing
trade costs between regions 1 and 3, regions 2 and 3 become more symmetric;
diﬀerently from the previous case the larger immobile local demand allows for
some entrepreneurs located in 2 (in BA2) or in 3 (BA′2). Both BA2 and BA
′
2
are characterised by one-way trade from the spokes to the hub.
When L = 5, as for the previous cases, the attracting equilibria CP1 and
CP2 coexist for ψ = 0. By increasing ψ, after crossing the curve L = BTCP2 (see
Fig. 10b), the ﬁxed point CP2 loses stability and a border attracting equilibria
BA′2 is born. Thus, as shown in Fig. 13a, where ψ = 0.48, compared with the
previous case (see Fig. 12b) the increase in L, allows for the location of some
entrepreneurs in region 3 (CP2 has lost stability in favour of BA′2). Further
increasing ψ, leads (via a ‘fold bifurcation’) to a border attracting and a saddle
equilibria BA2 and BA′′2 (see Fig. 13b where ψ = 0.5). Compared with the
previous case, due to a larger L, this occurs for a lower value of ψ.
Fig. 13. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 3) and their basins for L = 5, τ = 0.5
and ψ = 0.48 in (a), ψ = 0.5 in (b). The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
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To clarify better the importance of the size of immobile local demand (L)
relative to the demand that could potentially shift (E), let us comment one
more sequence of transformations of the basins observed for E = 5. We ﬁx
τ = 0.2 < 2(a−ηb)2b+cE
∣
∣
∣ ≈ 0.286, L = 4.8 and will increase ψ. As before, for ψ = 0
map Z has two coexisting attracting equilibria CP1 and CP2. At ﬁrst these
equilibria remain the only attractors of Z (see Fig. 14a and 14b where ψ = 0.4
and ψ = 0.55, respectively), the qualitative behaviour of the system and its
Fig. 14. Attracting ﬁxed points of map Z (Model 3) and their basins for E = 5,
L = 4.8, τ = 0.2 and ψ = 0.4 in (a), ψ = 0.55 in (b), ψ = 0.62 in (c), ψ = 0.75 in (d),
ψ = 0.779 in (e), ψ = 0.8 in (f). The other parameters are ﬁxed as in (24) and (25).
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economic interpretation are the same as before: compared with the case ψ = 0,
ﬁrms in region 1 (the hub) take advantage of the trade opening towards region
3 (one of the spokes), this leads to higher indirect utilities for the entrepreneurs
located in 1 and to the progressive enlargement of the basin of attraction of CP1
and the shrinking of that of CP2. Then, by increasing ψ, an attracting and a
saddle equilibria BA1 and BA′′1 belonging to the border Ib1 appear (via a ‘fold
bifurcation’, see Fig. 14c where ψ = 0.62). The ﬁxed point BA1 is positioned in
the partition S1: the possibility of one-way trade from 3 to 1 allows for a long-
run equilibrium where entrepreneurs are distributed between regions 1 and 3 and
trade goes from 3 to 1 and from 1 to 2 (one-way trade to region 2 compensates for
the stronger competition in the local market from ﬁrms located in 3, attracting
some of the entrepreneurs to region 1).
If ψ is further increased, this leads to the appearance of a border attract-
ing equilibrium BA3 ∈ Ib3 (via a ‘border transcritical bifurcation’ of CP2, see
Fig. 14d where ψ = 0.75), which mirrors BA1. Indeed, reducing trade costs
between 1 and 3 makes regions 2 and 3 more symmetric (while partition S3
completely overlaps with S): In BA3 (symmetrically with respect to BA1) entre-
preneurs are distributed between regions 1 and 2 and trade goes from 2 to 1 and
from 1 to 3.
By further increasing ψ, at ﬁrst the couple BA1 - BA′′1 disappears (see
Fig. 14e where ψ = 0.779), and then the couple BA3 - BA′′3 disappears (both
via a ‘fold bifurcation). After these bifurcations the ﬁxed point CP1 is a unique
attractor of Z (see Fig. 14f where ψ = 0.8). Due to the relatively small ratio
L/E the agglomeration forces are much stronger than in the previous examples,
thus due to the central position, region 1 attracts all entrepreneurs, with the
exception of the initial conditions in the basin of attraction of BA3 in Fig. 14e
or for all the initial conditions in the interior of S in Fig. 14f.
8 Final Remarks
In this paper we presented a basic analytic framework representing a small trade
network whose main objectives were: (i) highlight how distance may aﬀect the
formation of trade links and their direction; (ii) examine the long-term con-
sequences of trade integration on the emergence/disappearance of trade links
and on the distribution of economic activities across space; (iii) explore how
the spatial distribution of economic activities and the existence of trade links
are interrelated. Given the large number of possible trade structures, we only
considered three examples, representing three frequently realized patterns in the
EU trade network (see Basile et al. (2016)) and we provided three respective
models.
Some of our results are: For the ﬁrst model, dealing with three autarkic
regions, we found cases of coexistence of long-run equilibria which are absent
in a two-region context (see Behrens (2004)); for the second model, when only
region 1 and 2 trade with each other, we conﬁrmed Behrens (2005) result that
allowing for unilateral trade favours the region endowed with the higher initial
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distribution of entrepreneurs, however given the presence of a third region, not
necessarily all entrepreneurs agglomerate in the region with the better initial
endowment. Finally, for the third model, we found that, notwithstanding the
diﬀerent geography assumed, for some parameter combinations, the result of
Ago et al. (2006) according to which centrality could translate into a locational
disadvantage, is conﬁrmed.
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Appendix
For Model 3 the indirect utilities are deﬁned as follows:
if λ1 ≥ Λ(λ2), λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil1 , V2 = V bil2 , V3 = V bil3 ,
if λ1 ≥ Λ(λ2), λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, out1 , V2 = V bil, out2 , V3 = V bil, out3 ,
if λ1 < Λ(λ2), λ2 ≤ 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, in1 , V2 = V bil, in2 , V3 = V bil, in3 ,
if λ1 < Λ(λ2), λ2 > 1 − λ − λ1, then V1 = V bil, bil1 , V2 = V bil, bil2 , V3 = V bil, bil3 ,
where
λ =
2 (a − ηb − bT13)
cET13
, Λ(λ2) = λ − T13 − T12
T13
λ2,
V bil1 = (θ1T12 + ψ1)T12 + ω + CA, V
bil
2 = (θ2T12 + ψ2)T12 + ω + CA,
θ1 =
(b + cE)
(
4
[
cλ2E(2b + cλ2E) + 2b2
]
L + 3λ2EΔ1
)
24 [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
Δ1 = cE[cE(λ1 + λ2)(λ1 + 2λ2) + 4b(λ1 + 3λ2)] + 12b2,
ψ1 = − (a − ηb)(b + cE) [3λ2E(3b + 2cλ2E) + 2bL]
3 [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
ψ2 = − (a − ηb)(b + cE) [3λ1E(3b + 2cλ1E) + 2bL]
3 [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
ω =
(a − ηb)2(b + cE) (4bL + 3E(λ1 + λ2)[3b + cE(λ1 + λ2)])
6b [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
θ2 =
(b + cE)
(
4
[
cλ1E(2b + cλ1E) + 2b2
]
L + 3λ1EΔ2
)
24 [2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
2 ,
Δ2 = cE[cE(λ1 + λ2)(λ2 + 2λ1) + 4b(λ2 + 3λ1)] + 12b2,
V bil3 = V
no
3 =
(a − η)2(b + cE)[3λ3E(3b + cλ3E) + 2bL]
6b(2b + cλ3E)2
+ CA,
V bil, out1 = V
bil
1 + Π
out
13 ,
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Πout13 = (b+ cE)
[
a − ηb − [cE(1 − λ1 − λ2) + 2b] T132
2b + c(1 − λ2)E
]2 [
L
3
+ (1 − λ1 − λ2)E
]
,
V bil, out2 = V
bil
2 ,
V bil, out3 = (f3T13 + g3)T13 + h3 + CA,
f3 =
λ1E(b + cE)
(
cE [12b(1 − λ2) + 2cλ1L + 3cE(1 − λ1 − λ2)(1 + 2λ1 − λ2)] + 12b2
)
24 [2b + cE(1 − λ2)]2
,
g3 =
3λ1E(a − ηb)(b + cE)(cL3 − b − cλ1E)
3 [2b + cE(1 − λ2)]2
,
h3 =
3(a − ηb)2(b + cE)
(
cE2(1 − λ2)2 + b[2L3 + E(3 − 2λ1 − 3λ2)]
)
6b [2b + cE(1 − λ2)]2
,
V bil, in1 = S
bil, in
1 + Π
bil, in
11 + Π
bil, in
12 + CA,
Sbil, in1 =
λ2Q1T12 + Q2(1 − λ1 − λ2)T13 + Q3
8(2b + cE)2
(b + cE)E,
Q1 = T12
(
cE[cE(1 − λ2) + 4b] + 4b2
)− 8(b + cE)(a − ηb) − 2c2E2(1 − λ1 − λ2)T13,
Q2 = [c
2E2(λ1 + λ2) + 4b(b + cE)]T13 − 8(b + cE)(a − ηb), Q3 = 4(a − ηb)
2(b + cE)
b
,
Πbil, in11 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb + [(1 − λ1 − λ2)T132 + T122 λ2
]
cE
2b + cE
]2 (
L
3
+ λ1E
)
,
Πbil, in12 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb − T122 (2b + cλ2E)
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
]2 (
L
3
+ λ2E
)
,
V bil, in2 = S
bil
2 + Π
bil, in
21 + Π
bil
22 + CA,
Sbil2 =
λ1ΩT12 + Ψ
8[2b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]2
(b + cE)E,
Ω = T12
{
cE(λ1 + λ2)[cEλ2 + 4b] + 4b2
} − 8[b + cE(λ1 + λ2)](a − ηb) ,
Ψ =
4(a − ηb)2(λ1 + λ2)[b + cE(λ1 + λ2)]
b
,
Πbil, in21 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb + cE(1 − λ1 − λ2)T132 − T122 [cE(1 − λ2) + 2b]
2b + cE
]2 (
L
3
+ λ1E
)
,
Πbil22 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb + T12
2
cλ1E
2b + c(λ1 + λ2)E
]2 (
L
3
+ λ2E
)
,
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V bil, in3 = V
no
3 + Π
bil, in
31 ,
Πbil, in31 = (b + cE)
[
a − ηb + cEλ2 T122 − T132 [cE(λ1 + λ2) + 2b]
2b + cE
]2 (
L
3
+ λ1E
)
,
V bil, bil1 = V
bil, in
1 + Π
out
13 , V
bil, bil
2 = V
bil, in
2 , V
bil, bil
3 = V
bil, out
3 + Π
bil, in
31 .
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Abstract. In this Chapter we provide a critical review of parametric and semi-
parametric spatial econometric approaches. We focus on the capability of each
class of models to fit the main features of spatial data (such as strong and weak
cross-sectional dependence, spatial heterogeneity, nonlinearities, and time persis-
tence), leaving aside the technicalities related to the estimation methods. We also
provide a brief discussion of the existent software developed to estimate most of
the econometric models exposed in this Chapter.
Keywords: Spatial econometrics · Semiparametric models
1 Introduction and Motivation
Nowadays, the dominant paradigm in spatial econometrics is still a parametric one. The
first generation of spatial econometric models (essentially developed to handle cross-
sectional data) focused on modeling spatial dependence (or spatial spillover effects)
through different alternative linear specifications, such as the Spatial Lag or Spatial
Autoregressive Model (SAR), the Spatial Error Model (SEM), the Spatial Durbin Model
(SDM), the Spatial Autoregressive in X-variables Model (SLX), and a mix of SAR and
SEM (SAC or SARAR) (Anselin 1988; LeSage and Pace 2009). We may call this col-
lection of econometric tools as “econometrics of interaction”, since they can be applied
to any kind of network relationship among different sample units.
During the last decade, these models have been extended to handle spatial panel data
(or spatio-temporal data), that is data containing time series observations of a number
of geographical units. Elhorst (2014b) defines them second generation spatial econo-
metric models. By including a regional specific fixed or random effect, these models
prove to be particularly useful to control for unobserved spatial heterogeneity, that is
a fundamental task in empirical economic analyses, as failing to do so can introduce
omitted-variable biases and preclude causal inference. Moreover, spatial dependence
may simply be the consequence of (spatially correlated) omitted variables rather than
being the result of spillovers. Thus, controlling both for spatial dependence (through
c© The Author(s) 2018
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spatial lag terms) and spatial heterogeneity (through fixed or random effects) is a pri-
mary task when dealing with spatial data. More recent developments concern dynamic
spatial panel data models and spatial VAR (Vector-Autoregressive) models, which allow
to control for time persistence and reverse causality problems.
Notwithstanding these important advances in the literature, it is worth noting that
any parametric model is limited to specific forms of spatial variation of the parame-
ters, such as spatial regimes. They are not suitable for more general forms of spatial
heterogeneity of model parameters, i.e. when the variation of parameters is continu-
ous (smooth) over space and depends on coordinates, and when the functional form of
the relationship between the dependent variable and the regressor is unknown (poten-
tially non-monotonic). Moving away from the parametric approach, another strand of
the spatial econometric literature has proposed semiparametric methods as more flexi-
ble estimation frameworks, thus following the recommendations of McMillen (2012) of
using smoother techniques in order to remove spatial heterogeneity while considering
other potential nonlinearities.
First, following Brunsdon et al. (1996); Cho et al. (2010) have proposed an approach
that combines geographically weighted regression (GWR) and spatial autoregression
(SEM) methods, called GWR-SEM. The spatial autoregressive error term should allay
spatial dependency, while GWR addresses spatial heterogeneity by allowing the coef-
ficients to vary across observations. In the same vein, Pa´ez et al. (2002) propose an
estimation method for cross-sectional data in which the covariance is locally varying
and that can handle spatial autocorrelation of the error terms. Another notable con-
tribution accounting for both spatial autocorrelation and nonstationarity of the para-
meters has been made by Pace and LeSage (2004): they propose a spatial autoregres-
sive local estimation based on a recursive approach for maximum-likelihood estimation
of SAR that implies estimates on subsamples related to a neighboring of each obser-
vation. More recently, combining kernel smoothing methods and standard spatial lag
models, Geniaux and Martinetti (2017) have introduced a new class of data generating
processes, called MGWR-SAR (Mixed Geographically Weighted Regression Simul-
taneous AutoRegressive Model), in which the regression parameters and the spatial
dependence coefficient can vary over space. The advantage of the last class of models
is that it allows to consider the mixed case in which some parameters are constant over
space and others are spatially varying.
Second, Basile et al. (2014); Montero et al. (2012) have combined penalized
regression spline (PS) methods (Eilers et al. 2015) with standard cross-section
spatial autoregressive models (such as SAR, SEM, SDM and SLX). An impor-
tant feature of PS-SAR, PS-SEM, PS-SDM and PS-SLX models is the possibil-
ity to include within the same specification (i) spatial autoregressive terms to cap-
ture spatial interaction or network effects (thus avoiding spatial dependence bias),
(ii) parametric and nonparametric (smooth) terms to identify nonlinear relationships
between the response variable and the covariates (thus avoiding functional form
bias), (iii) a geoadditive term, that is a smooth function of the spatial coordinates,
to capture a spatial trend effect, that is to capture spatially autocorrelated unob-
served heterogeneity (thus avoiding spatial heterogeneity bias), and (iv) the interaction
between the geoadditive term and a covariate of particular interest to identify spatially
varying effects of X-variables.
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Third, Mı´nguez et al. (2017) have proposed an extension of the PS-SAR to spatio-
temporal data when both a large cross-section and a large time series dimensions are
available. With this kind of data it is possible to estimate not only spatial trends, but
also spatio-temporal trends in a nonparametric way (Lee and Durba´n 2011), so as to
capture region-specific nonlinear time trends net of the effect of spatial autocorrelation.
In other words, this approach allows to answer questions like: How do unobserved time-
related factors (i.e. common factors), such as economic-wide technological or demand
shocks, heterogeneously affect long term dynamics of all units in the sample? And how
does their inclusion in the model affect the estimation of spatial interaction effects?
In this sense, the PS-SAR model with spatio-temporal trend represents an alternative
to parametric methods aimed at disentangling common factors effects (such as com-
mon business cycle effects) and spatial dependence effects (local interactions between
spatial units generating spillover effects), where the former is sometimes regarded as
‘strong’ cross-sectional dependence, and the latter as ‘weak’ cross-sectional depen-
dence (Chudik et al. 2011).
In this paper, we propose a critical review of parametric and semiparametric spa-
tial econometric approaches trying to highlight their pros and cons. We will focus on
the capability of each class of models to fit the main features of spatial data (such as
strong and weak spatial dependence, spatial heterogeneity, nonlinearities, and time per-
sistence) leaving the estimation techniques on backstage. The plan of the paper is as
follows. Section 2 summarizes the huge literature on parametric spatial autoregressive
models. Section 3 is dedicated to the broad category of semiparametric spatial autore-
gressive models, disentangling GWR (or MGWR) models based on kernel methods and
models based on penalized spline smoothers. Section 4 provides a brief discussion of
the software available for the practitioners to apply all these models. Finally, Sect. 5
concludes.
2 Parametric Spatial Autoregressive Models
2.1 Modeling Spatial Interaction Effects: Spatial Autoregressive Models
for Cross-Sectional Data
Unlike time dependence, spatial dependence is a difficult concept to grasp, some peo-
ple find. Let us start from a generic notion of “interdependence” and, then, return to
the specific concept of spatial dependence. To introduce the concept of “interdepen-
dence”, let us consider a simple example. Imagine we want to model the scientific pro-
ductivity (SP) of a sample of researchers connected among each other in a network of
co–authorships. SP can be measured, for example, in terms of number of publications
or better in terms of a continuous outcome variable such as an evaluation score whose
distribution is assumed to be normal. For simplicity, we assume that this score depends
only on investments in human capital (such as number of books read, number of new
courses attended, number and length of academic visits abroad, and so on). To model
yi = SPi for each individual researcher i, we start from the classical linear regression
model:
yi = α +∑
k
βkxik + εi i = 1, ...,N εi ∼ iidN
(
0,σ2ε
)
(1)
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where xik indicates a measure of human capital investment. This model imposes a strong
assumption of independence. First, the assumptions on the error term (εi) exclude any
type of covariance. Second, the partial derivatives exclude any kind of indirect (inter-
action or spillover) effect, i.e. an investment in human capital by a researcher i will
affect only his/her own scientific productivity (yi), but not the productivity of any other
researcher (y j):
∂E [yi]/∂xik = β̂k ∂E [y j]/∂xik = ∂E [yi]/∂x jk = 0 i, j = 1, ...,N
We can write this model in matrix form as
y = ιNα +Xβ + ε E [ε] = 0 E
[
εε
′]
= σ2IN (2)
The independence assumption is quite unrealistic, however. In fact, we cannot eval-
uate the scientific performance of this sample of individuals without taking into account
the possibility of knowledge spillovers among them. Suppose that our sample is com-
posed of only five researchers (identified by the letters A, B, C, D, E). Scientific collab-
orations (co-authorship relations) will determine a network or connectivity scheme such
as the one shown in Fig. 1:
A
C
E
D
B
Fig. 1. A network scheme of scientific collaborations (co-authorship relations)
Researcher A has a co-authorship (that is a direct link) only with individuals B and
C. Researcher B has a co-authorship only with individuals A, C and E; and so on. This
network scheme can be translated into a symmetric 5×5 binary matrix W∗:
W∗ =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
A B C D E
A 0 1 1 0 0
B 1 0 1 0 1
C 1 1 0 1 0
D 0 0 1 0 0
E 0 1 0 0 0
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
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with w∗i j = 1 if i and j are classified as co-authors, and w∗i j = 0 otherwise. This binary
matrix can be row-standardized so as wi j = w∗i j/∑ j w∗i j s.t. ∑ j w∗i j = 1:
W =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
0 1/2 1/2 0 0
1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3
1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
Now, we can multiply W by the vector y:
Wy =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
0 1/2 1/2 0 0
1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3
1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
×
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
=
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1/2y2 +1/2y3
1/3y1 +1/3y3 +1/3y5
1/3y1 +1/3y2 +1/3y4
y3
y2
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
Each element of the vector Wy measures the weighted average of the scientific
productivity of the co-authors of each individual. We can also compute WX and Wε .
These three terms can be used to extend model (2). For example, we can include Wy on
the r.h.s. of (2):
y = ιNα +ρWy+Xβ + ε ε ∼ iidN (0,σ2ε IN) (3)
The reduced form of this model is:
y = (IN −ρW)−1(ιNα +Xβ + ε) (IN −ρW)−1 = IN +ρW+ρ2W2 + ...
To ensure that IN −ρW is invertible, one needs to impose some restrictions on the
parameter ρ , which for a row-normalized interaction matrix W correspond to take use
of a compact set of (1/ωmin,1), where ωmin is the minimum eigenvalue of W matrix.
Once this restriction is satisfied, using the estimated parameters of the model (ρ̂ and
β̂k), we can compute the impacts of a change in the k-th explanatory variable, i.e. the
partial derivatives of the expected value of the dependent variable y with respect to the
concerned variable, xk:
Ξ xky = ∂E [y]/∂xk = (IN − ρ̂W)−1β̂k (4)
Unlike to what we observe for the traditional classical linear regression model, diag-
onal elements of (4) are different from each other, off diagonal elements differ from zero
and the matrix itself is not symmetric. In particular, diagonal elements of (4) represent
own-partial derivatives, meaning the impact of a change in the k-th variable in unit i on
the expected value of the dependent variable in this unit. They are formally written as
∂E [yi]/∂xik = [Ξ xky ]ii i = 1, ...,N (5)
These own-partial derivatives are labeled direct impacts and include feedback loop
effects that arise as a result of impacts passing through interacting units j and back
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to unit i. As the set of interacting units is different for each unit, the feedback will be
heterogeneous by nature, giving birth to the notion of interactive heterogeneity. This
interactive heterogeneity should not be confused with parameter heterogeneity, which
refers to instability of parameters (structural breaks, clubs) or heteroskedasticity.
Off-diagonal elements of (4) represent the effects of a change in the k-th explanatory
variable in unit j on the dependent variable in unit i. As matrix (4) is asymmetric, this
further imply that this impact will not be the same as the one caused by a change in unit
i on unit j. Formally,
∂E [yi]/∂x jk = [Ξ xky ]i j = ∂E [y j]/∂xik = [Ξ xky ] ji (6)
These cross-derivative elements are thus labeled indirect effects. Using expressions
(5) and (6), we can for example say that an investment in human capital by individ-
ual A (i.e. an idiosyncratic shock in a xk variable) will affect not only the scientific
productivity of A (direct effect), but also the scientific productivity of his/her own co-
authors (individual A will transmit part of the new knowledge to his/her own co-authors
B and C), the co-authors of his/her co-authors and so on (spillover or indirect effect).
Thus, we can say that there is a global diffusion of the idiosyncratic shock. Given the
stability condition |ρ| < 1, the intensity of these knowledge spillovers decreases with
the increase in the order of co-authorship relations. Since the matrix (IN − ρ̂W)−1 pre-
multiplies also the error term, we can also say that there is a global diffusion of shocks
in the unobserved term.
Eventually, we may introduce both Wy and WX on the r.h.s. of Eq. (1):
y = ιNα +ρWy+Xβ +WXδ + ε ε ∼ iidN (0,σ2ε IN) (7)
Again, the reduced form of this model implies a global diffusion of both observed
and unobserved shocks. The matrix of partial derivatives of y with respect to the k-
th explanatory variable, presented in (8) and computed from the reduced form of model
(7), contains the additional term Wδk.
Ξ xky = ∂E [y]/∂xk = (IN − ρ̂W)−1(IN β̂k +Wδ̂k) (8)
Alternatively, we can leave the systematic part of model (2) unchanged and intro-
duce the assumption of spatial autocorrelation in the error term:
y = ιNα +Xβ + ε ε = λWε +u (9)
|λ | < 1 u ∼ iidN (0,σ2uIN
)
The reduced form of this model
y = ιNα +Xβ +(IN −λW)−1 u
implies a global diffusion of random shocks, but not spillovers of idiosyncratic shocks
in an observed variable. Thus, using model (9), in our example, we would exclude
knowledge spillovers from observed changes in human capital investments of researcher
A; only spillovers from unobserved factors would take place.
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Finally, we may extend model (2) by introducing on the r.h.s. only WX:
y = ιNα +Xβ +WXδ + ε ε ∼ iidN (0,σ2ε IN) (10)
This model implies only local spillovers: an investment in new knowledge by individual
A will spill over only to his/her own co-authors, and vice-versa.
Now, let’s turn to a spatial context and image that the network structure depicted in
Fig. 1 represents a spatial network, identifying direct neighborhood links (i.e. direct
proximity relationships) between regions or firms in space. In spatial statistics and
spatial econometrics, W∗ and W are called the spatial weights matrix and the row-
standardized spatial weights matrix, respectively. Wy is called the spatial lag operator; it
works to produce a weighted average of the neighboring observations. In spatial econo-
metrics, model (3) is called the Spatial Lag Model or Spatial Autoregressive Model
(SAR), model (7) is known as the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), model (9) is known as
the Spatial Error Model (SEM), and model (10) is known as the Spatial in X-variable
Model (SLX). Each of them allows us to capture a different spatial spillover effect.
For example, using cross-regional data, one may estimate a SDM version of the so-
called knowledge production function, according to which the knowledge produced in
a region (Ki) (approximated by the number of patents per capita or by the total factor
productivity) is an increasing function of both internal and external cumulative research
and development (R&Di, ∑ j =i wi j lnR&Dj), and both internal and external human cap-
ital stocks:
lnKi = α +β1 lnR&Di +β2 ∑
j =i
wi j lnR&Dj (11)
+β3 lnHi +β4 ∑
j =i
wi j lnHj +ρ ∑
j =i
wi j lnKj + εi
Technological spillovers among regions may be assumed to be driven by interre-
gional trade relations, as suggested by the endogenous growth theory. Thus, if interre-
gional trade data are available for the regional sample used in the analysis, a researcher
may use them to build a W matrix. Alternatively, spatial proximity measures (such
binary contiguity measures or inverse distance) can be used.
It is worth noticing that a more parsimonious version of (11) is often esti-
mated, which imposes zero values to parameters β4 and ρ , thus assuming only
local spillovers from R&D investments carried out by direct neighboring regions
and excluding global spillovers captured by a spatial multiplier mechanism.
A natural way to proceed is to estimate model (11) and then test these restrictions on
parameters parameters β4 and ρ .
The term Wy that appears on the r.h.s. of (3) and (7) is correlated with the error term,
Cov [Wy;ε] = 0, so that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are biased and inconsis-
tent. Consistent and efficient estimates can be obtained by maximum likelihood (ML)
or quasi-maximum likelihood estimates (QML) (Lee 2004). Two–Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) estimates adapt well to the case of (3) because higher orders of spatial lags
of the X variables are natural candidates to be used as instrumental variables (Kele-
jian and Prucha 1997). A more efficient estimator is the method of moments estimator
(MM) (Kelejian and Prucha 2001). Lee (2004) generalized the MM approach into a
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fully generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for the case of the SDM model
(7), while Liu et al. (2007) proposed a GMM estimator for a SDM with dependent
structures in the error term. The GMM estimator may have, under general conditions,
the same limiting distribution as the ML or QML estimators. Moreover, the 2SLS and
the GMM estimators allow the researcher to take into account any endogeneity prob-
lems in the r.h.s., different from the spatial lag of y.
As mentioned above, direct, indirect and total marginal effects change across spa-
tial units. Specifically, they depend on the specific position of the region within the
spatial proximity network. Thus, in order to summarize the results, it could be easier to
compute average measures of direct, indirect and total effects. In the case of Eq. 3,
the average total marginal effect is computed as N−1i′N
[
(IN −ρW)−1 INβk
]
iN (see
Table 1). The average direct impact is N−1tr
[
(IN −ρW)−1 INβk
]
, while the average
indirect (spatial spillover) impact is the difference between average total and average
indirect effects. In order to draw inference regarding the statistical significance of aver-
age direct and indirect effects, LeSage and Pace (2009, p. 39) suggest simulating the
distribution of these effects using the variance-covariance matrix implied by the ML
estimates. Efficient simulation approaches can be used to produce an empirical distri-
bution of the parameters α,β ,θ ,ρ,σ2 that are needed to calculate the scalar summary
measures. This distribution can be constructed using a large number of simulated para-
meters drawn from the multivariate distribution of the parameters implied by the ML
estimates.
2.2 Modeling Spatial Spillovers and Unobserved Spatial Heterogeneity: Spatial
Autoregressive Models for Panel Data
2.2.1 Static Spatial Panel Data Models
Recently, spatial econometric models have been extended to deal with spatial panel
data, that is data with both a spatial and a temporal dimension (Elhorst 2014b). The
two-dimensional structure of the data allows us to control for unobserved spatial and
time heterogeneity by including individual (spatial) and time effects on the r.h.s. of the
model. Thus, for example, the static panel data SAR model can be written in vector
form for a cross-section of observations at time t (t = 1,2, ...,T ) as:
Table 1. Average total (ATE), direct (ADE), and indirect (AIE) marginal effects
Model ADE AIE ATE
Linear βk 0 βk
SAR
tr
[
(IN −ρW)−1 INβk
]
N
Total-Direct
i
′
N
[
(IN −ρW)−1 INβk
]
iN
N
SEM βk 0 βk
SDM
tr
[
(IN −ρW)−1 (INβk +Wθk)
]
N
Total-Direct
i
′
N
[
(IN −ρW)−1 (INβk +Wθk)
]
iN
N
SLX βk θk βk +θk
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yt = ρWyt +α + ιNτt +Xtβ + ε t (12)
E (ε t) = 0 E (ε tε t) = σ2IN
where, again, W is a row-standardized N ×N spatial weights matrix whose diagonal
elements wii are 0; ρ is the spatial spillover parameter satisfying the usual stability
conditions, and ρ ∑Nj=1wi jy jt captures the spatial spillover effects net of the unobserved
heterogeneity effects filtered out by the spatial fixed effects, αi, and time fixed effects,
τt .
Similarly, the static panel SEM can be expressed as:
yt = α + ιNτt +Xtβ +ϕ t ϕ t = λWϕ t + ε t (13)
E (ε t) = 0 E (ε tε t) = σ2IN
And, the static panel data SDM as:
yt = ρWyt +α + ιNτt +Xtβ +WXtθ + ε t (14)
E (ε t) = 0 E (ε tε t) = σ2IN
For example, the static panel version of the spatial Durbin knowledge production
function (11) reads as:
lnKit = β1 lnR&Dit +β2 ∑
j =i
wi j lnR&Djt (15)
+β3 lnHit +β4 ∑
j =i
wi j lnHjt +ρ ∑
j =i
wi j lnKjt +αi + τt + εit
Depending on the assumptions about individual and time effects, these models will
be estimated using fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE). The latter, more efficient,
is adequate when the effects (individual and temporal) are independent from all regres-
sors included in the specification and are traditionally assumed normally distributed.
When this hypothesis of independence is rejected, either on the basis of a test statis-
tic (Hausman, Lagrange multiplier (LM) or likelihood ratio (LR)) or from economic
insights, the fixed effects specification should be preferred. Even though these two esti-
mation procedures are different, they both consist in first transforming the data (either
applying the within operator for the fixed effects or a quasi-within transformation when
the random effects estimation is used) and then applying standard spatial econometrics
techniques (for example, the QML estimator; Lee and Yu 2010a) on these transformed
data to obtain the estimated parameters.
It should be stressed that the spatial fixed effects can only be estimated consistently
when T is sufficiently large, because the number of observations available for the esti-
mation of each α̂i is T . Importantly, sampling more observations in the cross-sectional
domain is not a solution for insufficient observations in the time domain, since the num-
ber of unknown parameters increases as N increases, a situation known as the incidental
parameters problem. Fortunately, the inconsistency of α̂i is not transmitted to the esti-
mator of the slope coefficients β̂ in the demeaned equation, since this estimator is not
a function of the estimated α̂i. Consequently, the incidental parameters problem does
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not matter when β̂ are the coefficients of interest and the spatial fixed effects α̂i are not,
which is the case in many empirical studies.
Finally, it is important to recognize that, apart from the control for unobserved het-
erogeneity, the economic interpretation of static spatial autoregressive models is the
same as the one for cross-sectional data. Impacts measures implied by a spatial static
panel data model are indeed the same as those in a spatial autoregressive model for
cross-sectional data, as soon as the interaction matrix and the parameters of interest of
the former are assumed constant across time. Different is the case of spatial dynamic
panel data models, which give rise to the possibility of evaluating the effects of transi-
tory and permanent shocks both in the short-run and in the long-run equilibrium.
2.2.2 Dynamic Spatial Panel Data Models
In order to simultaneously deal with time persistence and spatial interdependence along
with spatial and temporal heterogeneity, a dynamic spatial panel data model with fixed
spatial and time effects is needed. The spatial econometric literature provides several
alternative specifications of spatial dynamic models. A very general one includes time
lags of both the dependent and independent variables, contemporaneous spatial lags of
both, and lagged spatial lags of both. However, as Elhorst (2014b) have pointed out,
this generalized model suffers from identification problems, and is thus not useful for
empirical research. A more parsimonious model (written in vector form for a cross-
section of observations at time t) can be expressed as:
yt = τyt−1 +ρWyt +ηWyt−1 +Xtβ +WXtθ +α +λt ιN + ε t (16)
ε t ∼ iidN (0,σ2ε IN)
Lee and Yu (2010b); Yu et al. (2008) have proposed bias corrected QML estimators
for a dynamic model with spatial and time fixed effects. However, these estimators are
based on the assumption of only exogenous covariates except for the time and spatial
lag terms. Kukenova and Monteiro (2008) have suggested to use System-GMM estima-
tor Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic spatial panel model with several endogenous
variables. More specifically, they have investigated the finite sample properties of differ-
ent estimators for spatial dynamic panel models (namely, spatial ML, spatial dynamic
ML, least-square-dummy-variable, Diff-GMM and System-GMM) and concluded that,
in order to account for the endogeneity of several covariates, spatial dynamic panel
models should be estimated using System-GMM.
The stationarity conditions on the spatial and temporal parameters in a dynamic
spatial panel data model like (16) go beyond the standard condition |τ| < 1 in serial
models, and the standard condition 1/ωmin < ρ < 1 in spatial models. Indeed, to achieve
stationarity in the dynamic spatial panel data model (16), the characteristic roots of the
matrix (IN −ρW)−1(τIN +ηW) should lie within the unit circle (Debarsy et al. 2012)
which is the case when
τ +(ρ +η)ωmax < 1 if ρ +η ≥ 0
τ +(ρ +η)ωmin < 1 if ρ +η < 0
τ − (ρ −η)ωmax > −1 if ρ −η ≥ 0
τ − (ρ −η)ωmin > −1 if ρ −η < 0
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Assuming that the matrix (IN − ρW)−1 is invertible, the reduced form of model
(16) can be re-written as
yt = (IN −ρWyt)−1(τιN +ηW)yt−1
+(IN −ρWyt)−1(Xtβ +WXtθ +α +λt ιN + ε t)
Taking the partial derivatives of the expected value of y with respect to each k-th
variable in X in each unit i at each time t, we than obtain the so-called impacts matrices
in the short run:
[
∂E(y)
∂xk1
...
∂E(y)
∂xkN
]
t
= (IN − ρ̂W)−1(β̂kIN +Wt θ̂k)
and in the long run:
[
∂E(y)
∂xk1
...
∂E(y)
∂xkN
]
= [(1− τ̂)IN − (ρ̂ + η̂)W]−1 (β̂kIN +Wt θ̂k)
The diagonal elements of both matrices give a measure of the so-called direct effect.
The off-diagonal elements of the matrices give a measure of the so-called indirect or
spillover effect (Table 2).
Table 2. Average total, direct, and indirect short-term and long marginal effects in dynamic spatial
panels. d: operator that calculates the mean diagonal element of a matrix. rsum: operator that
calculates the mean row sum of the non-diagonal elements.
Time horizon ADE
Short-term
[
(IN − ρ̂W)−1(β̂kIN + θ̂kW)
]d
Long-term
[
[(1− τ̂)IN − (ρ̂ + η̂)W]−1 (β̂kIN + θ̂kW)
]d
AIE
Short-term
[
(IN − ρ̂W)−1(β̂kIN + θ̂kW)
]rsum
Long-term
[
[(1− τ̂)IN − (ρ̂ + η̂)W]−1 (β̂kIN +θkW)
]rsum
Moreover, Debarsy et al. (2012) derive the algorithms to calculate partial derivatives
that can quantify the magnitude and timing of dependent variable responses in each
region at various time horizons t + T to changes in the explanatory variables at time
t. They also distinguish between two different interpretative scenarios, one where the
change in explanatory variables represents a permanent or sustained change in the level
and the other where we have a transitory (or one-period) change.
In particular, the T -period-ahead (cumulative) impact arising from a permanent
change at time t in the k-th variable is1:
∂Yt+T/∂Xk =
T
∑
s=0
Ds[INβk +Wθk] (17)
1 By a permanent change at time t they mean that: ∂Xk = (xt + δ ,xt+1 + δ , ...,xT + δ ), so the
values increase to a new level and remain there in future time periods.
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where Ds = (−1)s(B−1 + C)sB−1, with s = 0, ...,T − 1, B = (IN − ρW), and C =
−(τIN +ηW).
The main diagonal elements of the N ×N matrix sums in (17) for time horizon T
represent (cumulative) own-region impacts that arise from both time and spatial depen-
dence. The sum of off-diagonal elements of this matrix reflect both spillovers measuring
contemporaneous cross-partial derivatives, and diffusion measuring cross-partial deriv-
atives that involve different time periods.2
The T -horizon impulse response to a transitory change in the k-th explanatory vari-
able at time t would be given by the main and off-diagonal elements of:
∂Yt+T/∂Xk = DT [INβk +Wθk] (18)
where DT = (−1)T (B−1C)TB−1.
Getting back to the example of the knowledge production function, the spatial
dynamic version of (15) would be:
lnKit = β1 lnR&Dit +β2 ∑
j =i
wi j lnR&Djt +β3 lnHit +β4 ∑
j =i
wi j lnHjt (19)
+τ lnKi,t−1 +ρ ∑
j =i
wi j lnKjt +η ∑
j =i
wi j lnKj,t−1 +αi + τt + εit
The estimation of this model would allow us to compute not only spatial (contempo-
raneous) R&D spillovers, but also spatio-temporal diffusion processes of R&D shocks
originating in a region (or a country).
2.3 Modeling Spatial Dependence, Spatial Heterogeneity and Common Factors:
Spatial Autoregressive Models for Large Panel Data
When spatial panel data have both a large cross-sectional and a large time series dimen-
sion, it becomes important to distinguish between spatial spillover effects and com-
mon factors. As discussed above, spatial spillovers are due to unobserved idiosyncratic
shocks which propagate to all other regions with a distance-decay mechanism driven
by network relationships. Instead, common factors are unobserved time-related factors
which influence all regions (probably heterogeneously). Both determine cross-sectional
correlation in the residuals and make it difficult to get unbiased and efficient estimates.
On the one hand, spatial spillover effects can be analyzed by using, for example,
the spatial autoregressive model with fixed effects, described above. On the other hand,
strong cross-sectional dependence can be accommodated by the Common Correlated
Effects Pooled (CCEP) estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006). Suppose that yit is gen-
erated by the following DGP with a multifactor error structure:
yit = αi +x′itβ + εit (20)
xit = γ
′
i ft + vit
2 The term spillover is referred to contemporaneous cross-partial derivatives, those that involve
the same time period. These cross-partial derivatives involving different time periods are
referred to as diffusion effects, since diffusion takes time.
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where ft is a m×1 vector of common factors (introduced to allow for unobserved cross-
sectional dependence), and γi the corresponding heterogeneous response. ft are allowed
to be correlated with xit , while the idiosyncratic errors, εit , are assumed to be indepen-
dently distributed over xit . Pesaran (2006) shows that, for sufficiently large N, it is valid
to use cross-sectional averages of yit and xit as observable proxies for ft . Thus, consis-
tent β parameters can be estimated using the so-called CCEP estimator, which can be
viewed as a generalized fixed effects estimator3:
yit = αi +x′itβ +δixt +ηiyt + εit (21)
where xt = N−1 ∑Ni=1 xit and yt = N−1 ∑
N
i=1 yit .
The CCEP approach has been proved to be valid in presence of both strong and
weak (or semi-strong and semi-weak) cross dependence (Chudik et al. 2011; Pesaran
and Tosetti 2011). Thus, it can easily collect even the pure spatial spillover effects.
However, economic analyses often requires the assessment of the different forms of
cross dependence, or better still, they require the assessment of spatial network effects,
net of the effects of common factors. A natural way to deal with this problem is to
combine the two approaches.
Using slightly different frameworks, Bai and Li (2015); Bailey et al. (2016); Shi and
Lee (2016); Vega and Elhorst (2016) consider a joint modeling of spatial interaction
effects and common-shocks effects:
yit = αi +ρ
N
∑
j=1
wi j,Ny jt +x′itβ + γ
′
i ft + εit (22)
This model (we may call it SAR-CCEP model) allows one to test which type of effects
(common shocks, γ ′i ft , and/or spatial spillovers, ρ ∑
N
j=1wi j,Ny jt ) is responsible for the
cross-sectional dependence. Bai and Li (2015); Shi and Lee (2016) use principle com-
ponents to estimate common factors, while Bailey et al. (2016); Vega and Elhorst (2016)
follow Pesaran (2006) in using cross-sectional averages of yit and xit as observable
proxies for ft . Bailey et al. (2016) propose a two-stage estimation and inference strat-
egy, whereby in the first step strong cross-sectional dependence is modeled by means
of a factor model. Residuals from such factor models, referred to as de-factored obser-
vations, are then used to model the remaining weak cross dependencies, making use
of spatial econometrics techniques. Vega and Elhorst (2016), instead, suggest to model
common factors and spatial dependence simultaneously in a single-step procedure. All
these authors show that the QMLE is an effective way of estimating this model.
Getting back to the example of the knowledge production function, the SAR-CCEP
version of (15) would be:
lnKit = β1 lnR&Dit +β2 ∑
j =i
wi j lnR&Djt +β3 lnHit +β4 ∑
j =i
wi j lnHjt
+ρ ∑
j =i
wi j lnKjt +αi + γ
′
i ft + εit (23)
3 The assumption of fixed β parameters can be relaxed, and a random coefficient specification
can be assumed: β i = β + ui, with ui ∼ i.i.d.(0,Ωu). In this case the estimator proposed by
Pesaran (2006) is the common correlated effects mean group (CCEMG) estimator.
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Strong cross-sectional dependence in the errors of a knowledge production function
may arise as a result of unobserved common factors, including, for instance, aggregate
technological shocks, national policies intended to raise the level of technology or oil
price shocks that may influence TFP through their effects on product costs. The het-
erogeneous effects of these factors may be the result, for instance, of country-specific
technological constraints (Ertur and Musolesi 2016). Cross-sectional dependence in the
errors of a knowledge production function can also be regarded as a result of spatial
effects. Thus, a SAR-CCEP version of the knowledge production function seems to be
a natural choice when the panel data is large enough.
Some drawbacks of this approach are worth noticing. First, there is a large number
of incidental parameters under the joint modeling. Admittedly, this is not a serious prob-
lem as long as the model is linear, since inconsistency in the estimation of the incidental
parameters is not transmitted to the estimation of the slope parameters of interest (β );
but, it may create a problem when nonlinear terms are considered. Second, the ability of
the SAR-CCEP method to capture strong cross-sectional dependence and to disentan-
gle spatial spillover effects and common factor effects is crucially affected by the set of
covariates included in the model. On the one hand, if the estimated model contains one
or only a few regressors, the CEEP estimator may not fully control for cross-sectional
correlation (few regressors implies few cross-sectional averages as proxies for unob-
served common factors); on the other hand, if the model includes many regressors, the
resulting large number of cross-sectional averages hardly leave space for residual spa-
tial spillovers. In Sect. 3.3, we review an alternative semiparametric approach to filter
common-factor (or time-related) effects and, thus, to assess the presence of “residual”
spatial dependence effects which adequately addresses these problems.
3 Semiparametric Spatial Autoregressive Models
Parametric spatial econometric frameworks described above are unfeasible in the simul-
taneous presence of different sources of model misspecification, such as substantial
spatial dependence, nonlinear relationship of spatially correlated independent variables,
unobserved spatial heterogeneity, spatially varying relationships, and common factors.
Nonlinearities, spatial heterogeneity and time-related factors can cause spatial (or, more
generally, cross-sectional) dependence and the reverse is also true. Studies that con-
sider simultaneously spatial dependence, spatial heterogeneity, nonlinearities and com-
mon factors are still scarce in spatial econometrics literature. The recent contributions
of Basile et al. (2014); Geniaux and Martinetti (2017); Mı´nguez et al. (2017) represent
some attempts to promote more flexible estimation frameworks to address this problem.
3.1 Modeling Spatial Heterogeneity and Spatial Dependence: MGWR-SAR
What are the economic motivations underlying the specification of a spatially-varying
coefficient model? First, one can argue that models which only consider spatial autocor-
relation are not capable of correcting all the problems related to non-observable spatial
heterogeneity. This has pushed several authors to consider a non-stationary intercept
term amongst the regression variables, for example by means of a smooth interaction of
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the spatial coordinates, known as spatial trend (Wood 2006).4 Nevertheless, this argu-
ment can be extended to consider a model with spatially-varying slope coefficients. It
is also possible to consider a non-stationary spatial autocorrelation parameter. Indeed,
when the spatial weight matrix W is unknown and spatial locations are irregularly dis-
tributed over space, the choice of a neighboring scheme based only on distance or first
nearest neighbors can be tricky. Choosing one weighting scheme instead of the other
can lead to a spatial interaction matrix that is too dense or too dispersed in the heteroge-
neous parts of the space, resulting in under or overestimation of the parameters. Hence,
the use of a non-stationary spatial autocorrelation parameter could mitigate the effect
of the spatial weight matrix misspecification.
Very recently, Geniaux and Martinetti (2017) have introduced a new class of mod-
els, called MGWR-SAR (Mixed Geographically Weighted Regression Simultaneous
AutoRegressive models), where the regression parameters and the spatial dependence
coefficient can vary over space. In its most general form, the MGWR-SAR is specified
as:
y = ρ(xs1 ,xs2 ;h)Wy+X
∗β ∗ +β (xs1 ,xs2 ;h)X+ ε (24)
where y is the N−vector of the continuous dependent variable, X∗ is a matrix of k1
exogenous explanatory variables entering the model linearly (i.e. with spatially station-
ary coefficients β ∗), while X is a matrix of k2 exogenous explanatory variables with
non-stationary coefficients β (xs1 ,xs2 ;h)), xs1 ,xs2 are spatial coordinates, W is the spa-
tial weights matrix, ρ the spatial spillover parameter, ε is an i.i.d. error vector.
Thus, Geniaux and Martinetti (2017) relax one of the main hypothesis generally
adopted by existing estimators of SAR models, i.e. the spatial parameter ρ and the
regression parameters β are constant over the coordinates space. In fact, in equation
(24) the value of ρ and β depends on the coordinates. The parameters ρ(xs1 ,xs2)
and β (xs1 ,xs2) are only required to be spatially smoothed. The degree of smoothness
depends on the bandwidth parameter h which allows to define the local sub-sample
around the coordinates of each point (xs1 ,xs2 ) using a given kernel function.
Because of the presence of the endogenous spatial lag term (Wy) on the r.h.s. of
Eq. (24), the marginal effects of a change in X∗ or in X must be computed starting from
the reduced form of the model. Specifically, the marginal effect of a change in X∗ is:
∂y
∂X∗
= [IN −ρ(xs1 ,xs2 ;h)W]−1 β ∗ (25)
while the marginal effect of a change in X is:
∂y
∂X∗
= [IN −ρ(xs1 ,xs2 ;h)W]−1 β (xs1 ,xs2 ;h) (26)
For the estimation of these new models, Geniaux and Martinetti (2017) resort to
the Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares (S2SLS) technique. In particular, they use a 5-step
approach, a local linear estimator (a variant of the GWR) and Cross Validation for the
selection of the bandwidth parameter.
4 It is worth noting that the spatial trend term can be included even in a model for cross-sectional
data, while spatial fixed or random effects can be included in a model to control for spatial
unobserved heterogeneity only when spatial panel data are available.
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Using cross-regional data, one may for example estimate a knowledge production
function with heterogeneous parameters:
lnKi = α(xs1,i,xs2,i)+β1(xs1,i,xs2,i) lnR&Di (27)
+β2(xs1,i,xs2,i) lnHi +ρ(xs1,i,xs2,i)∑
j =i
wi j lnKj + εi
The regional learning process of generating and transferring knowledge may be
affected by local social capital, i.e. the institutional and cultural context of local net-
works, trust and conventions. Therefore, heterogeneous region-specific conditions are
a source of spatial heterogeneity in intra-regional knowledge creation. In addition, het-
erogeneous region-specific conditions are related with the regional capacity of exploit-
ing external knowledge sources. Thus, model 27 would allows a researcher to assess the
spatial stationarity (homogeneity) of the parameters associated to R&D investments and
to human capital investments, as well as the spatial stationarity of the spatial knowledge
spillover parameter (ρ). Nonstationarity may be evident by inspection of basic maps,
and can be formally tested. For example, Kang and Dallerba (2016) have investigated
the spatial heterogeneity in the marginal effects of a regional knowledge production
function by using nonparametric local modeling approaches such as GWR and mixed
GWR with two distinct samples of the US Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and
non-MSA counties. The results indicate a high degree of spatial heterogeneity in the
marginal effects of the knowledge input variables, more specifically for the local and
distant spillovers of private knowledge measured across MSA counties. On the other
hand, local academic knowledge spillovers are found to display spatially homogeneous
elasticities in both MSA and non-MSA counties.
A characteristic of this approach is that it only considers spatial parameter hetero-
geneity (i.e. parameter heterogeneity over the coordinates space), while neglecting the
possibility of pure nonlinearities (i.e. parameter heterogeneity over the domain of the
explanatory variable). Nevertheless, it remains very important to assess the existence of
pure nonlinearities in the relationship between the response variable and the covariates.
In fact, regional and urban economic development literature often predicts threshold
effects (for example in growth theory) or monotonic relationships (for example in urban
economics). Moreover, keeping the spatial autocorrelation parameter (ρ) constant over
space is a valid option: in that case, the feedback effects of spatial autocorrelation have
a clearer definition and the interpretation of direct and indirect effects is easier.
3.2 Modeling Spatial Dependence, Spatial Heterogeneity and Nonlinearities:
P-Spline Models for Cross-Sectional Data and Short Panels
Another recent strand of the spatial econometric literature has proposed Spatial Autore-
gressive Semiparametric Geoadditive Models as a means of simultaneously dealing
with different critical issues typically encountered when using spatial economic data;
namely, spatial dependence, spatial heterogeneity and unknown functional form (Basile
et al. 2014; Montero et al. 2012). This approach combines penalized regression spline
(PS) methods (Eilers et al. 2015) with standard spatial autoregressive models (such as
SAR, SEM, SDM and SLX). An important feature of these models is that they make it
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possible to include within the same specification: (i) spatial autoregressive terms to cap-
ture spatial interaction or network effects; (ii) parametric and nonparametric (smooth)
terms to identify nonlinear relationships between the response variable and the covari-
ates; and (iii) a geoadditive term, i.e. a smooth function of the spatial coordinates, to
capture a spatial trend effect, that is, to capture spatially autocorrelated unobserved het-
erogeneity.
The structural form of the Penalized-Spline Spatial Lag model (PS-SAR) is:
y = ρWy+X∗β ∗ + f1 (x1)+ f2 (x2)+ f3 (x3,x4) (28)
+ f4 (x1)z+ ...+h(xs1 ,xs2)+ ε
where y is a continuous univariate output variable, Wy its spatial lag, X∗β ∗ is the lin-
ear predictor for any strictly parametric component (including the intercept, all cate-
gorical covariates and eventually a set of continuous covariates). fk (.) are unknown
smooth functions of univariate continuous covariates or bivariate interaction surfaces
of continuous covariates, capturing nonlinear effects of exogenous variables. Which
of the explanatory variables enter the model parametrically or non-parametrically may
depend on theoretical priors or can be suggested by the results of model specifica-
tion tests (Kneib et al. 2009). f4 (x1)z is a varying coefficient term, where z is either
a continuous or a binary covariate. The term h(xs1 ,xs2) is a smooth spatial trend sur-
face, i.e. a smooth interaction between latitude and longitude. It allows us to control
for unobserved spatial heterogeneity, which is a primary task when dealing with spatial
data. When the term h(xs1 ,xs2) is interacted with one of the explanatory variables (e.g.,
h(xs1 ,xs2)x1), it allows us to estimate spatially varying coefficients (like in the GWR
model). Finally, ε are iid normally distributed random shocks.5
This model reflects the notion of spatial dependence made of two parts: (i) a spa-
tial trend due to unobserved regional characteristics, which is modeled by the smooth
function of the coordinates, and (ii) global spatial spillover effects, which are modeled
by including the spatial lag of the dependent variable. The introduction of the spatial
lags of the exogenous (X) variables results in what can be called the Penalized-Spline
Geoadditive Spatial Durbin Model (PS-SDM).
When the ρ parameter is not statistically different from zero, i.e. in the case of a
simpler semiparametric geoadditive model without the spatial lag of the dependent vari-
able (PS model), if all regressors are manipulated independently of the errors, f̂k (xk)
can be interpreted as the conditional expectation of y given xk (net of the effect of the
other regressors). Blundell and Powell (2003) use the term Average Structural Function
(ASF) with reference to this function. Instead, when ρ is different from zero, the esti-
mated smooth functions — f̂k(xk) — cannot be interpreted as ASF. Taking advantage
of the results obtained for parametric SAR, we can compute the total smooth effect
(total–ASF) of xk as
f̂ Tk (xk) = Σq [In − ρ̂Wn]−1i j bkq(xk)β̂kq (29)
5 This assumption can be relaxed by a more general specification, such as ε ∼ N (0,σ2ε Λ) being
Λ a covariance matrix reflecting cross-sectional dependence in the errors as, for example,
in Pinheiro and Bates (2000).
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where bkq(xk) are P-spline basis functions, and β̂kq the corresponding estimated para-
meters.
We can also compute direct and indirect (or spillover) effects of smooth terms in the
PS-SAR case as:
f̂ Dk (xk) = Σq [In − ρ̂Wn]−1ii bkq(xk)β̂kq (30)
f̂ Ik (xk) = f̂
T
k (xk)− f̂ Dk (xk) (31)
Similar expressions can be provided for the direct, indirect and total effects of the
PS-SDM (Table 3).
Table 3. Total, direct, and indirect smooth effects
Model Direct Smooth Effect: f̂ dekk (xk)
PS model bkq(xk)β̂kq
PS-SLM Σq [IN − ρ̂WN ]−1ii bkq(xk)β̂kq
PS-SEM bkq(xk)β̂kq
PS-SDM Σq [IN − ρ̂WN ]−1ii
[
bkq(xk)β̂kq +bkg(WNxk)β̂kg
]
PS-SLX bkq(xk)β̂kq
Model Indirect Smooth Effect: f̂ iekk (xk)
PS model 0
PS-SLM f̂ tekk (xk)− f̂ dekk (xk)
PS-SEM 0
PS-SDM f̂ tekk (xk)− f̂ dekk (xk)
PS-SLX bkg(WNxk)β̂kg
Model Total Smooth Effect: f̂ tekk (xk)
PS model bkq(xk)β̂kq
PS-SLM Σq [IN − ρ̂WN ]−1i j bkq(xk)β̂kq
PS-SEM bkq(xk)β̂kq
PS-SDM Σq [IN − ρ̂WN ]−1i j
[
bkq(xk)β̂kq +bkg(WNxk)β̂kg
]
PS-SLX bkq(xk)β̂kq +bkg(WNxk)β̂kg
The Spatial Error Geoadditive Model (PS-SEM) proposed by Mı´nguez et al. (2012)
augments the PS model by including a spatial autoregressive error term, while leaving
the systematic part unchanged:
y = X∗β ∗ + f1 (x1)+ f2 (x2)+ f3 (x3,x4) (32)
+ f4 (x1)z+ ...+h(xs1 ,xs2)+u
u = λWu+ ε ε ∼ iidN (0,σ2ε )
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where λ is a spatial autoregressive parameter. As in the case of the pure PS model, if
all regressors are exogenous, f̂k (xk) = Σqbkq(xk)β̂kq can be directly interpreted as the
conditional expectation of y given xk (ASF).
Getting back to the example of the knowledge production function, the PS-SAR
counterpart of model (15) for a short panel data can be for example specified as:
lnKit = α + f (lnR&Dit , lnHit)+ρ ∑
j =i
wi j lnKjt +h(xs1,i,xs2,i)+ εit (33)
The nonparametric part of model 33 relaxes the standard assumptions of linearity and
additivity regarding the effect of R&D and human capital. Charlot et al. (2015) use a
similar specification to analyze the genesis of innovation in the regions of the European
Union. Their results unveil nonlinearities, threshold effects, complex interactions and
shadow effects that cannot be uncovered by standard parametric formulations.
3.3 Modeling Spatial Spillovers, Spatial Heterogeneity, Nonlinearities and
Time-Related Factors: Spatio-Temporal Semiparametric Autoregressive
Models for Large Panel Data
In this section we propose a class of spatio-temporal models for large spatial panel data
which represent a generalization of the Spatial Autoregressive Semiparametric Geoad-
ditive Models discussed in Sect. 3.2. They are a flexible alternative to the parametric
models presented in Sect. 2.3 for modeling spatial panel data as long as the spatio-
temporal heterogeneity is smoothly distributed (a very common case, one may say, in
empirical economic analyses), so that we can approximate it with smooth nonparamet-
ric functions.
The general model proposed is written as:
y = f˜ (xs1 ,xs2 ,xt)+ρWy+
k
∑
δ=1
gδ (xδ )+ ε (34)
where f˜ (xs1 ,xs2 ,xt) is a smooth spatio-temporal trend, i.e. a three-dimensional smooth
function of the spatial coordinates (xs1 ,xs2 ), and of the time component xt ; gδ (.), δ =
1, . . . ,k, are also smooth functions of the covariates xδ ,it (they can be linear, or can
accommodate varying coefficient terms, smooth interactions between covariates, factor-
by-smooth curves, and so on); W is the spatial weights matrix, ρ the spatial spillover
parameter, and ε ∼ N (0,R) where R can be multiple of the identity (if errors are
independent), or include a temporal correlation structure.
In many situations the spatio-temporal trend to be estimated by f˜ can be complex,
and the use of a multidimensional smooth function may not be flexible enough to cap-
ture the structure in the data. To solve this problem, Lee and Durba´n (2011) proposed an
ANOVA-type decomposition of f˜ (xs1 ,xs2 ,xt) where spatial and temporal main effects,
and second- and third-order interactions between them can be identified:
f˜ (xs1 ,xs2 ,xt) = f1(xs1)+ f2(xs2)+ ft(xt)+ f1,2(xs1 ,xs2)
+ f1,t(xs1 ,xt)+ f2,3(xs2 ,xt)+ f1,2,3(xs1 ,xs2 ,xt)
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Thus, model (34) can be written as:
y = f1(xs1)+ f2(xs2)+ ft(xt)+ f1,2(xs1 ,xs2)+ f1,t(xs1 ,xt)
+ f2,3(xs2 ,xt)+ f1,2,3(xs1 ,xs2 ,xt)+ρWNy+
k
∑
δ=1
gδ (xδ )+ ε (35)
We will refer to it as the PS-ANOVA-SAR(AR1) model. It is flexible enough to simul-
taneously control for different sources of bias: spatial heterogeneity bias, spatial depen-
dence bias, omitted-time related factors bias, and functional form bias.
First, as already pointed out in Basile et al. (2014), the geoadditive terms given by
f1(xs1 ), f2(xs2) and f1,2(xs1 ,xs2) work as control functions to filter the spatial trend out
of the residuals, and transfer it to the mean response in a model specification. Thus,
they allow to capture the shape of the spatial distribution of y, eventually conditional
on the determinants included in the model. These control functions also isolate sto-
chastic spatial dependence in the residuals, that is spatially autocorrelated unobserved
heterogeneity. Thus, they can be regarded as an alternative to individual regional dum-
mies to capture unobserved heterogeneity as long as the latter is smoothly distributed
over space. Regional dummies peak significantly higher and lower levels of the mean
response variable. If these peaks are smoothly distributed over a two-dimensional sur-
face (i.e., if unobserved heterogeneity is spatially autocorrelated), the smooth spatial
trend is able to capture them.
Second, the smooth time trend, ft(xt), and the smooth interactions between space
and time - f1,t(xs1 ,xt), f2,t(xs2 ,xt), and f1,2,t(xs1 ,xs2 ,xt) - work as control functions
to capture the heterogeneous effect of common shocks. Thus, the PS-ANOVA-SAR
model works as an alternative to the models proposed by Bai and Li (2015); Bailey
et al. (2016); Pesaran and Tosetti (2011); Shi and Lee (2016); Vega and Elhorst (2016)
based on extensions of common factor models to accommodate both strong cross-
sectional dependence (through the estimation of the spatio-temporal trend) and weak
cross-sectional dependence (through the estimation of the ρ parameter). The advantage
of the PS-ANOVA-SAR model lies in the fact that its ability to fully control for the
residual cross-sectional dependence and to assess the presence of network effects net of
common factor effects, is not crucially affected by the set of covariates included in the
model.
Furthermore, this framework is also flexible enough to control for the linear and
nonlinear functional relationships between the dependent variable and the covariates.
Getting back to the example of the knowledge production function, the PS-ANOVA-
SAR version of (33) for a panel data with a long time series would be:
lnKit = f (lnR&Dit , lnHit)+ρ ∑
j =i
wi j lnKjt (36)
+ f1(xs1,i)+ f2(xs2,i)+ ft(xt)+ f1,2(xs1,i,xs2,i)+ f1,t(xs1,i,xt)
+ f2,3(xs2,i,xt)+ f1,2,3(xs1,i,xs2,i,xt)+ εit
4 Software
Nowadays there is a wide range of software allowing to estimate most of the economet-
ric models exposed in this Chapter. Some of them, like GeoDa (Anselin et al. 2006),
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use a menu interface which permits the user to perform spatial exploratory analysis,
and to estimate parametric spatial econometric models for cross-sectional data without
the need to learn new commands. Nevertheless, other well-known software alternatives
require some skills in the corresponding programming language to deal with the spa-
tial data. This is the case of some specialized packages in R (R Core Team 2016), the
library PySAL (Rey and Anselin 2007) written in Python (Van Rossum 1995), the tool-
box for spatial econometric models written by LeSage (2009) in MATLAB (MATLAB
2017), some functions, also in MATLAB, to estimate static and dynamic spatial panel
data models developed by Elhorst (Elhorst et al. 2013), and a suite of commands for
spatial data in SAS (SAS Institute Inc. 2013) or Stata (StataCorp. 2015). Bivand and
Piras (2015) compare the results obtained by using different software alternatives and
conclude that all of them provide similar results.
In this overview we focus on R, for the following reasons6:
• it is a well-tested free software with a growing number of packages in all statistical
fields (spatial analysis included);
• it has a huge community of users;
• the possibility to combine functional programming with object-oriented program-
ming (Chambers 2016) allows the developers to build new packages making use of
the existing ones;
• it allows to estimate most of the spatial econometric models exposed in this chapter
including both parametric models (for cross-sectional and static panel data) and
semiparametric models.
The R packages spdep (Bivand 2013) and sp (Bivand et al. 2013; Pebesma and
Bivand 2005) facilitate the creation, transformation and manipulation of spatial objects,
neighborhood matrices and the computation of descriptive measures of spatial autocor-
relation. Moreover, the package spdep allows researchers to estimate the whole set of
cross-sectional spatial autoregressive models exposed in Sect. 2.1 including SAR, SEM,
SDM, SLX and SAC models using either ML or GMM estimation in an efficient way.
Furthermore, this package also permits us to compute the marginal effects and make
inference on their values. To extend the range of standard spatial models considered,
Piras (2010) created the sphet package for estimating and testing parametric spatial
models with heteroskedastic innovations using estimation procedures based on GMM.
To deal with the static spatial panel data models discussed in Sect. 2.2.1, Millo and
Piras (2012) have developed the splm package. It includes a set of functions able to esti-
mate a full range of static spatial panel data models including fixed or random effects;
spatial lags for the error term or dependepent variable and, possibly, serial correlation
in the noise of the model. Millo (2014) provides an extensive overview of these models
including algorithms to estimate them using MLE. These packages can also be used
to estimate the SAR-CCEP model discussed in Sect. 2.3. Unfortunately, there is not a
freely available R package for he estimation and inference of dynamic spatial panel data
models, revised in Sect. 2.2.2, while some functions are available in MATLAB (Elhorst
2014a; Elhorst et al. 2013).
6 Two recent references of the use of R for spatial statistical and econometric analysis are Arbia
(2014); Brunsdon and Comber (2015). A more classical reference is given by Bivand et al.
(2013).
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Focusing on semiparametric spatial data models (Sect. 3), McMillen (2013) has
written the McSpatial package which includes routines to estimate nonparametric
and conditionally parametric versions of spatial linear regression and spatial models
with binary dependent variable. It mainly uses kernel techniques to perform the non-
parametric estimations. Moreover, the package GWmodel (Gollini et al. 2015; Lu et al.
2014) deals with geographical weighted (GW) models, and includes functions for com-
putation of GW summary statistics and regression, GW principal components analysis,
and GW discriminant analysis. The techniques to estimate MGWR-SAR models dis-
cussed in Sect. 3.1 are already included in the forthcoming R package gwrsar (Geniaux
and Martinetti 2017).
Finally, considering semiparametric regression models that include spatial or spatio-
temporal trends, both packages mgcv (Wood 2006) and R2BayesX (Belitz et al. 2016;
Umlauf et al. 2015) include some functions to estimate models including complex spa-
tial and spatio-temporal trends, parametric and non-parametric covariates and interac-
tions between them. Both packages have the possibility to choose P-spline methodology
or the combination of other type of spline bases with penalty matrices for the non-
parametric terms. The full class of models are usually estimated either by restricted
maximum likelihood (REML) or bayesian methods. The techniques to estimate PS-
SAR and PS-ANOVA-SAR models (Mı´nguez et al. 2017) discussed in Sect. 3.2 will
also be included in a forthcoming R package.
5 Conclusions
Spatial econometrics is commonly conceived as a powerful method for capturing spa-
tial spillover (or spatial interaction) effects. It is based on the assumption that, when
an idiosyncratic shock hits a specific spatial unit (a country, a region, a firm, etc.),
then its effects propagate to all other spatial units in the sample with a distance-decay
mechanism. For example, in estimating a regional knowledge production function using
a simple cross-section of regional data, we must be able to assess the impact of the
investment in R&D in a region on both its own productivity outcome (TFP) and on the
outcome of all other regions in the sample. Spatial econometricians have also derived
statistical measures of direct and indirect (spillover) marginal impacts to quantify this
phenomenon (LeSage and Pace 2009).
Nevertheless, is also important to recognize that the evidence of spatial spillovers
might (at least partially) mask other specification errors, such as wrong functional form,
unobserved spatial heterogeneity, heteroskedasticity, unobserved common factors, time
persistence, and so on. Without a proper control for these sources of bias, the esti-
mated spatial spillover effect often appears very (unrealistically) strong. For example,
in estimating a regional knowledge production function using a simple cross-section of
regional data without any control for nonlinearities and spatial unobserved heterogene-
ity, one may find evidence of an average indirect (spillover) impact of R&D on TFP sim-
ilar to the corresponding average direct marginal effect. This is obviously unreasonable.
In this Chapter we have reviewed different parametric and semiparametric
approaches recently developed to mitigate this problem. Not surprisingly, parametric
spatial panel models received most attention in the literature. In particular, dynamic spa-
tial panel data models and spatial panel autoregressive models with common factors turn
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to be very important tools for simultaneously control for spatial spillovers, unobserved
spatial heterogeneity, unobserved common factor and time persistence. However, in the
Chapter we have also pointed out that spatial autoregressive semiparametric geoaddi-
tive models (PS-SAR models; Basile et al. 2014) may play a prominent role in those
context in which the theory suggests the existence of spatial interdependence and het-
erogeneous behavior of the spatial units. These methods represent indeed some flexible
approaches which are able to address simultaneously spatial dependence, heterogeneity
and nonlinearity. Moreover, we have reviewed more recently developed semiparametric
models for longitudinal data including a non-parametric spatio-temporal trend, a spatial
lag of the dependent variable, and a time series autoregressive noise (PS-ANOVA-SAR-
AR1) which represent a valid alternative to parametric methods aimed at disentangling
strong and weak cross-sectional dependence (Mı´nguez et al. 2017). Natural directions
in which these methods can be extended are a specification for a dynamic framework.
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1 Introduction
Within the activities of the COST Action IS1104 ‘The EU in the new complex
geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evaluation’ the main
objective of the Working Group on ‘Economic Geography modelling’ has been to
provide a modelling strategy to represent the ‘EU as a multi-level complex evolving
system’. We started from the observation that the process of integration did not fully
deliver its promise leaving the economic activity unevenly spread across European
regions.
As a modelling strategy, we opted for the New Economic Geography (NEG) ap-
proach – originated from Krugman’s (1991) contribution – which has proven to be
quite fruitful in describing the basic economic mechanisms behind the spatial distri-
bution of economic activity. Briefly, the standard set-up of a NEG model includes an
economy with two regions (or countries), two sectors and two factors of production,
Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, CES preferences over the varieties of the
manufactured good, factor mobility between the regions, iceberg/multiplicative trade
costs. The spatial distribution of the economic activity is the result of the interplay
between agglomeration forces – market-access and cost-of-living effects – and dis-
persion forces – competition and local market size effects (for a more detailed
description of the NEG approach, please refer to Chaps. 1 and 2 of this book).
In the following sections, we summarise the research carried out byWorking Group I
on its main objective: multiregional NEG modelling; then we present some of the main
results and pointed at questions left open; ﬁnally, we suggest topics for future research.
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2 Summary of the Research Conducted Within the Action
Our main research focus has been multiregional New Economic Geography
(NEG) modelling. The aim of NEG models is to explain the uneven distribution of
economic activity across space driven by factor migration (labour, physical or human
capital) governed by interplay of agglomeration and dispersion forces.
In Commendatore et al. (2015a), we reviewed systematically multiregional NEG
models recently developed in the literature and compared different modelling strategies.
In that survey, we presented a taxonomy of the literature that groups the contributions
into two classes: the ﬁrst category of models follows the standard NEG approach: they
adopt CES consumer’s preferences leading to an isoelastic demand for each variety and
to a ﬁxedmark-up. In this type of models, trade liberalization or integration –modelled as
a reduction of ‘iceberg’ trade costs proportional to the manufactured commodity price –
favours the agglomeration forces over the dispersion forces. Conversely, the second class
of models suggests that trade integration – modelled as a reduction of trade costs which
are added to the price – may lead to the prevalence of dispersion forces over agglom-
eration forces. This feature is obtained by Ottaviano et al. (2002) by simply introducing
quadratic consumer’s preferences over the manufactured varieties generating linear
demands for these varieties and variable mark-ups. In a ‘linear’NEGmodel (see Baldwin
et al. 2003) prices fall depending on the number of (local and outside) ﬁrms which
compete in the local market. This adds a further dispersion force to those operating in
NEG models which manifests itself especially in a multiregional context. Indeed, Ago
et al. (2006) and Behrens (2011) show in models with a hub-and-spoke structure that
centrality delivers a locational advantage to the hub when competition is not too strong
(as in standard NEG models) and a locational disadvantage when competition is ﬁercer
(as in linear NEG models). This translate to completely different ﬁrms’ location patterns
and regional policy recommendations. In Commendatore et al. (2015a), we also sketched
the analytic structure of a general multi-regional model and we showed how simpler
cases can be derived from that general framework.
In other contributions, we put forward simpler standard NEG models (see Com-
mendatore and Kubin 2013; Commendatore et al. 2014, 2015b, c) and linear NEG
models (Commendatore et al. 2016, 2017a, b) where the number of regions is assumed
to be small (but larger than two) to obtain as much as possible analytic results and
numerical simulations easy to interpret. A distinguishing feature of these analyses is the
discrete time dynamic framework, which is a set-up able to generate a larger variety of
long-term behaviours compared to the continuous time version. We mainly used tools
from the mathematical theory of dynamical systems to study the qualitative properties
of such multiregional discrete time models.
Behrens (2004, 2005) and Ago et al. (2006) showed that, when demands are linear,
there are circumstances – linked to trade costs and local competition – in which one
region does not have a sufﬁcient incentive to export the manufactured good to another
region. So that different trade patterns may emerge: no trade, unilateral trade and
bilateral trade. Commendatore et al. (2017a, b) extend/integrate these contributions.
They represent a small trade network composed of three identical regions. In these
contributions, three examples have been discussed that can be interpreted as three
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stages of development. In the ﬁrst stage, since trade costs are very high throughout the
economy, all regions are fully autarkic; in the second stage two regions begin to
integrate and may engage in unilateral or bilateral trade, while the third region –
geographically more remote – is still in autarky; ﬁnally, in the third stage, when the ﬁrst
two regions are fully integrated, the trade costs between the remote region and one of
the other two shrink, so that the remote region and the now more central region engage
in trade. The three-region economy takes the shape of a hub-and-spoke trade structure.
Within this framework, Commendatore et al. (2017a, b) clarify: how distance and trade
costs are related to the existence and direction of a trade link; how trade integration
affects the long-term distribution of economic activities and which trade pattern
characterises each spatial equilibrium; and, ﬁnally, how trade patterns and the spatial
distribution of the economic activity are interrelated.
In recent efforts, we applied Social Network Analysis to investigate the statistical
properties of the network of trade flows between European regions at the NUTS 2 level
and put forward ﬁrst attempts to provide theoretical underpinnings of such a structure
(see Basile et al. 2016, 2017). In Basile et al. (2016), we used a new set of data on
regional trade flows and exploited their binary structure and their relative weights to
visualize the European regional trade network. Given the limits of the data (partially
inferred from other data aggregated at the national and international levels), to reduce
the density of the network we used a meaningful threshold cutting off negligible links.
This allowed us to detect the higher order statistics via clustering analysis and the main
triadic structures via the triad census of the interregional trade links. The latter
methodology is typically used to study the local properties of a network – which is a
structure composed of nodes (in our case, regions) and relationships linking one node
to another node (in our case, trade flows: one in the outward direction, exports; and one
in the inward direction, imports). An important property is, for example, the ‘third
region effect’ according to which the existence/absence of a trade link between two
regions is contingent upon the presence of (at least) another pre-existing link between
one of these two regions and a third region. A triad is a fundamental unit of analysis
composed of three nodes and by the possibility of presence/absence of links relating
pairwise these nodes. There are 64 possible types of triad that without speciﬁc dif-
ferentiations (related for example to regional sizes or geographical distances) can be
grouped into 16 isomorphism classes. In Basile et al. 2016, by using a speciﬁc cut off
threshold, we calculated for the European trade network the frequencies of these classes
and drew interesting insights on the interregional EU trade network. Moreover, we put
forward a three-region linear NEG model which is more general compared to those
existing in the literature. We assumed that the distance between the regions is not
necessarily the same so, differently from other contributions (see for example Ago et al.
2006; and Behrens 2011), we did not impose any speciﬁc geography on the possible
network structures. Thus, focusing on the short-run with no factor migration, we have
been able to derive the conditions, expressed in terms of different combinations of trade
costs and distributions of the economic activity, corresponding to each of the 16
possible network structures.
In Basile et al. (2017), we focussed on the role of trade costs in determining the
topological structure of the EU network. In dealing with the empirical analysis, to better
approximate their broad theoretical meaning, we considered two dimensions of trade
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costs: geographical distance – we created different sub-graphs (i.e. sub-networks)
composed of groups of regions differentiated on the basis of regional bilateral distances –
and the presence of a border effect – we created different sub-graphs distinguishing
between regions involved in intra-national or international regional trade. The theoretical
part extends Basile et al. (2016) by explicitly differentiating the distances between the
regions and exploring how trade costs impact on the frequency of the 64 triadic con-
ﬁgurations, examining the likelihood of each conﬁguration. We found correspondence,
with some exceptions, between empirical and theoretical results.
3 Main Results and Open Questions
3.1 Main Results
We focus here on results concerning agglomeration and dispersion patterns charac-
terising the stationary long-term equilibria of some of the multiregional NEG models
we have examined during the life time of the Action. Other results are reviewed in
Chaps. 1 and 2 of this book. Moreover, readers interested in the mathematical prop-
erties of these models can refer to Kubin et al. (2016). In that contribution we stressed
that the possible long-term states of the economy are by all means not limited to
stationary equilibria.
Concerning three-region models, we found that the presence of a third region
matters. In Commendatore et al. (2014), we provided a paradigmatic example: we
considered a 3-region footloose-entrepreneur new economic geography model with
standard CES preferences. The three regions have a speciﬁc geographical arrangement:
two of them are symmetric and form an economically integrated area (the Union), the
third one is an outside trade partner. Entrepreneurs can freely migrate within the Union,
but no factor mobility is allowed between the Union and the third region. Depending on
the skill endowment, the market size of the outside region and the different degrees of
trade liberalisation – explored in its two aspects of regional integration and globali-
sation – we found that stationary long-run interior equilibria may exist characterised by
an industrial sector unevenly distributed across all regions. Trade integration may lead
to agglomeration of industry in only one region via a smooth transition (in contrast to
the NEG typical catastrophic scenario).
In a second paper (see Commendatore et al. 2016), we adopted the same geo-
graphical arrangement but assumed a quadratic utility function and linear demand
functions (for a similar approach see Behrens 2011). This set-up allowed us to compare
the NEG and the Heckscher-Ohlin perspectives. According to the standard predictions
of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework trade integration leads to specialization, trade
diversion and trade creation; however, with factor mobility, it may also lead to
agglomeration within the Union, which agrees with the standard NEG result,
strengthening the specialization and trade effects of integration. Finally, given the
simpler analytical structure following the assumption on preferences, only a stable
symmetric equilibrium or full agglomeration (Core-Periphery) equilibria exist.
In other two works, we increased the number of regions to four in a standard NEG
model. In the ﬁrst contribution (Commendatore et al. 2015c), four regions of equal size
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are located along a line, the two regions on the left and those on the right form two
countries (or trade blocs) sharing a common border passing through the two regions in
the middle. Again, the mobile factor (entrepreneurs) can only migrate within the same
country. Due to various geographical impediments to trade the two inland regions (at
the extremes of the line) can only access the national market and international trade can
only occur between the two bordering regions (at the centre of the line). The speciﬁc
geography adopted bears on the relative strength of agglomeration and dispersion
forces: local ﬁrms in the peripheral region face only national competition from ﬁrms
located in the adjacent central region, whereas the latter face both national and inter-
national competition, respectively originating from the peripheral region in the same
country and from the bordering region in the other country. On the other hand, a ﬁrm
located in a central region has access to a larger market selling goods both to the
national market (both locally and to the adjacent peripheral region) and to the inter-
national market (i.e. to the foreign bordering region). Moreover, in a central region a
larger variety of goods are accessible to local consumers. Thus, the market size effect,
the price index effect and the competition effect are all stronger in a central region with
the strength depending on the size of the manufacturing sector in the bordering region
in the other country. The usual NEG sequence (as depicted in the standard tomahawk
diagram) occurs with trade liberalization: low trade costs bring dispersion and high
trade costs agglomeration. However, a larger variety of patterns can emerge compared
with the standard two-region set up: with low trade costs, dispersion involves a larger
share of industry in the two central regions; with high trade costs agglomeration could
be symmetric – industry agglomerates in the two central regions, thus ﬁrms enjoy the
full extent of the market size effect – or asymmetric – industry agglomerates in a central
region in one country and in a peripheral region in the other country, thus ﬁrms in the
periphery are sheltered from competition –; with intermediate trade costs, partial
agglomeration may occur: industry is agglomerated in one country and dispersed in the
other where ﬁrms, as in the previous case, ﬁnd shelter from foreign competition.
In the second contribution (Commendatore et al. 2017c), we differentiated the
regions on the basis of their size according to the sequence: small, big, small, big. This
set-up allowed us to study the interplay between centrality and local market size effects –
two different manifestations of the market access effect – which is not possible in other
4-region NEG models. Thus, each country is composed of a small region and a big
region. In one country, the small region is peripheral and the large region is central and
in the other country, on the contrary, the small region is central and the large region is
peripheral. As before, factor mobility is only allowed between regions in the same
country. Instead, differently from the previous contribution, we allow for both direct and
indirect trade (i.e. between adjacent and non-adjacent regions). Taking into account that
additional trade costs are incurred crossing the international border, we differentiated
between national and international trade costs. Conﬁning here our discussion to the
long-run full agglomeration outcomes (Core-Periphery or CP equilibria), we have been
able to ﬁnd that by varying national and international trade costs, the stability properties
of CP equilibria follow patterns which depend on the interplay of three effects: cen-
trality, local market size and competition. Our model includes the standard two-region
asymmetric NEG model as a special case (when trade costs between countries are
prohibitive). In the two-region set-up, when trade costs take intermediate values,
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agglomeration can only occur in the bigger region (the local market size effect is strong);
and when trade costs are low, depending on initial conditions, industry may agglomerate
in the smaller region as well (the local market size effect is weak). In our more general
four-region set-up, matters are more complicated. Given that agglomeration can only
occur within each country, because factors cannot migrate across countries, what can
occur is that or all ﬁrms end up in the two bigger regions, or in the two smaller regions,
or in the two central regions or in the two peripheral regions. The following scenarios are
possible: (i) when trade costs are high between countries and low within countries all CP
equilibria are stable and are possible long-run outcomes, replicating the standard result
which applies to the case of two asymmetric regions; (ii) when we increase national
trade costs (without reducing too much international trade costs) simultaneous
agglomeration in the two small regions is not possible, again as it was the case in the
standard two-region set-up, because of the market size effect; (iii) when we further
increase trade costs within countries (or decrease trade costs between countries)
simultaneous agglomeration in the two remote regions is not possible. Centrality gains
importance. Firms may still end up in the larger remote region which keeps the
advantage of a larger size; (iv) further reducing trade costs within countries and letting
international trade costs sufﬁciently high leads to agglomeration only in the bigger
regions, as the local market size effect becomes prevalent; (v) instead the same reduction
of national trade costs, but in correspondence of low international trade costs leads to
agglomeration in the central regions as centrality becomes the prevailing force.
3.2 Open Questions
There are a few questions left open deserving to be addressed in future projects:
• Number of regions. We limited our analysis to economies composed of a small
number of regions. Given the complicated analytical structure of the NEG approach
with a CES utility function, also for this ‘simpler’ models, it was not easy to
interpret all the results.
• Trade Patterns. In the standard model, with ﬁnite trade costs, only a trade pattern is
possible corresponding to two-way trade between any two regions. By introducing a
quadratic utility function leading to linear demand functions, the analysis is made
simpler and more analytical results can be derived. Moreover, other issues can be
explored given that, for example, with a linear demand, differentiated patterns of
trade can emerge (no trade, one-way trade, two-way trade). In fact, considering two
regions four trade patterns are possible; when three regions are considered the
possible patterns of trade are 64 and so on. We believe that this apparently minor
difference represents a powerful tool of analysis.
• Policy issues. We examined a variety of policy issues (tax competition, government
expenditure, trade integration, and so on) but, following the large part of the current
NEG literature, only considering two or little more regions (for a review on how
policy issues are treated in this literature, see Chap. 1 of this book).
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4 Suggested Topics for Future Research
Following the previous section on open issues, we would like to draw a few lines for
future research:
(i) Multi-regional NEG modelling. We plan to extend the standard NEG model to
many regions arranged on a square lattice (for a similar framework see Stelder
2005; Ikeda and Murota 2014; Ikeda et al. 2017). To reconcile computing
simpliﬁcation and real world resemblance, the mobile factor migration process is
modelled as a stationary markovian stochastic process. One of the objective of
this project is to put forward a platform for simulating multiregional NEG
models by using a user-friendly programming language, as for example Python.
(ii) Multiregional NEG modelling. We also plan to extend the linear NEG model to
many regions. Given that this type of NEG models is much less treated in the
literature more gaps should be ﬁlled. In Basile et al. (2016, 2017), we put
forward a three-region linear NEG model and explored both theoretically and
empirically the probability of the emerging of different trade patterns, depending
on trade costs and the degree of competition for a given distribution of the
industrial activity (by ﬁxing the number of entrepreneurs). The next step would
be allowing for factor mobility and explore the simultaneous evolution through
time of industrial location and trade patterns. This would lead to more general
cases compared to those discussed in Chap. 2 of this book. A ﬁnal more
ambitious step would be to consider a large number of regions and to study the
effects of local and global shocks, affecting trade costs, on the trade network
structure in the short run and on the distribution of economic activities and in the
endogenous formation of trade network structures in the long run. Notice that a
complementary problem has been studied in the literature: Countries may have
an economic incentive – ﬁxed in the short-run – to create bilateral trade
agreements, this leading to the formation of a free trade agreement network (see
Furusawa and Konishi 2007). It would be interesting to verify the evolution of
such network once the economic incentive is allowed to vary.
(iii) Market structure. We plan to strengthen the link between IO modelling and
spatial issues by using linear demand spatial models and departing from the
standard monopolistic competition set-up generally adopted in NEG modelling.
(iv) Policy issues. Very much connected with the other three lines of research, another
project would address speciﬁc policy issues: impact of creation/resolution/
modiﬁcation of trade agreements; impact of EU policies; impact of local gov-
ernment policies; regulations related to environmental issues, and so on. As an
example, a three-region linear NEG model could be fruitfully used as tool of
analysis to clarify the possible effects of Brexit (the withdrawal of the UK from the
EU) on trade flows between the most important economic areas involved –Britain,
the EU and United States – and on their citizens welfare. The model would be an
extension of the linear NEG model with two regions of asymmetric sizes devel-
oped byOkubo et al. (2014). In our set-up, two large regions (the USA and the EU)
may engage in trade between each other and with a third small region (the UK).
Alternative trade agreements resulting from EU and UK negotiations translate into
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trade costs of different magnitudes, reshaping trade patterns and long-run distri-
bution of the economic activity between the three economic areas.
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The Meso Perspective – Financial
Markets
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Abstract. We propose a mechanism for shock ampliﬁcation that poten-
tially can account for fat tails in the distribution of the growth rate of
national output. We argue that extreme macroeconomic events, such as
the Great Depression and the Great Recession, were preceded by signiﬁ-
cant turmoil in the banking system. We have developed a model of bank
network formation and presented numerical simulations that show that,
for the benchmark case, aggregate credit follows a random walk. When
we introduce ﬁre sales the model does not only produce larger variations
in the growth of aggregate credit but also shows that there is an asym-
metry between booms and busts that is also consistent with empirical
evidence.
Keywords: Systemic risk · Banking system · Aggregate risk · Financial
network · Fat tails
1 Introduction
The two most severe macroeconomic crises of the last 100 years, namely, the
Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession that commenced at the
close of the ﬁrst decade of the current century, were preceded by extreme events
in ﬁnancial markets in general and the banking system in particular. In a recent
study, Schularick and Taylor (2012) have empirically identiﬁed a historical link
between the level aggregate credit in the economy and macroeconomic perfor-
mance. They argue that aggregate credit can be a powerful predictor of economic
crises, especially, rare catastrophic events.
Our aim is to provide a microfoundational explanation for the above relation-
ship. In this work we focus on the behavior of aggregate credit. In particular, we
analyze the dynamics of aggregate bank credit in an economy where all ﬁnancial
transactions are intermediated through the banking system. Viewing the ﬁnan-
cial system as a network of banks that are connected through their ﬁnancial
obligations to each other, we examine how the impact of shocks on the asset side
of the banking balance sheets may disrupt the supply of aggregate credit.
Each period the capacity of a bank to ﬁnance new projects depends on the
size of its balance sheet which, in turn, depends on the success rate of the
projects that it ﬁnanced the period before. Each period, the total capacity of
the banking system to ﬁnance new projects entirely depends on the aggregate
c© The Author(s) 2018
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liquidity available within the system. At the beginning of each period each bank’s
available liquidity (reserves) is equal to the sum of its household deposits plus
its equity.
Projects are allocated sequentially and randomly across banks. A bank that
faces a demand for funds but has run out of liquidity can borrow from other
banks. This process creates a network of banks where its links, that reﬂect inter-
bank exposures, are both directed and weighted.
As banks are unable to completely diversify their loan portfolios they can
become insolvent. This will be the case when the total loan repayments (from
both entrepreneurs and other banks) are insuﬃcient to cover their obligations
to their depositors and other banks. In order to clear the banking system when
some banks become insolvent we apply the method suggested by Eisenberg and
Noe (2001). Insolvencies can propagate through the banking network. When one
bank is unable to meet its obligations to another bank, the latter bank might
itself become insolvent even if it would have remained solvent had its loans to the
originally failed bank been repaid. The bankruptcy resolution process terminated
when there are no insolvent banks left. The number of bank failures will depend
on (a) the distribution of initial losses across the banking system, and (b) the
structure of the ﬁnancial network (see, for example, Acemoglu et al. 2015).
As long as the liquidation of assets held by insolvent institutions does not
depress the market values of these assets the total systemic losses by the end
of the resolution process will be equal to the initial losses due to the inability
of entrepreneurs to repay their loans. However, as Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
have argued during systemic episodes, exactly because there are many failing
institutions, the market value (liquidation value) of the assets can drop below
their corresponding book values (ﬁre sales). These drops in asset prices forces
other institutions to reevaluate their own assets thus potentially causing new
rounds of failures.1
In our model, when we do not allow for ﬁre sales, the value of aggregate
credit provided by the banking network follows a random walk. This is because
the capacity of the banking network to provide credit each period depends on the
availability of reserves which in turn depends on the performance of aggregate
loans the period before. Given that shocks are normally distributed each period
it follows that aggregate lending activity follows a random walk. When we intro-
duce ﬁre sales we observe that systemic losses can be much greater than initial
losses thus introducing fat tails on the lower end of the distribution of aggregate
credit. Under the supposition that aggregate credit is positively correlated with
aggregate output our approach might be useful for accounting two features of
business cycles: (a) the asymmetry in booms and busts (Acemoglu and Scott,
1991), and (b) macroeconomic fat tails Acemoglu et al. 2017a).
Our work is related to many strands of the economics literature. Our main
premise is that bank leverage can be the source of systemic risk which in turn
can lead to fat tails in the distributions of many macroeconomic aggregates.
1 For models of ﬁre sales see Diamond and Rajan (2011) and Caballero and Simpsek
(2013). For a review of the literature on ﬁre sales, see Shleifer and Vishny (2011).
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The relationship between leverage in ﬁnancial markets and fat tails is also
addressed by Thurner et al. (2012).
In recent years a number there have been some attempts to build network
models of the economy that can account for the fat tails in the distribution of
the growth rate of national output. This literature has been motivated by the
inability of traditional DSGE models to account for such fat tails (see Ascari
et al. 2015). Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2017a) have analyzed production networks
where the aggregate eﬀects of idiosyncratic shocks depend on both the initial
distribution of shocks and the structure of the network.2 Anthonissen (2016)
considers dynamic versions of similar economies. Thurner et al. (2012) show
how leverage, through bankruptcies, can exacerbate volatility.
There is also a growing related literature that develops agent-based models to
study the relationship between ﬁnancial markets and the macroeconomy. Ashraf
et al. (2017) integrate a banking sector with an agent-based economy where
the source of turmoil is the market for goods. In contrast, in our work we view
the ﬁnancial sector as the one being responsible for the ampliﬁcation eﬀects
on shocks. Battiston et al. (2007) consider the propagation of bankruptcies in
production networks while the source of system risk in Geanakoplos et al. (2012)
is the housing market. For an empirical investigation of the relationship between
the macroeconomy and systemic risk, see Giglio et al. (2016).
Lastly, our work is related to a very large literature that uses network analysis
to address issues related to systemic risk in banking systems. The interested
reader is referred to the literature reviews on this subject by Acemoglu et al.
(2017b), Babus and Allen (2009), Bougheas and Kirman (2015), and Glasserman
and Young (2016).
2 The Model Without Fire Sales
Time is discrete (t = 0, 1, ...); each period t is divided into sub-periods (τ =
0, 1, ...). There is a set of n banks with a typical element bi , where (i = 1, ..., n).
Table 1 shows the general form of a bank balance sheet:
Table 1. Bank balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Reserves: Ri Deposits from Households: D
H
i
Loans to Households: LHi Deposits from other Banks: D
B
i
Loans to Banks: LBi Equity: Ei
There is a single divisible good that banks can (a) hold as reserves, (b) lend
it to households to ﬁnance projects, and (c) lend it to other banks. Banks accept
2 See Carvalho (2014) for an overview of this approach.
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deposits form households and from other banks (loans from other banks). We
assume bank equity is given by:
Ei ≡ Ri + LHi + LBi − DHi − DB1 (1)
Further, the following condition must hold for any closed bank network:
∑n
i=1
LBi =
∑n
i=1
DBi
We set the net interest rate on household deposits rD equal to 1, the net interest
rate on household loans rL equal to 1θ (given (a) limited liability debt contracts,
and (b) zero-proﬁt condition for risk-neutral banks), and the net interest rate on
interbank loans rB equal to 1+θ2θ (nash-bargaining splits the diﬀerence between
the interest rates on households loans and household deposits between the two
banks).3
At the beginning of each period t (τ = 0) the balance sheet of bi is shown on
Table 2 (all entries are endogenously determined):
Table 2. Bank balance sheet at (τ = 0)
Assets Liabilities
Ri0  0 DHi0  0
LHi0 = 0 D
B
i0 = 0
LBi0 = 0 Ei0  0
Projects. Projects require 1 unit of investment, last for one period and yield
a stochastic return. With probability θ they yield a gross return Z and with
probability 1 − θ they fail yielding nothing, where θZ  1. Projects returns are
independently distributed.
Network Formation. The demand for project ﬁnancing is inﬁnitely elastic.
Projects are ﬁnanced sequentially and the allocation of projects to banks is
random. As long as there exists at least one bank with reserves greater of equal
to unity the banking system will keep ﬁnancing new projects. Thus, the aggregate
credit provided each period will be approximately equal to aggregate reserves.4
Suppose that bi is allocated a project. If Ri  1, bi oﬀers a loan and the following
two changes take place on its balance sheet ΔLHi = +1 and ΔRi = −1. If Ri < 1
then bi randomly selects another bank, say bj and request an interbank loan.
3 It will become clear below that our qualitative results are not sensitive to the
processes by which the three interest rates are determined.
4 To keep the program simple we do not allow projects to be ﬁnanced by multiple
banks. This means that aggregate lending might be less that aggregate reserves.
However, given that the number of banks is small relatively to the amount of aggre-
gate reserves this simpliﬁcation will not have any qualitative inﬂuence on our results.
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If Rj  1, bj oﬀers an interbank loan to bi and the latter ﬁnances the project. The
balance sheet changes for the two banks are given by: ΔDBi = +1, ΔL
H
i = +1,
ΔRj = −1 and ΔLBj = +1. If Rj < 1 then bi repeats the process by randomly
selecting one of the remaining banks. The whole process terminates when no
bank has reserves greater or equal to unity. At the end of the network formation
process (τ = 1) the balance sheet of bi is shown on Table 3:
Table 3. Bank balance sheet at (τ = 1)
Assets Liabilities
Ri1 < 1 D
H
i1  0
LHi1  0 DBi1  0
LBi1  0 Ei1  0
Household Loan Repayments. Close to the end of period t project returns
are realized and loans granted for successful projects are repaid. Despite the fact
that project returns are independently distributed the ﬁniteness of a bank’s loan
portfolio implies that bank equity can take negative values, that is banks can
become insolvent. Now, balance sheets also reﬂect the interest payments due.
Table 4 shows the bank balance sheet after loans are repaid or written oﬀ but
before the interbank market clears (τ = 2):
Table 4. Bank balance sheet at (τ = 2)
Assets Liabilities
Ri2  0 DHi2 = DHi1
LHi2 = 0 D
B
i2 =
1+θ
2θ
DBi1
LBi2 =
1+θ
2θ
LBi1 Ei0 ≷ 0
Reserves have been augmented by loan repayments. As projects last only one
period all loans to households are either repaid or written oﬀ. Identity (1) is used
for the calculation of bank equity.
Bankruptcy Resolution Process (No Fire Sales). All banks with negative
equity are insolvent and they will be liquidated. The proceeds of the liquidation
process will be distributed pro rata to all the liability holders. In this section, we
assume that the market value of liquidated assets are equal to their book values.
That is, for the moment, we assume no ﬁre sales. Below we extend our model
by including ﬁre sales. We follow the method proposed by Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) for clearing the banking network. This procedure, at least for the case with
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no ﬁre sales, is independent of the order that insolvent banks are liquidated.5
This is because interbank loans are only settled after the bankruptcy resolution
process is completed. Completion implies either that all remaining banks are
solvent or that no banks are left. Below we describe the algorithm that we used
to implement the procedure.
If there are any banks with negative equity choose one randomly, say bi. Let
λ ≡ DHi2
DHi2+D
B
i2
; the ratio of household deposits to total deposits. Let dji denote
the liabilities of bi to bj (interbank loan from bj to bi). Let lki ≡ dik denote
an interbank loan from bi to bk.6 Then, the assets of bi will be distributed to
its creditors pro rata as follows7: The depositors of bi will receive a fraction λ
of (a) Ri2, and (b) lki for all k (1, ..., n).
8 Each bank bj such that d
j
i > 0 will
receive a fraction d
j
i
DHi2+D
B
i2
of (a) (a) Ri2, and (b) lki for all k (1, ..., n). Given that∑n
j=1 d
j
i = D
B
i2 the above process will redistribute all the assets of bi to its two
classes of creditholders.
Next consider changes on the balance sheets of all other banks following the
resolution of bi. Consider any bank bj such that d
j
i > 0 and any bank bk such
that dik > 0. Then,
1. bk will set its liabilities to bi equal to zero: Δdik = −dik;
2. bk will increase its household deposits: ΔDHk2 = λd
i
k;
3. bk will increase its deposits by bank bj : Δd
j
k =
dji
DHi2+D
B
i2
dik;
4. bj will set its loan to bi equal to zero: Δlij = −lij ;
5. bj will increase its loans to bank bk: Δlkj =
dji
DHi2+D
B
i2
dik.
This will end the bankruptcy procedure for bi. Notice that given that some
of the creditors of bi were not fully repaid it is possible that some banks that
before the above process were solvent now they are insolvent. If there are any
banks insolvent then by choosing one of them randomly the whole procedure
repeats itself. If there are no more insolvent banks the bankruptcy resolution
process terminates. After the resolution process all the assets of insolvent banks
would have been distributed between their depositors and the remaining banks.
5 Uniqueness is achieved under very mild conditions. In the Appendix we provide a
numerical example.
6 According to the network formation process of our model it is possible that both
LHi2 and D
H
i2 to be positive. However, you cannot have a pair of banks where each
one has oﬀered a loan to the other.
7 In this work we have followed Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and have assumed that
all creditors are treated equal. As Acemoglu et al. (2015) have shown the clearing
process can easily be modiﬁed to allow a class of creditholders (e.g. depositors) to
have a priority claim over the bank’s assets. There is an ongoing debate over the
design of optimal priority rules for banks (for a review of the relevant literature see
Bougheas and Kirman 2016).
8 Clearly lii = 0, and l
k
i = 0 if bi has not oﬀered a loan to bk.
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Interbank Market Clearing. Given that all remaining banks are solvent all
outstanding loans in the interbank market can be settled. After the interbank
market is cleared the balance sheets of solvent banks will have exactly the same
form as those at τ − 0.
Dynamics. In order to complete the description of the model we need to specify
how the initial balance sheets are formed, what happens to the banking systems
after some banks failed and what happens to the depositors of failed banks.
At t = 0, each bank is randomly allocated reserves, R, drawn form a uniform
distribution with support [0, R¯]. Household deposits are set equal to a ﬁxed ratio
δ of reserves. Thus, bank equity is equal to (1 − δ)R.
At the end of each period t, new banks enter to replace the ones that have
been insolvent. We make this assumption to ensure that the banking system does
not vanish. It would then seem natural to have households whose original banks
became insolvent to deposit their funds at the new banks. However, there is a
problem. On one hand, new banks, on average, would be smaller in size as their
depositors have suﬀered losses. On the other hand, given that the allocation of
projects to banks is random these new banks would by disproportionately highly
indebted to other banks and given that their equity levels would also be low they
would fail again with a high probability. Put diﬀerently, the dynamics of the
system would be such that in the long-run the banking system would artiﬁcially
become very highly concentrated. There are two possible ways to avoid this
problem. The ﬁst one, and the one that we have followed in this paper, is to
have all reserves randomly redistributed in the system. While this approach
is much simpler and, as a result, our main results very easy to interpret, it
destroys some interesting dynamic interactions. The second approach is to allow
households who had deposits at failed institution to have them now depositing
their funds at the new banks but now change the network formation process so
that banks with higher reserves have a higher probability of being allocated a
project. This second approach is more realistic, however, when we introduce ﬁre
sales, it makes it more diﬃcult to assess the exact mechanism that produces the
distribution of aggregate credit shocks.
Lastly, we adjust equity and deposits at each bank so that at the beginning
of t + 1 the ratio of deposits to reserves is equal to δ.9
3 Results Without Fire Sales
The number of banks that will become insolvent each period would depend on
three factors. The ﬁrst factor is the realized proportion of successful projects.
Even if each project fails with probability 1 − θ, the economy is ﬁnite and
the law of large numbers does not hold. The resulting aggregate uncertainty
implies that the realized proportion of successful projects will vary over time.
9 The recapitalization is clearly necessary for all new banks that otherwise would begin
with no equity.
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The second factor is the distribution of failed projects across the banking system.
Other things equal, the more uneven this distribution is the higher the numbers
of insolent banks will be. The third factor is the structure of the banking net-
work. Acemoglu et al. (2015) have shown that as long as the initial losses are not
to large a more connected banking system can provide a buﬀer against contagion
as losses are distributed across many banks. In contrast, when initial losses are
large a less connected system might prevent such contagion.
Even if it is diﬃcult to predict the number of banks that will fail following
an aggregate shock, the level aggregate of credit provided by the banking sys-
tem follows a well deﬁned pattern. At the beginning of each period t aggregate
credit is approximately equal to aggregate reserves, Rˆt.10 Projects that are suc-
cessful boost reserves and equity of the banks that ﬁnanced them. The losses of
the projects that failed are initially absorbed by the equity of the banks that
ﬁnanced them. If this equity is not large enough to absorb the losses then the
creditholders of the bank absorb the losses, that is its depositors and other banks.
Fig. 1. Aggregate credit, no ﬁre sales
10 The approximation qualiﬁcation is due to the fact that we do allow banks to co-
ﬁnance projects and thus aggregate credit is less than or equal to aggreagte reserves
but more than or equal to aggregate reserves minus the number of banks. Given that
the number of banks is relative to the level of aggregate reserves is relatively small
in what follows we ignore this approximation.
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Thus when the process ends all losses have been absorbed either by the deposi-
tors or equityholders. Given that at the end of the period all liquidation proceeds
are redeposited in the banking system aggregate credit follows a random walk
(with drift if θZ > 1).
Rˆt+1 = Rˆt + εt
Notice that the error term depends on the realized number of successful projects
and thus it is binomially distributed, however, the fact that the number of
projects is large implies that the distribution is approximately normal.
The introduction of ﬁre sales below complicates signiﬁcantly the dynamic
behavior of the model and we will have to use calibrations. Below we present
calibration results for the benchmark case when ﬁre sales are set equal to zero.
Numerical Results. For our calibration exercise we set the following parameter
values: n = 20, R¯ = 100, θ = 0.8, Z = 1.25, and δ = 0.8. In this particular case
there is no growth as θZ = 1. The four panels of Fig. 1 show four of aggregate
credit for 100 periods, while the four panels of Fig. 2 show the corresponding
runs of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of aggregate credit activity. These examples just
verify our assertion that without ﬁre sales the dynamic path of aggregate credit
not inconsistent with a random walk process.
Fig. 2. First diﬀerences of aggregate credit, no ﬁre sales
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4 The Model with Fire Sales
In our model the only assets that banks hold when they get liquidated are
reserves and loans to other banks. In reality banks would hold many other assets
including outstanding loans to households. When banks are forced to liquidate
any assets, either loans to households (ﬁrms) or any other liquid assets that
they hold as reserves, the prices of these assets can fall below their book values.
Such a fall in prices can be the result of either (a) asymmetric information
problems arising from allocating assets, such as loans to ﬁrms, to new creditors,
or (b) price externalities generated when many institutions are attempting to
sell their assets at the same time. The ﬁrst to consider ﬁre sales within a ﬁnancial
equilibrium framework was Shleifer and Vishny (1992). More closely relate to
our work Caballero and Simsek (2013) have considered ﬁre sales in a banking
network.11
As we have demonstrated in the section above, without introducing liqui-
dation costs the aggregate performance of the banking system is completely
determined by the realized distribution of initial shocks. Put diﬀerently, the net-
work structure only aﬀects the distribution of gains and losses across the system
but not their aggregate value.
When we analyzed above the bankruptcy resolution process for the case
without liquidation costs we noted that insolvent banks distribute their reserves
Ri2 pro rata among their creditors. The presence of liquidation costs implies that
now the value of reserves (liquid assets) distributed Ri3 will be lower than Ri2.
Below we consider two alternative ampliﬁcation mechanisms for aggregate
shocks.
Linear Liquidation Costs. Suppose that when a bank’s assets (reserves) are
liquidated they lose a fraction f of their book value. Thus, we have
Ri3 = (1 − f)Ri2
The linearity restriction refers to the fact that f is independent of the number
of banks that become insolvent, nˆ  n. The availability of aggregate credit
at the beginning of the next period will depend on how the following three
factors aﬀect nˆ: (a) the aggregate value of loan repayments (b) the distribution
of loan repayments across the network, and (c) the structure (topology), g, of
the network.
Without liquidation costs the evolution of aggregate credit depended only
on the aggregate value of loan repayments. However, with the introduction of
liquidity costs the performance of aggregate credit will now depend on the other
11 For assets that are not liquid traditional ‘mark to market’ accounting evaluation
methods tend to exacerbate such problems. This is because such asset reevaluations
might also aﬀect institutions that are not directly connected with institutions that
have become insolvent. In our work we are unable to capture such eﬀects given that
we do not explicitly allow for illiquid assets.
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two factors.12 For a given network structure, the total losses would depend on
how connected the aﬀected banks are. For example, isolated banks do not impose
any external eﬀects. But the total losses would also depend on the structure of
the network itself (see Acemoglu et al. 2015).
Thus, whether or not the linear case is suﬃcient to produce fat tails in the
distribution of aggregate credit would depend on how the last two factors aﬀect nˆ.
Non-Linear Liquidation Costs. In this case we allow for the liquidation cost
to depend on the number of banks that become insolvent. Suppose that bi is the
jth bank that is liquidated. Then, we let
Ri3 = (1 − f)j Ri2
The idea here is that as the number of banks that become insolvent increase the
more depressed asset values become.
Fig. 3. Aggregate credit, ﬁre sales
12 The ampliﬁcation mechanism is asymmetric as it aﬀects only losses. However as we
will see below, even if the initial aggregate shoch is positive, that is the number of
successful p[ojects is greater than θ , depending on the distribution of failed projects
across the banking system it is still possible that aggregate credit declines.
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5 Results with Fire Sales
We use the same parameters as for the case without ﬁre sales and we also set
f = 0.05.
There is one additional complication when we introduce ﬁre sales. We have
noted above that for the case without liquidation costs the ﬁnal outcome of the
bankruptcy resolution process does not depend on the exact sequence by which
insolvent banks are liquidated. Unfortunately, this is not the case anymore. We
control for this complication by allowing for multiple randomizations after we
reach that stage.
The four panels of Fig. 3 show four of aggregate credit while the four panels
of Fig. 4 show the corresponding runs of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of aggregate credit
activity. Comparing these ﬁgures with the corresponding ﬁgures obtained in the
case without ﬁre sales we make the following observations. From Fig. 3 we ﬁnd
that aggregate credit almost vanishes. This is because the asymmetry of the
ampliﬁcation mechanism. While there is nothing to boost the performance of
institutions that are unaﬀected by bankruptcies those that are aﬀected are suf-
fering from additional losses due to ﬁre sales. Without compensating by allowing
for growth, that is θZ > 1, the distribution is not stationary. Nevertheless, Fig. 4,
at least in the early periods when the size of the banking system is still relatively
large, clearly shows that the magnitude of negative shocks has increased.
Fig. 4. First diﬀerences of aggregate credit, ﬁre sales
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These preliminary observations provide hints that our proposed mechanism
might account for both the fat tails and the asymmetric nature of the distribution
of aggregate economic activity over time.
6 Conclusion
We have suggested that some of the properties of the time series of aggregate
output might be accounted by the behavior of aggregate credit activity. Our work
provides a microfoundations explanation for the relationship between the pro-
vision of aggregate credit and macroeconomic crises observed by Schularick and
Taylor (2012). In particular, we have argued that by analyzing the causes of
systemic risk in the ﬁnancial system can potentially help us understand both
the presence of fat macroeconomic tail risk and the asymmetry between booms
and busts along the business cycle.
We have captured systemic risk through an interbank network with links
representing interbank exposures. Each period banks borrow and lend to each
other so that they can ﬁnance loans to households that are randomly allocated
across the banking system. Given that households loans are risky and lack of
complete diversiﬁcation the loan portfolio of each bank is also risky and banks
can become insolvent. By applying standard methods for the bankruptcy res-
olution process we have captured the process of contagion across the banking
system as failing banks put at risk their own creditors and thus providing a
measure of systemic risk.
We have presented some preliminary numerical results where we compare two
versions of our model, namely, one with and one without ﬁre sales, for the case
when there is no economic growth. For the case without ﬁre sales we have shown
that aggregate credit follows a random walk. The introduction of ﬁre sales has
signiﬁcantly ampliﬁed negative shocks on aggregate credit. Without a stabilizing
mechanism at the limit aggregate credit vanishes. Below we discuss our plans
for extending the present work.
Our ﬁrst priority is to allow for growth by setting θZ > 1 so that the dis-
tribution of the growth rate of aggregate credit becomes stationary. We will be
able then to compare the moments of the distribution for the two versions of our
model and thus provide a quantitative assessment of the ability of our model to
produce both fat tails and asymmetries in the distribution of aggregate credit.
As we explained in Sect. 2, unless we introduce a mechanism for rebalancing
the system we would end up with some small-size banks being heavily indebted
and thus repeatedly failing. In order to avoid this from happening we have, at
the end of each period, redistributed deposits across the banking system. Doing
so has allowed us to keep the network formation process completely random.
We plan to explore an alternative method where larger banks face a higher
demand for household loans. This is a more natural way to model the banking
system, however, the disadvantage is that we introduce another potential source
of variation in the model, mainly tails in the distribution of the size of banks,
that could also aﬀect systemic risk. However, comparing the two methods we
should be able to disentangle these eﬀects.
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Another important task would be to try to improve our understanding of the
relationship between network structure and systemic risk. We can do that by
producing estimates for network measures (e.g. average degree, centrality) for
each period of our model and then by checking how these measures are correlated
with the corresponding growth rates of aggregate credit at the end of the period
and the aggregate shock at the beginning of the period.
Lastly, our plan is to embed the whole banking structure in an agent-based
model of the whole economy so that we can assess how ﬂuctuations in the supply
of credit are related to booms and busts of the economy. At the minimum, we
would hope that our model would account for the fat tails in the growth rate of
aggregate economic activity and the asymmetry in the patterns between booms
and busts. However, by also allowing for an endogenous growth process we would
hope that the more general framework would also provide an account not only for
the long-term growth patterns of economic activity but also for the persistence
in aggregate shocks.
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A Appendix: Numerical Example
We present an example that demonstrates how the bankruptcy resolution process
works and why the outcome is independent of the order of bank resolutions.
There are three banks: b1, b2 and b3. For ease of exposition we have set all net
interest rates equal to 0. The balance sheets of the three banks at the beginning
of the period are given by (Table 5):
Table 5. A1: Initial balance sheets
b1 b2 b3
R 1 1 1
LH 0 2 2
LB 1(b2) 1(b3) 0
Assets 2 4 3
DH 1 2 1
DB 0 1(b1) 1(b2)
E 1 1 1
Liabilities 2 4 3
Suppose that all projects failed. Then the three balance sheets after the
writing oﬀ of losses are given by (Table 6):
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Table 6. A2: Balance sheets adjusted for losses
b1 b2 b3
R 1 1 1
LH 0 0 0
LB 1(b2) 1(b3) 0
Assets 2 2 1
DH 1 2 1
DB 0 1(b1) 1(b2)
E 1 -1 -1
Liabilities 2 2 1
Banks b2 and b3 are insolvent.13 We need to consider two cases:
Bankruptcy Resolution Process Begins with b3. The reserves of b3 will be
divided equally between the depositors of b3 and b2. After this step the balance
sheets are given by (Table 7):
Table 7. A3: Balance sheets after the resolution of b3
b1 b2 b3
R 1 1.5 0.5
LH 0 0 0
LB 1(b2) 0 0
Assets 2 1.5 0.5
DH 1 2 0.5
DB 0 1(b1) 0
E 1 -1.5 0
Liabilities 2 3 0.5
The reserves of b2 will be divided pro-rata between the depositors of b2 and b1.
After this step the balance sheets are given by (Table 8):
13 After a bank is liquidated it cheases to exist. However, to keep track of what hap-
pened to its depositors we assume that another bank (with the same name) has
replaced it where households can deposit their liquidation proceeds.
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Table 8. A4: Balance sheets after the resolution of b2
b1 b2 b3
R 1.5 1 0.5
LH 0 0 0
LB 0 0 0
Assets 1.5 1 0.5
DH 1 1 0.5
DB 0 0 0
E 0.5 0 0
Liabilities 1.5 1 0.5
The process has been completed.
Bankruptcy Resolution Process Begins with b2. The reserves and deposits
in b3 of b2 will be divided pro-rata between the depositors of b2 and b1. The
depositors of b2 will receive 2/3 in reserves (keep them as deposits) and 2/3 in
deposits in b3. b1 will receive 1/3 in reserves and 1/3 in deposits in b3. After this
step the balance sheets are given by (Table 9):
Table 9. A5: Balance sheets after the resolution of b2
b1 b2 b3
R 4/3 2/3 1
LH 0 0 0
LB 1/3(b3) 0 0
Assets 5/3 2/3 1
DH 1 2/3 5/3
DB 0 0 1/3(b1)
E 2/3 0 -1
Liabilities 5/3 2/3 1
The reserves of b3 will be divided pro rata between the depositors of b2
depositors of b3 and b1. Depositors of b3 will receive 1/2 in reserves, depositors
of b2 will receive 1/3 in reserves and b1 will receive 1/6 in reserves. After this
step the balance sheets are given by (Table 10):
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Table 10. A6: Balance sheets after the resolution of b3
b1 b2 b3
R 1.5 1 0.5
LH 0 0 0
LB 0 0 0
Assets 1.5 1 0.5
DH 1 1 0.5
DB 0 0 0
E 0.5 0 0
Liabilities 1.5 1 0.5
The process has been completed. The results for the two cases are identical.
References
Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V., Ozdaglar, A., Tahbaz-Salehi, A.: The network origins of
aggregate ﬂuctuations. Econometrica 80, 1977–2016 (2012)
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., Tahbaz-Salehi, A.: Systemic risk and stability in ﬁnancial
networks. Am. Econ. Rev. 105, 564–608 (2015)
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., Tahbaz-Salehi, A.: Microeconomic origins of macroeco-
nomic tail risks. Am. Econ. Rev. 107, 54–108 (2017a)
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., Tahbaz-Salehi, A.: Networks, shocks, and systemic risk.
In: Bramoulle, Y., Galeotti, A., Rogers, B. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook on the
Economics of Networks. Oxford University Press, NY (2017b)
Acemoglu, D., Scott, A.: Asymmetric business cycles: theory and time-series evidence.
J. Monetary Econ. 40, 501–533 (1991)
Anthonissen, N.: Microeconomic shocks and macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in a dynamic
network economy. J. Macroecon. 47, 233–254 (2016)
Ascari, G., Fagiolo, G., Roventini, A.: Fat-tail distributions and business cycle models.
Macroecon. Dyn. 19, 415–476 (2015)
Ashraf, Q., Gershman, B., Howitt, P.: Banks, market organization, and macroeconomic
performance: an agent-based computational analysis. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 135,
143–180 (2017)
Babus, A., Allen, F.: Networks in ﬁnance. In: Kleindorfer, P., Wind, J. (eds.) Network-
Based Strategies and Competencies, pp. 367–382. Wharton School Publishing, Upper
Saddle River (2009)
Battiston, S., Delli Gatti, D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B., Stiglitz, J.: Credit chains
and bankruptcy propagation in production networks. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 31,
2061–2084 (2007)
Bougheas, S., Kirman, A.: Complex ﬁnancial networks and systemic risk: a review.
In: Commendatore, P., Kayam, S., Kubin, I. (eds.) Complexity and Geographical
Economics: Topics and Tools. Springer, Heidelberg (2015)
Bougheas, S., Kirman, A.: Bank insolvencies, priority claims and systemic risk. In:
Commendatore, P., Matilla-Garcia, M., Varela, L., Canovas, J. (eds.) Complex Net-
works and Dynamics: Social Economic Interactions. Springer, Heidelberg (2016)
136 S. Bougheas et al.
Caballero, R., Simsek, A.: Fire sales in a model of complexity. J. Finance 68, 2549–2587
(2013)
Carvalho, V.: From micro to macro via production networks. J. Econ. Perspect. 28,
23–248 (2014)
Diamond, D., Rajan, R.: Fear of ﬁre sales, illiquidity seeking, and credit freezes. Q. J.
Econ. 126, 557–591 (2011)
Eisenberg, L., Noe, T.: Systemic risk in ﬁnancial systems. Manag. Sci. 47, 236–249
(2001)
Geanakoplos, J., Axtell, R., Farmer, D., Howitt, P., Conlee, B., Goldstein, J., Hendrey,
M., Palmer, N., Yang, C.-Y.: Getting at systemic risk via an agent-based model of
the housing market. Am. Econ. Rev. Papers Proc. 102, 53–58 (2012)
Giglio, S., Kelly, B., Pruitt, S.: Systemic risk and the macroeconomy: an empirical
evaluation. J. Financ. Econ. 119, 457–471 (2016)
Glasserman, P., Young, P.: Contagion in ﬁnancial networks. J. Econ. Lit. 54, 779–831
(2016)
Schularick, M., Taylor, A.: Credit booms gone bust: monetary policy, leverage cycles,
and ﬁnancial crises 1870–2008. Am. Econ. Rev. 102, 1029–1061 (2012)
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.: Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium
approach. J. Finance 47, 1343–1366 (1992)
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.: Fire sales in ﬁnance and macroeconomics. J. Econ. Perspect.
25, 29–48 (2011)
Thurner, S., Farmer, D., Geanakoplos, J.: Leverage causes fat tails and clustered volatil-
ity. Quant. Finance 12, 695–707 (2012)
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium
or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were
made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
Market Interactions, Endogenous Dynamics
and Stabilization Policies
Noemi Schmitt1, Jan Tuinstra2, and Frank Westerhoff1(&)
1 Department of Economics, University of Bamberg, Bamberg, Germany
frank.westerhoff@uni-bamberg.de
2 Amsterdam School of Economics and CeNDEF, University of Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract. We review a recent literature that shows that interactions between
markets, created by the market entry and exit behavior of boundedly rational
ﬁrms, may cause complex endogenous dynamics. In particular, these models
predict that welfare decreases if ﬁrms rapidly switch between markets. Against
this background, we show that policy makers have the opportunity to stabilize
markets and thus to enhance welfare by regulating interacting markets. For
instance, imposing proﬁt taxes reduces the markets’ proﬁt differentials and thus
slows down the ﬁrms’ market entry and exit behavior. However, these stabi-
lization policies may also lead to undesirable side effects, such as coexistence of
attractors, hysteresis effects and, in a multi-region setting, failure of policy
makers to coordinate on the globally optimal policy. Moreover, regulation may
be subject to the lobbying efforts of special interest groups and thus not be
optimal.
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1 Introduction and Outline
In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis that hit the global economy by the end of the noughties
many economists and policy makers realized that the strong links between individual
markets played an important role in allowing the crisis to spread globally, or may even
have been at the core of the emergence of the crisis (see, amongst others, Karras and
Song 1996, Bordo et al. 2001 and Shiller 2015). This has spawned a literature that deals
both with the effect that interactions between markets have on market stability, and with
the policy measures that may be implemented to counter the instabilities that potentially
arise from these interactions. While some policy measures indeed stabilize markets and
thereby improve welfare, other policy measures may yield surprising and unwanted side
effects. In this chapter we will review a small part of that literature.
That individual markets may lead to instability has been recognized for some time
already. Classic textbook examples are the cobweb model under naïve expectations
(see Ezekiel 1938) or the Cournot oligopoly model under best reply dynamics (see
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Theocharis 1959). More recently the development of the theory of nonlinear dynamical
systems has led to an increased attention for the possibility of market instability. Some
early and important applications of this theory are Grandmont (1985) and Bullard
(1994) on overlapping generations models, Chiarella (1988), Hommes (1994) and
Brock and Hommes (1997) on cobweb markets, Day and Huang (1990), Lux (1995)
and Brock and Hommes (1998) on ﬁnancial markets and Puu (1991) and Kopel (1996)
on Cournot duopoly models. Laboratory experiments with paid human subjects suggest
that instability is indeed likely to occur in some of these market environments (see e.g.
Hommes et al. 2005 and Heemeijer et al. 2009).
In the last decade the interaction between markets has been identiﬁed as an addi-
tional route to market instability. Dieci and Westerhoff (2009, 2010), for example, ﬁnd
that two stable cobweb markets may become unstable when they are linked. Tuinstra
et al. (2014) show that this increased instability may result in the counterintuitive policy
prescription that under certain circumstances strictly positive import tariffs are welfare
enhancing. Even in the absence of naïve price expectations and cobweb dynamics,
linking two markets may lead to instability, as demonstrated by Schmitt et al. (2017a,
b). If ﬁrms are sufﬁciently sensitive to proﬁt differences between markets this may lead
to unstable dynamics. Following the insights from Schmitt and Westerhoff (2015,
2017), the papers by Schmitt et al. (2017a, b) investigate how the introduction of proﬁt
taxes may dampen the proﬁt differences between the two markets and thereby stabilize
the dynamics and increase welfare. However, these proﬁt taxes may also induce
undesirable side effects, such as coexistence of attractors and hysteresis effects (Schmitt
et al. 2017a), or it may turn out to be difﬁcult for regulators to coordinate on a globally
optimal proﬁt tax policy (Schmitt et al. 2017b).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we provide a brief
review of the literature on market interactions, and Sect. 3 discusses some contributions
that analyze the stabilizing or destabilizing effect that regulatory policies may have on
the dynamics of interacting markets. Section 4 concludes.
2 Market Interactions
The beneﬁts of a non-regulated market economy depend crucially on the assumption
that markets are stable and prices attain their equilibrium values. In this way a (Pareto)
efﬁcient allocation of scarce resources will be established, and governments have no
reason to interfere in the market process (other than for, typically subjective, distri-
butional concerns). Market stability therefore has been, and continues to be, an
important ﬁeld of research in economics. One of the simplest and intuitive models to
study this issue is by means of the so-called cobweb model, initially introduced by
Ezekiel (1938). This model represents a market where suppliers face a production lag.
That is, it takes one period for their (non-storable) product to be produced, implying
that the producers have to make a supply decision one period in advance – this setting
is relevant, for example, for many agricultural markets. The optimal supply decision
consequently depends upon the producers’ expectation of the market clearing price in
the next period. The actual market price is the price that clears the market, that is, the
price that equates consumer demand for the produced commodity with the aggregate
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supply that was determined, on the basis of producers’ price expectations, in the
previous period. If the number of producers on the market and the consumer demand
schedule for the produced commodity is constant over time this gives rise to a unique
‘fundamental’ steady state price. If the producers have rational expectations (that is:
they know the full market structure, including consumer demand and cost functions of
all producers), and if in addition there is common knowledge of rationality (that is:
every producer knows that every producer is rational, and knows that every producer
knows that every producer is rational, and so on) they will coordinate on this funda-
mental steady state price (and correctly predict it).
However, these assumptions are very strong, and less demanding forms of
expectation formation have been suggested in the literature. In particular, at the other
extreme we can ﬁnd naïve expectations, as discussed in the original model of Ezekiel
(1938), where producers predict next period’s price to be equal to the last observed
price (that is, the price in this period). Introducing naïve expectations for all producers
implies that prices evolve according to a ﬁrst order difference equation which,
depending on the relative slopes of the consumer demand and producer supply func-
tions, as well as on the number of producers, may lead to oscillating converge to the
unique steady state, to diverging oscillations, or to a period two cycle, where market
clearing prices jump back and forth between a low and a high level.
More complicated unstable dynamics may emerge in the cobweb model for more
sophisticated, but still boundedly rational, prediction strategies. For example, Chiarella
(1988) and Hommes (1994, 1998) consider adaptive expectations, where the price
expectation is adapted in the direction of the last observed price. They show that this
expectation mechanism can lead to more erratic dynamics in prices and predictions.
Another promising avenue to study the role of expectations in the stability of the cobweb
market was advanced by the influential work of Brock andHommes (1997). They assume
that producers in the cobweb model form expectations either in a rational or in a naïve
manner, and switch between these ‘forecasting heuristics’ on the basis of past forecasting
accuracy. The interaction between cobweb dynamics and endogenous switching pro-
vides an intuitive mechanism that leads to endogenous fluctuations, both in market
clearing prices and in the distribution of producers over the different expectation rules.
For other contributions in this direction, see for example, Goeree and Hommes (2000),
Branch (2002) and Chiarella and He (2003). That the cobweb model has a tendency to
result in complicated dynamics is also conﬁrmed by laboratory experiments (see
Hommes et al. 2007) and strategy experiments (Sonnemans et al. 2004).
Note that, if producers switch between the stabilizing rational and the destabilizing
naïve forecasting heuristic according to a performance measure that also includes past
realized proﬁts, policy makers may have an opportunity to stabilize markets. Indeed,
Schmitt and Westerhoff (2015, 2017) show that policy makers may set proﬁt taxes such
that the more stabilizing forecasting heuristic gains in popularity, thereby calming
down complex dynamics. For instance, rational expectations usually require some kind
of information costs and may thus be less proﬁtable than naïve expectations – at least at
the steady state where predictions of rational and naïve expectations are the same. In
such an environment, policy makers should increase proﬁt taxes to reduce the fore-
casting heuristics’ proﬁtability. In doing so, they promote the use of rational
expectations.
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The literature discussed so far has focused on the dynamics of a single market.
However, another route to complicated dynamics may arise when different markets are
coupled and producers can switch between these markets, for example – similar to the
mechanism used in the literature on switching between different expectation rules –
based upon past (relative) proﬁtability of being active on these two markets. Note that
there might be different interpretations for the two markets. They may, for example,
correspond to different regional markets for the same homogeneous commodity.
Switching then refers to ﬁrms specializing on exporting their product to the other
region, or even migrating their full production facility to that region. The markets may
also relate to two different products that are produced and consumed in the same
region, and that can be produced by slight (and cheap) modiﬁcations in the production
technology. In this case switching means that ﬁrms use their productive assets for
producing a different commodity.
Dieci and Westerhoff (2009, 2010) are among the ﬁrst to investigate this switching
of ﬁrms between markets, which gives a very intuitive explanation for complicated
dynamics. To appreciate the mechanism it is important to understand that stability of
the cobweb dynamics on an individual market depends upon the sensitivity of the
aggregate supply function with respect to the expected price. Suppose aggregate supply
responds aggressively to a change in the expected price. In that case a small change in
the actual price generates, through producers’ naïve expectations, a strong response
from the producers and a price correction that tends to be larger than the initial price
change. Now, if individual supply functions are the same for all producers, it follows
immediately that an increase in the number of producers active on an individual market
increases aggregate supply for each value of the expected price and, by the argument
given above, tends to destabilize the price dynamics.
To see how the mechanism works consider two interacting markets, market A and
market B, and suppose that the distribution of ﬁrms over these two markets is such that
market A is more proﬁtable than market B. This will attract ﬁrms from market B to
market A. The resulting increased aggregate supply sensitivity on market A may very
well destabilize that market, generating volatility in market clearing prices. In turn, this
decreases proﬁts on market A and there will be a tendency for ﬁrms to leave market A
and enter market B, which may stabilize the dynamics on market A, but simultaneously
destabilizes market B, after which the whole cycle repeats again. Note that we may
have a scenario where in the absence of switching both markets are stable under
cobweb dynamics, but connecting them by allowing ﬁrms to move between markets,
makes both of them unstable. This is illustrated by Fig. 1, which considers a setting
where, when considered in isolation, both cobweb markets are indeed stable under
naïve expectations. The times series in Fig. 1 show that interaction destabilizes the
markets. In period 1 ﬁrms are almost equally distributed between markets, and although
markets are symmetric, proﬁts in market A are slightly higher in period 1. Since the
price in market A is below the fundamental value, under naïve expectations we would
expect each ﬁrm in that market to have a relatively low supply, and that the market
clearing price therefore goes up. However, the difference in proﬁts in period 1 leads to
an increase in the number of ﬁrms in market A in period 2, which increases aggregate
supply in that market, and the market clearing price actually decreases and moves
further away from the steady state. Similarly, although individual supply under naïve
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Fig. 1. Interacting cobweb markets. The panels show the time evolution of prices in market A,
proﬁts in market A, prices in market B, proﬁts in market B and the fraction of ﬁrms active in
market A, respectively. Parameter setting as in Dieci and Westerhoff (2010).
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expectations goes up in market B (because of the relatively high price in period 1),
aggregate supply decreases because a number of ﬁrms move to market A. Also for this
market the market clearing price moves away from the steady state. The net effect of
these changes is that in period 2 market B is the most proﬁtable and ﬁrms move back to
market B, and so on. It is important to note that this type of dynamics may even hold if
ﬁrms only respond to differences in past proﬁts slowly (see also Tuinstra et al. 2014).
Although complicated behavior in interacting markets arises quite naturally in the
case of cobweb dynamics (that is, when producers face a one period production lag and
have naïve expectations), this type of behavior occurs more generally. First, also if
ﬁrms have adaptive expectations the same mechanism may apply. Moreover, even in
the extreme case of rational expectations, or alternatively when there is no production
lag and the market clearing price is established immediately, the interaction between
markets may lead to complicated dynamics, see Schmitt et al. (2017a, b). The dynamics
in this case depend upon how responsive ﬁrms are with respect to past proﬁts generated
by the two regions. Consider, for example, the scenario where there are two markets
that, given the number of ﬁrms active on the market, are always in equilibrium. That is,
ﬁrms either have perfect foresight about the equilibrium price after they enter the
market, or prices adjust instantaneously and ﬁrms do not need to predict the price, but
observe it when they make their supply decision. The market equilibrium prices
obviously depend upon the distribution of ﬁrms over the two markets. If that distri-
bution is such that proﬁts in market A are higher than in market B, ﬁrms active in the
latter will move to the former. If they respond slowly to the proﬁt differential the
distribution of ﬁrms will gradually adjust such that in the end proﬁts in the two markets
are equalized. However, if ﬁrms are sensitive to the proﬁt differential the number of
ﬁrms moving to market A may be so large that the resulting equilibrium proﬁts in that
market become lower than that of market B and ﬁrms consequently move back.
Through this process of overshooting complicated dynamics may emerge again.
Complicated dynamics also emerge in more elaborate general equilibrium envi-
ronments. A number of models use a New Economic Geography perspective to model
market interactions, for example, Agliari et al. (2011, 2014) and Commendatore et al.
(2014, 2015). These contributions show that endogenous fluctuations may emerge from
market interactions between different economic regions. Another interesting aspect of
these contributions is that they investigate the tools that policy makers have to stabilize
fluctuations, for example trading costs. In the next section we review the effect of
different types of regulatory policies that may stabilize dynamics in market interaction
models with a partial equilibrium flavor as discussed above. As we will see, some of
these regulatory policies may also give rise to surprising side effects.
3 Stabilization Policies
Different types of regulatory policies can be implemented to stabilize the erratic
dynamics generated by interacting markets. We will briefly discuss two of them here:
the imposition of import tariffs between regions (see Tuinstra et al. 2014) and the use of
proﬁt taxes (Schmitt et al. 2017a, b).
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3.1 Optimal Trade Barriers
Tuinstra et al. (2014) extend the interacting cobweb markets, advanced by Dieci and
Westerhoff (2009, 2010), by introducing trade barriers for ﬁrms in one region (say
region A) that want to export their product to the other region (region B). The size of
these trade barriers determines the level of interaction between the markets. On one
hand, a prohibitively high trade barrier takes away any incentive for ﬁrms in one region
to export to the other region, and consequently implies that markets function in iso-
lation. On the other hand, in the absence of any trade barriers there will be free trade
and no restrictions on exports. From Dieci and Westerhoff (2009, 2010) we know that
the resulting unrestricted interaction between markets may lead to instability, even if
markets are stable in isolation. If this is the case it follows that increasing trade barriers
sufﬁciently (for example in the form of import tariffs) may stabilize markets.
However, trade barriers may also come at substantial economic costs. In particular,
suppose that ﬁrms in region A are more productive, are more numerous and/or face
relatively smaller consumer demand, relative to region B. Then, when comparing
steady states with and without trade barriers, it follows straightforwardly that although
consumers in region A and producers in region B may suffer from free trade, aggregate
welfare in each of the regions (and thereby total welfare over the regions) increases.
This conclusion is only valid, however, if markets remain stable. The trade-off between
increased efﬁciency at the steady state that follows from diminishing trade barriers,
versus the resulting increased instability means that the level of trade barriers that
maximizes total aggregate welfare may be strictly positive. This contradicts conven-
tional economic wisdom, which is based on comparing steady state allocations only.
Figure 2 illustrates the main point. The ﬁgure shows bifurcation diagrams for
increasing import tariffs. Starting with a high level of import tariffs it will not be
proﬁtable for ﬁrms in region A to export their product to region B, although market
prices in region B are higher. If the import tariffs decrease ﬁrms from region A will start
to export to region B, see the lower left panel of Fig. 2. The market clearing price in the
latter will decrease, because of increasing supply, and the market clearing price in
region A increases (because of decreasing supply). However, if import tariffs decrease
too much, the inflow of supply to region B destabilizes that market and fluctuations in
prices in both regions and in the export level emerge endogenously. The lower right
panel shows aggregate welfare as a function of the import tariff. If the government
objective can be characterized by the aim to maximize total aggregate welfare, it
follows that the government will choose that level of the import tariff such that market
dynamics are ‘just’ stable – that is, any further decrease in trade barriers would lead to
welfare decreasing fluctuations. In Fig. 2 this corresponds to an import tariff of about
0.43.1 Note that, if the government is incompletely informed, or if the economic
environment is subject to regular (demand and/or supply) shocks, this optimal policy
may (occasionally) lead to instability as well. Instability may furthermore occur if
special interest groups, for example representing consumers and producers from the
1 Note that in general it is not apparent that fluctuations always reduce welfare. Indeed several
contributions to the literature have shown that welfare-improving fluctuations are possible in some
environments, see for example Dawid and Kopel (1999), Matsumoto (2003) and Huang (2008).
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different regions, lobby for a decrease or increase in trade barriers. Tuinstra et al.
(2014) also present a model where trade barriers are endogenously determined by the
lobbying efforts of these special interest groups. These efforts depend on the fluctua-
tions in consumer and producer welfare, implying that trade barriers will vary over
time. Figure 3 shows a simulation with this model, where import tariffs are revised
every sixteen periods (that is, once in a political cycle of four years, if we interpret one
period in the model as a quarter). Although the government of region B is in principle
able to set an import tariff such that the markets are stable, the effect of lobbying is that
the dynamics of prices and export levels becomes highly complicated.
There have been some other contributions to the literature that have similarly
identiﬁed a potential trade-off between allocative efﬁciency on the one hand, and
stability on the other. For example, Commendatore and Kubin (2009) show that
deregulating labor and product markets may lead to instability and endogenous fluc-
tuations, although it would increase steady state employment. Moreover, recent con-
tributions in the ﬁeld of New Economic Geography also analyze the effect of trade
Fig. 2. Optimal barriers to entry. The panels show prices in market A, prices in market B, the
fraction of exporting ﬁrms and average welfare versus import tariffs, respectively. Parameter
setting as in Tuinstra et al. (2014).
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costs on stability and volatility. Reducing trade barriers, by cutting trade costs, may
lead to an increase in instability (see e.g. Agliari et al. 2011, 2014 and Commendatore
et al. 2014, 2015). There is also some empirical evidence suggesting a relation between
trade openness and volatility. A positive correlation between the two was found by
Fig. 3. Import tariffs and lobbying efforts of special interest groups. The panels show the time
evolution of prices in market A, prices in market B, import tariffs, and the fraction of exporting
ﬁrms, respectively. Parameter setting as in Tuinstra et al. (2014).
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Karras and Song (1996). Moreover, Bordo et al. (2001) argue that the increased
incidence of ﬁnancial and economic crises is due to an increase in deregulation.
3.2 Proﬁt Taxes
As discussed above, Schmitt and Westerhoff (2015, 2017) show that fluctuations on an
individual market can be dampened or even fully stabilized by an appropriate level of
proﬁt taxes. The intuition is that, in an environment where ﬁrms switch strategies on
the basis of their past proﬁtability, and instability occurs because ﬁrms respond
strongly to these proﬁt differences, proﬁt taxes curb the sensitivity with respect to
proﬁts. Schmitt et al. (2017a, b) analyze whether proﬁt taxes can have a similar sta-
bilizing effect when there are interacting markets. To that end, they consider a model
where there is a large number of ﬁrms, and each period all ﬁrms have to decide
simultaneously on which of the two markets to supply their good. For convenience it is
assumed that, after entry decisions have been made, markets immediately adjust such
that the market clearing price is established. Therefore there is no production lag and
ﬁrms are not required to form price expectations. This implies that cobweb dynamics
are absent. Equilibrium proﬁts on each market decrease in the number of ﬁrms on that
market, so ﬁrms have to solve a nontrivial coordination problem. If ﬁrms are quite
sensitive with respect to proﬁt differences the number of ﬁrms entering the market that
was more proﬁtable in the previous period tends to overshoot the steady state number
of ﬁrms for that market, and complicated dynamics may emerge. Proﬁt taxes may be
introduced to mitigate the response of the ﬁrms, thereby slowing down the dynamics
and eventually stabilizing it altogether. Schmitt et al. (2017a) and (b) each focus on two
potential complications that may come to the fore when regulators contemplate using
proﬁt taxes to stabilize interacting markets.
A ﬁrst complication derives from the observation that proﬁt taxes typically only
apply to strictly positive proﬁts. That is, net proﬁts (as a function of gross proﬁts) have
a kink at zero, with a slope equal to 1 for negative proﬁts, and a slope equal to 1 s for
positive proﬁts, where 0 s\1 is the level of proﬁt taxes. This implies that the
evolutionary model where ﬁrms make entry decisions on the basis of past proﬁts
becomes a piecewise (one-dimensional) nonlinear map. These types of maps have been
studied extensively in recent years (see Avrutin et al. 2018, for a general introduction
and Commendatore et al. 2014, 2015, and Tramontana et al. 2010, 2013 for economic
applications) and it turns out they typically give rise to an even richer set of compli-
cated behaviors than smooth nonlinear maps already do.
Schmitt et al. (2017a) study the complications that emerge through the kink in the
proﬁt function. For convenience they focus on a stylized setting where there is one
market and a safe outside option. Proﬁts associated with the outside option are inde-
pendent of the number of ﬁrms choosing that option. Firms have strictly positive ﬁxed
costs for supplying in the market implying that proﬁts become negative if too many
ﬁrms enter the market, and the kink in the proﬁt function then becomes relevant.
As long as proﬁts remain strictly positive an increase in the sensitivity of ﬁrms with
respect to proﬁt differences will destabilize the dynamics through a so-called period
doubling bifurcation and the fraction of entrants oscillates between a high and a low
value. However, due to the kink in the proﬁt function it turns out that a high-amplitude
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period two cycle already exists when the steady state is locally stable. For some
parameter values this high-amplitude period two cycle coexists with the locally stable
steady state, and for other parameter values it coexists with a low-amplitude period two
cycle. This coexistence of attractors leads to a number of intriguing dynamical phe-
nomena. For example, a small decrease in the proﬁt tax rate may lead to abrupt changes
in the dynamics, because suddenly the low-amplitude period two cycle ceases to exist
and the dynamics is attracted to the high-amplitude period two cycle. This is illustrated
by the upper two panels in Fig. 4, which show that a decrease of the proﬁt tax rate from
0.5 to 0.4 drives the dynamics to a high-amplitude period two cycle. It may prove
difﬁcult for the government to correct for this. Increasing the proﬁt tax rate to its initial
value typically does not sufﬁce, as is conﬁrmed by period 41–60 in the second panel of
Fig. 4 and the corresponding dynamics in the ﬁrst panel. A much higher increase in the
proﬁt tax rate may be required. This hysteresis effect is due to the kink in the proﬁt
function and turns out to be very robust to changes in the model. It imposes some
important restrictions on stabilizing markets through proﬁt taxes that regulators should
be aware of. Even if the proﬁt tax rate is constant over time interesting dynamical
phenomena may emerge. The lower two panels of Fig. 4 show the dynamics when the
tax rate is constant at 0.5 but where stochastic shocks hit the dynamical system
occasionally. These shocks may move the dynamics from the basin of attraction of one
of the coexisting attractors to that of the other attractor. The fluctuations that may
emerge can be quite complicated, as illustrated by the third panel of Fig. 4.
Schmitt et al. (2017b) consider a variation of the model used by Schmitt et al.
(2017a) with two important changes. First, the outside option is explicitly modelled as
a different market, and second, ﬁrms have no ﬁxed costs. The implication of the second
adjustment is that ﬁrms will never make losses and therefore there is no kink in the
proﬁt function. This makes the model more suitable for understanding the effect of
proﬁt taxes in the two different markets (or regions) on the stabilization of complicated
dynamics and on (the distribution of) welfare in the two different markets, which is
exactly the aim of that paper.
By imposing a proﬁt tax in both regions volatile market dynamics can be stabilized,
see the ﬁrst two lines of Fig. 5. The ﬁrst line shows the effect of the so-called intensity
of choice, a parameter that measures how strongly ﬁrms respond to proﬁt differentials.
The proﬁt tax rates are zero in both regions, and an increase in the intensity of choice
induces instability (left panel), which decreases total average welfare (right panel). The
second line shows that this instability can be reversed by increasing proﬁt tax rates in
both regions (note that the intensity of choice parameter used in the second line
corresponds to the maximum value in the panels on the ﬁrst line).
It turns out that, in the symmetric setting of the model, in order to stabilize the
dynamics it will be sufﬁcient to introduce a proﬁt tax in only one of the two regions.
The third line of Fig. 5 shows the case where only region A imposes a proﬁt tax rate
(again with intensity of choice equal to 27). Although the proﬁt tax rate in region A that
is required to stabilize the dynamics is higher than before, stabilization of the dynamics
is still possible. However, because the difference in proﬁt tax rates distorts the steady
state distribution of ﬁrms between regions total aggregate welfare is not maximized in
this way. If the aim of the regulators is to maximize average welfare aggregated over
the two regions it is better to coordinate on proﬁt taxes and set them at the same
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(sufﬁciently high) level (see the fourth line of Fig. 5, where total average welfare is
maximized when both regions set a tax rate of 0.5). Such a coordinated tax policy may
be difﬁcult to achieve in practice, since regulators in each region will have the incentive
to reduce the proﬁt tax and thereby attract more ﬁrms to their region. Although this may
lead to instability, it will also increase tax revenues for the consumers in that region and
Fig. 4. Time evolution of ﬁrms active in market A and the proﬁt tax rate in market A. The ﬁrst
two panels illustrate the hysteresis effect, the latter two panels show the dynamics with occasional
exogenous noise, with constant tax rates. Parameter setting as in Schmitt et al. (2017a).
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the net effect may be beneﬁcial. In this way, a coordinated tax policy could easily
unravel and the regions then become trapped into a regime with volatile markets and
low welfare levels.
Fig. 5. The ﬁrst two lines show bifurcation diagrams for the fraction of ﬁrms in region A and
average welfare as a function of the intensity of choice (proﬁt tax rate is zero), and as a function
of the proﬁt tax rate, taken to be equal in both regions. For the third (fourth) line the proﬁt tax rate
in region B is zero (0.5) and the proﬁt tax rate in region A varies. The intensity of choice
parameter equals 27 in all graphs (except for those on the ﬁrst line, where this parameter varies
from 0 to 27).
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4 Conclusions and Outlook
In recent years the interaction between individual markets has received attention for its
role in reinforcing, or even creating, instability and complicated endogenous dynamics.
In this chapter we have reviewed some of the mechanisms that have been identiﬁed, as
well as the effect of stabilization policies that have been put forward.
Tuinstra et al. (2014), for example, show that market interaction may imply that,
although import tariffs between markets may decrease allocative efﬁciency at the steady
state equilibrium, such tariffs may be welfare enhancing nevertheless. This is because
they weaken the link between markets and thereby stabilize consumption and production
patterns. Schmitt et al. (2017a, b) investigate how the introduction of proﬁt taxes may
stabilize interacting markets where ﬁrms responds strongly to past proﬁt differences.
Schmitt et al. (2017a) argue that proﬁt taxes result in an additional nonlinearity in the
dynamics (a kink of the proﬁt function at zero), which introduces complicated dynamics
such as coexistence of attractors and hysteresis. Schmitt et al. (2017b) discuss the sce-
nario where each region is overseen by an independent local government or regulatory
authority. Optimally, these two regulators coordinate their proﬁt taxes in such a way that
markets are stable and total welfare is maximized. However, Schmitt et al. (2017b) argue
that, if regulators are only (or mainly) interested in welfare in their own region, each of
them will have the incentive to decrease the proﬁt tax, which can destabilize markets.
We conclude this chapter by briefly discussing several possible extensions to the
work discussed here. One extension is to present the tax competition discussed in
Schmitt et al. (2017b) as a game between the regulators of the two regions, where each
regulator independently sets the proﬁt tax rate for its own region with the goal to
maximize average welfare in that region. The question then is under which conditions
the Nash equilibria of this game are characterized by unstable market dynamics and
suboptimal global welfare levels. Other interesting extensions naturally follow from the
observation that the models that we discussed in this chapter are quite stylized. One
simplifying assumption has been to consider a partial equilibrium framework. An
obvious question is whether the main insights discussed in this chapter will also be
valid in a full-fledged general equilibrium model. Moreover, thus far we have only
looked at interaction between markets on the supply side. New insights may be
obtained if markets are also connected through consumer demand. Similarly, it makes
sense to consider models that depart from the assumption that producers can migrate
free of any costs between markets or regions and that consumers are fully immobile.
Relaxing these assumptions may to a certain extent mitigate some of the adverse effects
of stabilization policies on stability, although we believe the basic mechanism will
survive the generalizations discussed here.
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Abstract. We propose a number of possibilities for future research on
issues related to systemic risk in financial markets and its relationship
to the macroeconomy. Some of the proposals aim to improve our under-
standing of the behavior of aggregate credit. Other proposals involve the
development or richer agent-based models that potentially can help us
understand the time-series properties of national output.
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1 Future Challenges
Traditional dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models of the
macroeconomy view ﬂuctuations of GDP around its trend as the product of
aggregate shocks drawn form a lognormal distribution. The investment func-
tion of these models produces the observed autocorrelation in error terms (GDP
follows an AR process) while a number of alternative mechanisms have been
proposed to account for the increasing secular trend. However, there are other
features of the behavior of the aggregate output trend that these models can-
not explain. For example, persistence, that is the tendency for output shocks in
one period to be correlated with those in the period before, is usually cap-
tured by directly imposing such pattern on the structure of macroeconomic
shocks (error terms are serially correlated). It is also well known that there
is an asymmetry in the behavior of aggregate output between expansions and
slumps, whereby the former are smooth and the latter are sharp. Acemoglu and
Scott (1991) have demonstrated how the last two features, namely persistence
and asymmetry, can be accounted by allowing heterogeneity among producers
and some form of increasing returns at the ﬁrm level. Lastly, as Ascari et al.
(2015) have shown DSGE models cannot explain the observation that the tails
of the distribution of aggregate shocks are ‘fat’; that is are inconsistent with nor-
mal draws. This last observation has recently motivated researchers to consider
alternative approaches, such as network theory (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2012, 2017;
Carvalho 2014), agent-based modeling (e.g. Ashraf et al. 2017) and also frame-
works that are combine these two approaches (e.g. Battiston et al. 2007). In
all these papers the ampliﬁcation mechanism is produced within the production
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sector. The ﬁnancial sector either is non-existent or when it exists, as in Ashraf
et al. (2017), is not responsible for the excess volatility in the system.
In Chap. 20 of this volume, we have suggested an alternative mechanism
according to which the excess volatility is created by network eﬀects in the
banking system. Support for our approach is oﬀered by Schularick and Taylor
(2012) who have empirically identiﬁed a historical link between the level aggre-
gate credit in the economy and macroeconomic performance. The authors argue
that aggregate credit can predict economic crises, especially, rare catastrophic
events, like the Great Depression and the Great Recession. These where the two
more severe macroeconomic crises of the last 100 years, and both were preceded
by extreme events in the banking system. For example, in the period 1930–1933
approx. 10,000 banks suspended operations or failed. The corresponding losses
from the more recent crisis have been well documented.
Our central feature of our model was the presence of ‘ﬁre sales’ (see, Shleifer
and Vishny 2011). This is a price externality (see, Caballero and Simsek 2013)
imposed by failing banks on other banks. As failing banks sale their assets, the
prices of these assets drop causing other banks to reevaluate their assets at
these new lower prices potentially leading to their own failure. Our work thus
far has suggested that this mechanism is a good candidate for accounting for
macroeconomic fat tails. Our aim is to ﬁrmly establish that this is indeed the
case but also within a more general model that potentially can account for the
other features of aggregate output described above.
Thus, looking ahead we are planning a number of extensions of our bench-
mark model. The ﬁrst two are direct extension of the benchmark model focusing
on the banking sector. The following two will be addressing issues related to the
impact of the ﬁnancial system on the rest of the economy.
Network structure, fire sales and systemic risk. Our ﬁrst task is to try to
understand how the interplay between the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
and network structure generate the ampliﬁcation mechanism. We can do that
by producing estimates of network measures (e.g. average degree, centrality) for
each period of our model and then by checking how these measures are correlated
with the corresponding growth rates of aggregate credit at the end of the period
and the aggregate shock (aggregate of idiosyncratic shocks) at the beginning of
the period.
Core-periphery network structure, distribution of bank size and sys-
temic risk. We can experiment with alternative network formation speciﬁca-
tions where banks that perform better face a higher demand for loans from
ﬁrms. Actual banking networks have a core-periphery structure where banks in
the core are responsible for a higher proportion of lending activity. Within such
a framework we should be able to address important policy issues related to
institutions that are either ‘too big’ or ‘too connected’ to fail.
The above issues have to varying degrees already been addressed in the lit-
erature. What is novel in our approach, is the introduction of ﬁre sales in the
general model. This is important because we will be able to get a measure of sys-
temic losses. In models without ﬁre sales, as we have already shown in Chap. 5,
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the total losses are equal to the initial losses and thus these models can only
address issues related to the total number of institutions being aﬀected follow-
ing a shock (more likely providing a minimum estimate as ﬁre sales would more
likely generate more failures) but not the impact of such failures on economic
losses.
An agent-based model of the macroeconomy with a bank network. In
its present form the model captures the dynamics of aggregate credit as generated
by a dynamic interbank model. We plan to extend the model by introducing con-
sumers (depositors) and producers (ﬁrms) in the model. By taking into account
the saving decisions of agents and by explicitly introducing production technolo-
gies along with externalities we hope that our model will be able to account for
(a) the empirical relationship between growth patterns and cyclical ﬂuctuations,
(b) the persistence in GDP growth movements, and (c) the asymmetry between
booms and busts.
Inequality and Business Cycles. Recently, there has been a lot research on
understanding global inequality trends (see, Piketty 2013). One issue that has
been overlooked are the cyclical patterns of inequality. Our agent-based model
will naturally produce inequality variations along the economic cycle and this
can help us identify economic groups that are more likely to suﬀer from economic
downturns.
As we argued in Chap. 5 the asymmetry between booms and busts can be
naturally captured by ﬁre sales. By introducing some externality at the ﬁrm
level, following Acemoglu and Scott (1991), we can also explain persistence. For
example, ﬁrms that succeed in one period are more likely to succeed in the
following period. The additional advantage of such speciﬁcation would be that
potentially can account for the observed size distribution of ﬁrms (Gabaix 2011).
Within such a generalized framework we could then compare alternative sources
of macroeconomic stability (ﬁnancial versus technological).
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Abstract. This paper analyzes the optimal location choice of a ﬁrm in a
dynamic Cournot framework, in which ﬁrms’ absorptive capacities may
depend on their knowledge stock. The ﬁrm decides whether to locate
irreversibly in a cluster or in isolation. In the cluster the ﬁrm beneﬁts
from inward spillovers from its competitors, but also generates outward
spillovers. If the ﬁrm chooses to locate in isolation no knowledge ﬂows
occur. All ﬁrms’ production costs are determined by their knowledge
stocks, which evolve over time due to own R&D investments and poten-
tially inward spillovers. It is shown that, if absorptive capacity is con-
stant, the incentive to locate in the cluster decreases with respect to the
ﬁrm’s knowledge stock. Conversely, if absorptive capacity depends posi-
tively on knowledge stock, the ﬁrm’s incentive to join the cluster is larger
the more knowledge it has. It is also shown that qualitative properties of
the equilibrium paths of R&D investments and knowledge stocks diﬀer
substantially depending on whether absorptive capacities are constant
or knowledge dependent.
1 Introduction
Firms’ location choices are aﬀected by several factors. In particular, the per-
tinent literature – often focusing on the choices of multinational ﬁrms – has
highlighted the role of the proximity to sales and factor markets, that of the
local institutions and regulations, and that of local labor markets, especially in
relation to availability of the appropriate skill mix (see e.g. Almazan et al. 2007;
Lee and Mansﬁeld 1996; Henisz 2000; De Beule and Duanmu 2012). Somewhat
surprisingly, the eﬀects of inward and (especially) outward knowledge spillovers
on the location choices of ﬁrms have not received much attention, although
such spillovers are known to have a large impact on ﬁrms’ decisions. Given that
knowledge is in many cases tacit and localized, a ﬁrm’s ability to beneﬁt from
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knowledge ﬂows and the associated spillovers is likely to depend to a large extent
on geographical proximity. This establishes an immediate link between the rel-
evance of knowledge spillovers and ﬁrms’ strategic location choices, which is
conﬁrmed by the ﬁndings of a relatively recent (and mainly) empirical literature
on the borders between Management and Industrial Organization. Alcacer and
Chung (2007) ﬁnd that technologically advanced ﬁrms tend to avoid locations
with strong industrial activity in an attempt to distance themselves from com-
petitors, favoring instead areas characterized by high levels of academic activity.
Knowledge spillovers – more precisely, the consideration of the gains from inward
spillovers (the opportunity for knowledge sourcing from other ﬁrms in the same
location) vs. the costs of outward spillovers – are argued to lie at the hearth of
the observed location choices. Along the same lines, Leiponen and Helfat (2011)
show that ﬁrms mainly involved with imitative innovation tend to choose mul-
tiple locations for their R&D activities, while ﬁrms mainly dealing with ‘new to
the market’ innovations do not. The heterogeneity between the location choices
of the two types of ﬁrms can again be easily related to the diﬀerential impact of
knowledge spillovers. The relevance of knowledge spillovers in clusters has been
the object of a large literature (see e.g. Griliches 1992; Jaﬀe et al. 1993) mainly
emphasizing the positive externalities – in terms of knowledge generation dynam-
ics – stemming from ﬁrms’ agglomerations (Head et al. 1995). The importance
of outward spillovers – obviously a negative externality of local agglomerations -
has been instead substantially underweighted in the literature, at least until
Alcacer and Chung (2007).1
As already noted, despite the abundance of empirical and anecdotal evi-
dence about the importance of knowledge spillovers for ﬁrms’ location choices,
relatively little theoretical work has been done but for a few notable exceptions.
For instance, Gersbach and Schmutzler (1999) focus on the eﬀects of internal and
external knowledge spillovers on the location of production and innovative activ-
ities in a Bertrand duopoly. Knowledge spillovers play a role also in Piga and
Poyago-Theotoky (2005) that focus on a Hotelling-type oligopoly where ﬁrms
choose their locations, as well as their R&D eﬀorts and prices. In their frame-
work, however, ﬁrms’ choices depend crucially on transportation costs that play
no role at all in our setup.2 Quite a few papers investigate the location choices
of multinational ﬁrms. Among them, Gersbach and Schmutzler (2011) focus on
the location of the production and R&D activities of multinational ﬁrms in the
presence of knowledge sourcing. Belderbos et al. (2008) build on Gersbach and
Schmutzler’s (1999) setup to investigate the strategic location of R&D by two
1 More recently, Mariotti et al. (2010) have stressed the negative role of technological
leakages in the location decisions of multi-national ﬁrms, qualitatively conﬁrming
Alcacer and Chung’s (2007) key insights. Furthermore, Belderbos et al. (2008) have
shown that technological leaders are more attracted than followers by countries
endowed with better intellectual property right protection mechanisms, indirectly
conﬁrming that ﬁrms are afraid of possible outward spillovers.
2 Note that in Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) ﬁrms choose from a continuum of
locations, while here – as in most of the literature – we focus on a binary choice
only: either ﬁrms locate in a cluster or in isolation.
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multinational ﬁrms (a technological leader and a laggard) competing in their
home markets and abroad, showing that the fraction of R&D located abroad
depends on the extent of inward and outward spillovers, on product market
competition, as well as on the gap between the technological leader and the
laggard.3
A fundamental diﬀerence between all these papers and our contribution is
that they focus on essentially static frameworks, so that they cannot investigate
how the dynamics of knowledge and proﬁts aﬀect ﬁrms’ location decisions, as
well as the diﬀerences between their short run and long run implications. In
Colombo and Dawid (2014) we make a ﬁrst attempt at modeling ﬁrms’ strate-
gic location choices – considering the binary choice of clustering vs. isolation –
in a dynamic game-theoretic framework by putting the role of inward and out-
ward spillovers on the front stage. That paper develops a diﬀerential game setup
studying the conditions under which it is optimal for a ﬁrm to locate inside or
outside an R&D cluster, focusing also on how ﬁrms’ incentives depend on the
intensity of knowledge spillovers in the cluster, on the degree of competition in
the industry, and on ﬁrms’ planning horizons. Furthermore, it characterizes the
eﬀects of ﬁrms’ location choices on social welfare in the long run, providing a
normative base on which to ground the evaluation of alternative policies.4 To
be more speciﬁc, we consider a diﬀerential game with n ﬁrms producing at each
time t a homogeneous good and competing in a common market. Firms’ pro-
duction costs are decreasing in their knowledge stock, which can be improved
through R&D. The industry is characterized by the presence of a cluster of ﬁrms
and each ﬁrm can either decide to locate in the cluster, or in isolation. By locat-
ing in the cluster, a ﬁrm can beneﬁt from knowledge spillovers that depend on
the overall knowledge stock of all the ﬁrms belonging to the cluster, while by
locating in isolation a ﬁrm cannot beneﬁt from inward spillovers neither suﬀer
from outward spillovers. We solve the game by ﬁrst characterizing the feedback
strategies of the ﬁrms in the cluster and in isolation with respect to their R&D
investments in a Markov perfect equilibrium for an arbitrary location pattern of
ﬁrms. We then investigate the incentives to locate in the cluster or in isolation by
comparing the numerically determined value functions under the Markov perfect
equilibrium of the diﬀerential game for the two location scenarios.
We focus in particular on the location choice of a ﬁrm – a technological
leader – that is either more eﬃcient in performing R&D than its competitors,
because of a structural advantage, or has only an initial advantage with respect
to the size of its knowledge stock. Under the assumption that the technologi-
cal leader enjoys a structural advantage, we show that it adopts a ‘threshold’
3 The location of R&D by multinational ﬁrms in the presence of spillovers is also the
focus e.g. of Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000); Ekholm and Hakkala (2007); Alcacer
and Zhao (2012), although their research questions diﬀer substantially from the one
we focus on here.
4 Also Alcacer et al. (2013) highlight the role of dynamic strategic interactions on
(multinational) ﬁrms’ location choices, although they concentrate on the eﬀects of
ﬁrms’ decisions on an industry competitive environment.
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strategy, choosing to locate outside the industry cluster whenever its advantage
over the competitors is suﬃciently large. Two major forces are at play in our
dynamic setup. In the short run, the leader beneﬁts from locating in the cluster
as its investment there is lower than in isolation. This follows immediately from
the observation that, when in the cluster, the leader’s R&D eﬀorts end up reduc-
ing the future costs faced by competitors. In the long run, however, the leader is
worse oﬀ in the cluster than in isolation (i.e. it has a lower market share), due to
the faster catching-up of the followers that beneﬁt from the outward spillovers
generated by the presence of the technological leader in the cluster. The relative
strength of the short run investment eﬀect vs. that of the long run market share
eﬀect determines whether – for given intensity of the knowledge spillovers – the
technological leader chooses to locate in the cluster or in isolation. The threshold
at which the location choice of the leader switches from cluster to isolation is
shown to be increasing in the discount rate – indicating that the more myopic
the leader is the larger are its incentives to join the cluster, as well as in the
dispersion of the industry and in the intensity of spillovers – suggesting that
the leader’s incentives to join the cluster are larger the higher the number of
competitors is and the more pervasive spillovers are.
The implications of the model are entirely diﬀerent when focusing on the case
in which the technological leader enjoys an initial knowledge advantage only, as
it is often the case for market pioneers in new sub-markets within an industry.
Although the leader’s location choice between the cluster and isolation is still
determined by a threshold strategy, both the long run proﬁts and the knowledge
stock of the leader are larger when locating in the cluster rather than in isola-
tion (exactly the opposite of what happens under a structural advantage). This
follows immediately from the observations that, under a temporary knowledge
advantage, in the long run the balance between outward and inward spillovers
is the same for both the leader and its competitors (whereas under a structural
advantage the wedge between the two is systematically larger for the leader than
for the competitors), and that by locating in the cluster the leader can beneﬁt
from the spillovers generated by the competitors, which would instead be absent
were it to locate in isolation. Similar arguments explain the opposite results
we ﬁnd in this case with respect to the structural advantage one in terms of
comparative statics, with a negative relationship between the leader’s location
threshold and ﬁrms’ discount rate.
Interestingly, both under a structural and a temporary R&D advantage of
the leader, our numerical simulations show the existence of scenarios in which,
although the technological leader chooses to locate in isolation, both total indus-
try proﬁts and consumers’ surplus would be larger if it were to locate in the
cluster. Hence, the leader’s optimal choice contrasts with the socially optimal
one. This ineﬃciency result is easily understood by noting that locating in the
cluster the leader would strengthen competition, hence reducing market price
and correspondingly increasing consumers’ surplus; an eﬀect that the leader has
no incentives to take into account.
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A clear limitation of the analysis of Colombo and Dawid (2014) is that all
ﬁrms are assumed to be equally able to assimilate and exploit the knowledge
generated by other ﬁrms. Cohen and Levinthal (1989), and the literature origi-
nating from their seminal contribution, emphasize instead that a ﬁrm’s ability
to eﬀectively use external information depends also on its own R&D. Indeed,
besides generating innovations, R&D is argued to enhance a ﬁrm’s ability to
“identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment .... encom-
passing a ﬁrm’s ability to imitate new process or innovations [but also] outside
knowledge of a more intermediate sort” (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, p. 369);
what the authors label as absorptive capacity. As R&D contributes to a ﬁrm’s
absorptive capacity, the incentives to spend in R&D are aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s
available knowledge base and by the ease of learning external technological and
scientiﬁc knowledge. In our terminology, this translates into the observation that
the ability of a ﬁrm to beneﬁt from inward spillovers depends on its absorptive
capacity, while the magnitudes of the outward spillovers it generates depend on
that of competitors.
The main purpose of this chapter is to explicitly account for the eﬀects of
absorptive capacities on knowledge spillovers and to investigate their impact
on ﬁrms’ location choices. We do so by augmenting the framework in Colombo
and Dawid (2014), a detailed summary of which has been provided above, by
allowing for diﬀerences in absorptive capacities across ﬁrms. In particular, we
extend the setting of Colombo and Dawid (2014) by considering in addition to
the case of constant absorptive capacity also that in which absorptive capacity is
proportional to the ﬁrm’s knowledge stock. In the latter case, the resulting diﬀer-
ential game does not have a linear-quadratic structure and we rely on numerical
methods to approximately solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations char-
acterizing the value functions corresponding to Markov Perfect Equilibria of the
game for diﬀerent location choices. Interestingly, the insight in Colombo and
Dawid (2014) that a technological leader has higher incentives than a laggard to
locate in isolation is reversed if the absorptive capacity is proportional to the
knowledge stock. In particular, in the latter case it is optimal for the ﬁrm to
locate in the cluster only if its knowledge stock is substantially larger than that
of its competitors. Furthermore, we show that a knowledge dependent absorptive
capacity also gives rise to diﬀerent strategic eﬀects, as well as diﬀerent dynamic
patterns of R&D investment and knowledge accumulation, compared to the case
of constant absorptive capacity. Speciﬁcally, the strategic implications of locat-
ing in the cluster are reversed. Under constant absorptive capacity, the other
ﬁrms in the cluster increase their R&D investments if an additional ﬁrm enters,
whereas under knowledge dependent absorptive capacity the opposite occurs.
Also, under knowledge dependent absorptive capacity, a technological leader is
able to keep its advantage for an extended time window even when entering the
cluster, which makes this location choice more attractive. Conversely, for a ﬁrm
with a small initial knowledge stock locating in the cluster becomes less attrac-
tive if the absorptive capacity depends on knowledge, because at least initially
this ﬁrm can hardly proﬁt from inward spillovers.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3
characterizes Markov-perfect equilibria and describes the usage of collocation
methods in our numerical analysis. Section 4 discusses the incentives of ﬁrms to
locate in an industrial cluster rather than in isolation, as a function of knowledge
spillovers and of ﬁrms absorptive capacity. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We investigate the location choice of a ﬁrm competing in a dynamic Cournot
oligopoly market consisting of three ﬁrms, which at each point in time t ≥ 0
simultaneously choose the quantities of a homogeneous good. Following Colombo
and Dawid (2014), we focus on an economy with a representative consumer whose
preferences are described by a quadratic Dixit-Stiglitz utility function yielding
an inverse demand function of the form
p(t) = a − b
3∑
j=1
qj(t), a, b > 0, (1)
where qj(t) ≥ 0 denotes the quantity of ﬁrm j and p(t) is the price of the good
at time t.
We assume that all ﬁrms have constant marginal costs. More speciﬁcally, the
level of marginal costs of ﬁrm i at time t, ci(t), depends in a linear way on its
stock of (cost-reducing) knowledge ki(t) at time t, i.e.
ci(t) = c¯ − γki(t), c¯, γ > 0. (2)
This formulation implies that in the absence of any cost-reducing knowledge all
ﬁrms have identical marginal costs. To avoid negative marginal costs, we add
the state constraint
ki(t) ≤ c¯
γ
i = 1, .., 3. (3)
We concentrate on the location decision of ﬁrm i = 1 that, at time t = 0,
chooses whether to locate in an industrial cluster or in isolation. By locating
in the cluster the ﬁrm is exposed to inward and outward knowledge spillovers,
aﬀecting the dynamics both of its own knowledge stock and of that of its competi-
tors. We assume that the two competitors of ﬁrm 1, ﬁrms i = 2, 3 are located
in the industrial cluster.5 Each ﬁrm in the cluster receives spillovers from all
other ﬁrms in the cluster and transfers (a fraction of) its own knowledge to the
other ﬁrms in the cluster. The intensity according to which ﬁrm i can trans-
form incoming spillovers into own knowledge depends on the ﬁrm’s absorptive
capacity, κi(ki). In what follows we consider two speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst,
we assume that absorptive capacity is independent from the ﬁrms’ knowledge
stock, i.e. κi(ki) = κconst ∀ki ≥ 0 and we normalize κconst to 1. In the second,
5 We focus on three ﬁrms as it is the lowest number of ﬁrms such that spillovers arise
in the cluster even if one of the ﬁrms decides to locate outside the cluster.
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we consider a scenario in which absorptive capacity is proportional to the ﬁrm’s
knowledge stock, i.e. κi(ki) = κlin(ki) := ξki.
Rather than locating in the cluster, ﬁrm 1 can decide to locate in isolation,
where it is not aﬀected by inward or outward spillovers. To keep our analysis as
simple as possible, we assume that there are no direct costs associated with either
of the two location choices and that no relocation is possible at any point in time
t > 0.6 However, in order to capture congestion in the cluster (e.g. in terms of
higher rental costs for production facilities), we assume that the ﬁrms located in
the cluster suﬀer a ﬁxed cost F > 0 per period, whereas the corresponding cost
is normalized to zero if a ﬁrm locates in isolation.
Formally, ﬁrm 1 chooses its location l1 ∈ {C, I} at t = 0. Following again
Colombo and Dawid (2014), we denote with NC ⊆ {1, .., 3} the set of ﬁrms in the
cluster, where |NC | = nC ≤ 3. The overall number of ﬁrms located in the cluster
is then nC . Having assumed that the competitors of ﬁrm 1 are in the cluster
implies that l2 = l3 = C. The knowledge stock of ﬁrm i depends positively on
its R&D eﬀort, xi, and negatively on knowledge depreciation, which is assumed
to occur at the same rate δ > 0 for all ﬁrms. Furthermore, ﬁrms in the cluster
beneﬁt from inward spillovers. Formally, we have
k˙i(t) =
{
xi(t) + βκi(ki)
∑
j∈NC\{i} kj(t) − δki(t) li = C
xi(t) − δki(t) li = I . (4)
The parameter β > 0 captures the general intensity of spillover ﬂows in the
cluster – that may depend on the characteristics of the key technology in the
considered industry, or on the institutional properties of the cluster – and κi
denotes the speciﬁc absorptive capacity of ﬁrm i. This formulation is fully con-
sistent with the observation, well established empirically, that a ﬁrm typically
acquire knowledge by interacting with the other ﬁrms in its proximity (see e.g.
Jaﬀe et al. (1993); Saxenian (1994)).
The R&D activities of ﬁrm i, i = 1, .., 3, are associated to the quadratic cost
function
gi(xi) =
ηi
2
x2i .
whereas in principle we allow for heterogeneous R&D cost functions, in the
numerical analysis below we will only consider scenarios in which all ﬁrms are
symmetric in this respect, i.e. η1 = η2 = η3.
All ﬁrms are assumed to maximize their discounted proﬁts. Hence, the deci-
sion problem of the generic ﬁrm i is given by
Ji =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt [(p(t) − ci(t)) qi(t) − gi(xi(t))] dt, (5)
subject to (1), (2), (4) the constraints (3), (qi(t), xi(t)) ≥ 0, and ki(0) = kinii ,
for a given distribution of initial knowledge (kini1 , k
ini
2 , k
ini
3 ).
6 The decision to relocate often implies substantial transaction costs and therefore it
is typically a long run decision.
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Recalling that in our setup ﬁrm 1 is the only one having the possibility to
choose where to locate, its choice variables are the initial location choice, l1, and
– at each point in time t ≥ 0 – the R&D eﬀort, x1(t), and the output quantity,
q1(t). Instead, ﬁrms 2 and 3 – being both located in the cluster – only choose
xi(t) and qi(t), i = 2, 3, at each point in time t ≥ 0.
3 Markov Perfect Equilibria
We investigate the optimal location choice of ﬁrm 1 under the assumption that
for any given proﬁle of location choices the two dynamic decision variables of
each ﬁrm (xi(t), qi(t)), i = 1, .., 3 are chosen according to a Markov Perfect Equi-
librium (MPE) of the underlying diﬀerential game. Taking into account that the
quantity choices of ﬁrms have no intertemporal eﬀects, it follows that at each
point in time in equilibrium ﬁrms choose Cournot quantities given the current
proﬁle of marginal costs. More precisely, the equilibrium quantities are given by
q∗i (k1, .., k3) =
a − c¯ + γ
(
3ki −
∑
j =i kj
)
4b
(6)
and the resulting instantaneous proﬁts at each point in time read
π∗i (xi, k1, .., k3) =
(
a − c¯ + γ
(
3ki −
∑
j =i kj
))2
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− gi(xi). (7)
Hence, we can rewrite (5) as
Ji =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtπ∗i (xi, k1, .., k3)dt. (8)
Concerning R&D investments, a Markovian feedback strategy of ﬁrm i takes
the form
φi(k1, .., k3), i = 1, .., 3 with φi :
[
0, c¯γ
]3
→ [0,∞).
A proﬁle (φ1, .., φ3) of feedback strategies constitutes a Markov Perfect Equi-
librium if, for each ﬁrm i, the strategy φi maximizes (8) subject to (4) as well
as xi ≥ 0 and the initial conditions, given that the other ﬁrms use φj , j 	= i.
Although in general the existence and uniqueness of a MPE cannot be guar-
anteed, our numerical procedure always yields a unique MPE proﬁle for each
parameter setting and location choice. We denote the MPE proﬁle resulting
from ﬁrm 1 locating in the cluster as (xC1 , .., x
C
3 ), whereas we refer to the MPE
with ﬁrm 1 locating in isolation as (xI1, .., x
I
3). The following proposition char-
acterizes for both location scenarios ﬁrms’ equilibrium investment strategies in
terms of the corresponding value functions V Ci and V
I
i , respectively.
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Proposition 1. For a given location choice of firm 1, l1 ∈ {C, I}, any profile
of MPE investment strategies has to satisfy
xli =
1
ηi
∂V li
∂ki
, i = 1, .., 3, (9)
where the value functions V li solve the following Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB)
equations:
rV Ci = maxxi≥0
[
π∗i (xi, k1, .., k3) − F +
(
xi + βκi(ki)
∑
j =i kj − δki
)
∂V Ci
∂ki
+
∑
j =i
(
xCj + βκj(kj)
∑
m =j km − δkj
)
∂V Ci
∂kj
]
,
rV I1 = maxx1≥0
[
π∗1(x1, k1, .., k3) + (x1 − δk1) ∂V
I
1
∂k1
+
(
xI2 + βκ2(k2)k3 − δk2
) ∂V I1
∂k2
+
(
xI3 + βκ3(k3)k2 − δk3
) ∂V I1
∂k3
]
,
rV I2 = maxx2≥0
[
π∗2(x2, k1, .., k3) − F +
(
xI1 − δk1
) ∂V I2
∂k1
+(x2 + βκ2(k2)k3 − δk2) ∂V
I
2
∂k2
+
(
xI3 + βκ3(k3)k2 − δk3
) ∂V I2
∂k3
]
,
rV I3 = maxx3≥0
[
π∗3(x3, k1, .., k3) − F +
(
xI1 − δk1
) ∂V I3
∂k1
+
(
xI2 + βκ2(k2)k3 − δk2
) ∂V I3
∂k2
+ (x3 + βκ3(k3)k2 − δk3) ∂V
I
3
∂k3
]
.
(10)
Proof. The structure of the HJB equations follows from standard characteri-
zations of Markov Perfect Equilibria (see e.g. Dockner et al. (2000)) and the
expression (9) for the optimal investment is immediately obtained from the ﬁrst
order conditions of the right hand side of (10).
If κi = κconst, then the considered game corresponds to that analyzed by
Colombo and Dawid (2014) and it has a linear-quadratic structure. In this case,
the MPE under the diﬀerent location choices of ﬁrm 1 give rise to value functions
that are quadratic in the state variables and the set of HJB equations (10) can
be easily solved taking this into account.
For κi = κlin the right hand side of the HJB equations (10) includes terms
where the state derivative of the value function is multiplied by an expression
that is non-linear in the state variables. This implies that no polynomial value
functions exist for the problem and we cannot provide an analytical character-
ization of the value functions. Hence, we rely on numerical methods to solve
the HJB equations and to characterize the equilibrium investment functions. In
particular, we employ a collocation method using Chebychev polynomials (see
e.g. Dawid et al. (2017)) in order to obtain an approximate solution to the HJB
equations (10). We determine polynomial approximations Vˆ Ci , respectively Vˆ
I
i ,
such that (10), after substituting (9) for the optimal investment, is satisﬁed on
a ﬁnite set of nodes in the state-space and it exhibits small diﬀerences between
the left- and the right-hand side of the equations for all other points in the state
space. To this end, we generate a set of ni Chebychev nodes Nki in [0, k¯] for
i = 1, .., 3 and some k¯ < c¯γ (see e.g. Judd (1998) for the deﬁnition of Chebychev
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nodes and Chebychev polynomials) and we deﬁne the set of interpolation nodes
in the state space
[
0, k¯
]3 as
N = {(k1, k2, k3)|ki ∈ Nki}.
As a set of basis functions for the polynomial approximation of the value func-
tion, we use B = {Bj,k,l, j = 1, .., n1, k = 1, .., n2, k = 1, .., n3} with
Bj,k,l(k1, k2, k3) = Tj−1
(
−1 + 2k1
k¯
)
Tk−1
(
−1 + 2K2
k¯
)
Tl−1
(
−1 + 2K3
k¯
)
,
where Tj(x) denotes the j-the Chebychev polynomial. Since Chebychev poly-
nomials are deﬁned on [−1, 1], the state variables have to be transformed
accordingly.
The value function is approximated by
V hi (k1, k2, k3) ≈ Vˆ (k1, k2, k3) =
n1∑
j=1
n2∑
k=1
n3∑
l=1
Chj,k,lBj,k,l(k1, k2, k3),
k1, k2, k3 ∈ [0, k¯]; i = 1, .., 3; h = C, I, (11)
where Ch = {Chj,k,l} with j = 1, .., n1, k = 1, .., n2, l = 1, .., n3 and h = C, I is the
set of n1n2n3 coeﬃcients to be determined for each location choice h = C, I. To
calculate these coeﬃcients we solve the system of non-linear equations derived
from the condition that Vˆ Ci satisﬁes the HJB equation (10) on the set of inter-
polation nodes N . To this end, an initial guess C˜h,0 = (Ch,0j,k,l)j,k,l=1,..,n1,n2,n3 of
the coeﬃcients is chosen, and in iteration m ≥ 1 the coeﬃcients C˜h,m−1 are used
to calculate approximations of the value functions and their partial derivatives
at each node in N . These approximations are inserted for all terms that occur in
(10), after insertion of (9), where the value function or its derivatives appear in a
non-linear form. Inserting the approximation (11) with Ch replaced by C˜h,m for
all terms in (10), where the value function and its derivatives occur in a linear
way, yields a linear system of equations for the coeﬃcients C˜h,m that can be
solved eﬃciently using standard methods, even for large values of ni, i = 1, .., 3,
as long as the coeﬃcient matrix is well conditioned. The solution of this linear
system gives the new set of coeﬃcient values C˜h,m. To complete the iteration,
the new approximations of the value functions and their derivatives are inserted
into all (including the non-linear) corresponding terms in (10) and (9), and the
resulting absolute value of the diﬀerence between left and right hand side of this
equation relative to the corresponding value function is determined for all nodes
in N . If the maximum of this relative error is below a given threshold  the
algorithm is stopped. It is then checked that the absolute value of the diﬀerence
between the left and the right hand side of (10) is suﬃciently small on the entire
state space, and if this is satisﬁed we set Ch = C˜h,m and the current approxima-
tion of the value function is used to calculate the equilibrium feedback function
according to (9). If the error outside N is too large, the number of considered
nodes or the size of the state space are adjusted and the procedure is repeated.
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As a ﬁnal step, it is checked that the considered state space [0, k¯]3 is invariant
under the state dynamics induced by the equilibrium feedback functions deter-
mined by the numerical method. In the following numerical calculations, the
parameters of the collocation procedure have been set to n1 = n2 = n3 = 6,
k¯ = 80 and  = 10−6. The rationale underlying this parameter conﬁguration
is the aim to keep the number of considered nodes as small as possible while
keeping the error small. With respect to the model parameters we stay as close
as possible to Colombo and Dawid (2014) in order to ensure the comparability
of our ﬁndings across the two settings, and use
a = 100, b = 1, γ = 0.22, c¯ = 60, β = 0.01, δ = 0.1, r = 0.05, ξ = 0.025,
ηi = η = 10, i = 1, .., 3, F = 10.
4 Economic Analysis
In what follows, we compare the equilibrium outcomes and the induced location
choice of ﬁrm 1 in the benchmark case in which absorptive capacity is indepen-
dent from the ﬁrm’s knowledge stock (κi = κconst) with a situation in which it
depends positively on the ﬁrm’s knowledge stock (κi = κlin).
Fig. 1. Diﬀerence in equilibrium R&D investments if ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster and
in isolation, for (a) κi = κ
const and (b) κi = κ
lin
Although our main focus is on the optimal location decision of ﬁrm 1, it is
instructive to characterize the incentives of ﬁrm 1 to invest in R&D depending
on whether it is in the cluster or in isolation, for κi = κconst and κi = κlin,
respectively. Figure 1 displays the diﬀerence between ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium invest-
ment when it locates in the cluster and in isolation under the assumption that
the two competitors have the same knowledge stock (i.e. k2 = k3). Panel (a)
shows that under constant absorptive capacity ﬁrm 1 invests more in the cluster
than in isolation if its own knowledge stock is substantially smaller than that
of its competitors. In such a situation, ﬁrm 1 expects to catch-up quickly in
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terms of its knowledge stock if it locates in the cluster, whereas the gap to its
competitors will be closed at a much slower pace if it locates in isolation. Since
a gap in the knowledge stock translates into higher marginal costs and a lower
market share, the incentives to invest in (unit cost reducing) innovation is lower
if ﬁrm 1 locates in isolation. A similar rationale explains why under constant
absorptive capacity ﬁrm 1 invests less in the cluster than in isolation if it is a
technological leader (i.e. if k1 is larger than k2 = k3). Furthermore, it should be
noted that for a given level of k2 = k3 the diﬀerence xC1 − xI1 becomes smaller
as the knowledge stock of ﬁrm 1 increases. To obtain an intuitive understanding
for this relationship observe that a marginal increase of the knowledge stock of
ﬁrm 1 induces a positive externality on the competitors’ knowledge stock if ﬁrm
1 is in the cluster. Hence, the positive eﬀects on the future market share of ﬁrm
1 are smaller compared to the scenario in which the ﬁrm is in isolation. This
implies that the positive eﬀect of an increase of k1 on R&D incentives is larger
if ﬁrm 1 locates in isolation rather than in the cluster.
As it can be seen in panel (b), if absorptive capacity depends on the ﬁrm’s
knowledge stock we reach completely diﬀerent conclusions. Indeed, for κi = κlin
ﬁrm 1 invests more if located in the cluster rather than in isolation regardless of
the (relative) size of the ﬁrms’ knowledge stock. Also, the diﬀerence between xC1
and xI1 is always increasing in k1, with a slope that becomes larger the larger the
competitors’ knowledge stock is. Intuitively, if absorptive capacity depends on
knowledge stock, then increasing k1 has a positive impact on the size of future
inward spillovers, which increases the future market share of ﬁrm 1 if it locates
in the cluster. Clearly, this eﬀect is absent if ﬁrm 1 is in isolation, which explains
why for a knowledge dependent absorptive capacity R&D incentives grow faster
with k1 if the ﬁrm locates in the cluster.
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Fig. 2. Diﬀerence in value functions if ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster and in isolation
depending on the initial knowledge stock of ﬁrm 1, for (a) κi = κ
const and (b) κi = κ
lin
Having studied ﬁrm 1’s optimal R&D investment as a function of location,
we now turn to the analysis of its optimal location choice. Figure 2 shows the
diﬀerence in the value function of ﬁrm 1 between locating in the cluster and
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Fig. 3. Evolution of the R&D investment of ﬁrm 1 (a) and ﬁrms 2 and 3 (b), as well
as of the instantaneous proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 (c) and ﬁrms 2 and 3 (d), for κi = κ
const and
k1(0) = 0. The solid line depicts the case in which ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster, the
dashed line corresponds to the case in which the ﬁrm locates in isolation
in isolation for diﬀerent levels of the ﬁrm’s knowledge stock. In Fig. 2, and also
in the examination of the model dynamics, we assume the (initial) knowledge
stock of the competitors to be k2 = k3 = k∗h, where k∗h, h ∈ {const, lin}, is
their steady state knowledge stock under the two speciﬁcations for absorptive
capacity and assuming that ﬁrm 1 locates in isolation.7 Panel (a) refers to the
case of constant absorptive capacity. Consistently with the results in Colombo
and Dawid (2014), the incentive to locate in the cluster decreases the larger k1
is. If absorptive capacity depends on the ﬁrm’s knowledge stock, the eﬀect of k1
on the incentives to locate in the cluster is exactly the opposite. Panel (b) of
Fig. 2 highlights that the diﬀerence in the value functions of ﬁrm 1 when locating
in the cluster and in isolation grows larger the more knowledge the ﬁrm has. In
particular, for the level of cluster ﬁxed cost F underlying Fig. 2, the optimal
location choice of ﬁrm 1 depends crucially on whether its absorptive capacity is
7 It should be noted that the steady state knowledge stock diﬀers between the case in
which κi = κ
const and that in which κi = κ
lin. In particular, for our parametrization
we have that k∗const = 29.59 and k∗lin = 30.85.
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a function of its knowledge stock. When the value of k1 is not too large compared
to the steady state level k∗, then it is optimal for ﬁrm 1 to locate in isolation
if its absorptive capacity depends on the knowledge stock, and in the cluster
if its absorptive capacity is constant. In scenarios in which ﬁrm 1 has a large
knowledge advantage compared to its competitors, the optimal location decision
again diﬀers between the cases of κi = κconst and κi = κlin. In particular, as
a strong knowledge leader, ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster only if its absorptive
capacity depends on k1.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the R&D investment of ﬁrm 1 (a) and ﬁrms 2 and 3 (b), as well
as of the instantaneous proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 (c) and ﬁrms 2 and 3 (d), for κi = κ
const and
k1(0) = 70. The solid line depicts the case in which ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster, the
dashed line corresponds to the case in which the ﬁrm locates in isolation
In order to obtain a clear understanding of the mechanisms driving the
insights of Fig. 2 we ﬁrst focus on the case of constant absorptive capacity. Fig-
ures 3 and 4 show the dynamics of the R&D investments and of the instanta-
neous proﬁts of all ﬁrms for the two scenarios in which k1(0) = 0 and k1(0) = 70,
respectively. Figure 2 shows that it is optimal for ﬁrm 1 to locate in the cluster
if k1(0) = 0, and to locate in isolation if k1(0) = 70. It can be clearly seen that,
regardless of the initial knowledge stock of ﬁrm 1, its competitors invest less in
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R&D if it locates in the cluster. Intuitively, for constant absorptive capacity, the
crucial factor determining R&D investment is the expected trajectory of ﬁrm
sales. If ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster, it will beneﬁt from a higher knowledge
stock in the long run compared to the scenarios in which it locates in isolation.
By knowing this, ﬁrm 1’s competitors anticipate that their own market share will
become smaller. Hence, they invest less in R&D if ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster.
This strategic eﬀect has positive implications for the proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 and it is
the dominant eﬀect as long as the initial knowledge stock of ﬁrm 1 is not too
large. In particular, panel (c) of Fig. 3 shows that, after a short initial phase,
the ﬁxed costs incurred in the cluster are more than outweighed by the strategic
eﬀect we just discussed.
Focusing now on Fig. 4, it can be seen that the initial impact of the location
choice of ﬁrm 1 on the competitors’ R&D investment is much smaller if k1 is large
compared to the case in which k1(0) = 0. Hence, the strategic incentive for ﬁrm
1 to locate in the cluster is much weaker when k1(0) = 70. Furthermore, if for
k1(0) = 70 ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster, its competitors will proﬁt substantially
from inward spillovers reducing their unit costs. Clearly, this also has negative
implications for ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. Overall, these eﬀects imply that the initial time
interval for which the instantaneous proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 are larger if it locates
in isolation rather than in the cluster is much longer for k1(0) = 70 than for
k1(0) = 0 (cf. panel (c) of Figs. 3 and 4). Considering the instantaneous proﬁts
of ﬁrms 2 and 3, we observe that they beneﬁt from ﬁrm 1 locating in the cluster
if the latter is a knowledge leader (k1(0) = 70), while their proﬁts are negatively
aﬀected if ﬁrm 1 joins the cluster with no initial knowledge.
Finally, we turn to the case of knowledge dependent absorptive capacity
that is illustrated in Figs. 5 and 6 for the two situations in which k1(0) = 0
and k1(0) = 70, respectively. The two panels (b) of these ﬁgures highlight that
for knowledge dependent absorptive capacity the R&D investment of ﬁrms 2
and 3 is larger if ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster rather than in isolation. This
is exactly the opposite of what we observe in the case of constant absorptive
capacity (see the corresponding panels in Figs. 3 and 4). Accordingly, if absorp-
tive capacity depends on knowledge stock, the strategic eﬀect on the opponents’
behavior increases the incentive for ﬁrm 1 to locate in isolation. Furthermore,
if the initial knowledge stock of ﬁrm 1 is small (Fig. 5) the ﬁrm cannot absorb
substantial inward spillovers, at least initially. However, its own investment in
R&D generates knowledge ﬂows to its competitors, which have a substantially
larger knowledge stock of k∗lin = 30.85. This eﬀect weakens the competitiveness
of ﬁrm 1 relative to the other ﬁrms. Hence, as it is shown in panel (c) of Fig. 5,
ﬁrm 1’s instantaneous proﬁts remain larger if it locates in isolation for a long
initial time window. Only in the long run the cost reductions resulting from the
spillovers that emerge in the cluster become suﬃciently strong to make being in
the cluster more proﬁtable. Therefore, as it can be seen in Fig. 2(b), it is optimal
for ﬁrm 1 to locate in isolation if k1(0) is small.
Diﬀerent conclusions are reached if focusing instead on the case in which
k1(0) = 70, corresponding to a scenario (illustrated in Fig. 6) where ﬁrm 1
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Fig. 5. Evolution of the R&D investment of ﬁrm 1 (a) and ﬁrms 2 and 3 (b), as well
as of the instantaneous proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 (c) and ﬁrms 2 and 3 (d), for κi = κ
lin and
k1(0) = 0. The solid line depicts the case in which ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster, the
dashed line corresponds to the case in which the ﬁrm locates in isolation
has an initial knowledge advantage compared to its competitors (recall that
k2(0) = k3(0) = 30.85). In this case, ﬁrm 1 is able to greatly beneﬁt from inward
spillovers if it locates in the cluster. Due to the fact that the absorptive capacity
of ﬁrm 1 is larger than that of ﬁrms 2 and 3, it is able to sustain its initial knowl-
edge advantage over time. Taking this into account – as well as the investment
incentive resulting from ﬁrm 1’s goal to preserve its (high) absorptive capacity
when locating in the cluster – implies that for κi = κlin the R&D investment of
ﬁrm 1 is consistently larger if it locates in the cluster rather than in isolation.
Also in this respect the scenario discussed here is qualitatively diﬀerent from the
one with constant absorptive capacity (see Fig. 4(a)). Overall, if ﬁrm 1 is a tech-
nological leader, the instantaneous proﬁts it can achieve in the cluster become
quickly larger than those it can obtain by locating in isolation, and it is there-
fore optimal for the ﬁrm to locate in the cluster (Fig. 2(b)). Finally, panels (d)
of Figs. 5 and 6 show that if the absorptive capacity depends on the knowledge
stock, then the instantaneous proﬁts of ﬁrms 2 and 3 are always larger if ﬁrm 1
locates in isolation regardless of its initial knowledge stock.
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Fig. 6. Evolution of the R&D investment of ﬁrm 1 (a) and ﬁrms 2 and 3 (b), as well
as of the instantaneous proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 (c) and ﬁrms 2 and 3 (d), for κi = κ
lin and
k1(0) = 70. The solid line depicts the case in which ﬁrm 1 locates in the cluster, the
dashed line corresponds to the case in which the ﬁrm locates in isolation
5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we augment the analysis of ﬁrms’ optimal location choice in
Colombo and Dawid (2014) by explicitly considering the implications of an
endogenously determined absorptive capacity. In particular, we compare the
benchmark of constant absorptive capacity with a scenario in which absorp-
tive capacity is assumed to be an increasing function of the knowledge stock
accumulated by a ﬁrm. We consider the diﬀerential games emerging for diﬀerent
location choices of a ﬁrm (cluster vs. isolation) and, by applying appropriate
numerical methods, we are able to characterize the feedback strategies and the
value functions associated with the Markov Perfect Equilibria of these games.
We ﬁnd that under endogenous absorptive capacity the relationship between
the initial knowledge stock of a ﬁrm and its optimal location decision is exactly
the opposite with respect to the one emerging under constant absorptive capac-
ity. In particular, our analysis shows that for constant absorptive capacity a
ﬁrm chooses to locate in an industrial cluster rather than in isolation if its ini-
tial knowledge stock is relatively small, whereas under endogenous absorptive
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capacity the initial knowledge stock has to be large (relative to that of competi-
tors) for the ﬁrm to locate in the cluster.
Our ﬁndings highlight that a full understanding of ﬁrms’ optimal location
choices in diﬀerent industries requires a careful examination of the characteristics
of the spillovers that are associated to these choices. In particular, it is important
to investigate how the ability to beneﬁt from spillovers depends on the knowledge
of the absorbing ﬁrm.
Several extensions are possible that would further enrich our analysis. First,
in this study we focus on the investigation of the location choice of only one ﬁrm
in a market with three competitors. Although this setting already allows us to
capture the main mechanisms that are responsible for ﬁrms’ location decisions, it
would be interesting to develop a framework with an arbitrary number of ﬁrms,
all initially choosing their locations. Second, some preliminary ﬁndings for the
setting with endogenous absorptive capacity presented here suggest that, even in
a model with symmetric ﬁrms, (stable) steady states exist in which ﬁrms have
asymmetric knowledge stocks. This raises the question of how the long term
market outcome depends on ﬁrms’ initial knowledge stocks. Third, more general
relationships between the knowledge stock and the absorptive capacity of a ﬁrm
could be explored. Finally, more fundamental extensions of the work reported
here involve the consideration of multiple locations, as well as the option for
ﬁrms to relocate their activities. Exploring these issues in more details is left to
future work.
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Abstract. The present work considers competition between a local ﬁrm
and a multinational enterprise (MNE). The MNE has a competitive
advantage in terms of lower unit costs and plans to enter the local ﬁrm’s
market either through exports or through FDI. The local ﬁrm may strate-
gically become “socially responsible” and follow a “doing well by doing
good” strategy by investing in socially responsible activities along its
value chain. Investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) increase
the responsible ﬁrm’s equilibrium output and proﬁt as well as consumer
surplus and total welfare in its country. The multinational ﬁrm’s incen-
tives to serve the foreign country through FDI are mitigated in the aver-
age consumer’s valuation for CSR in the responsible ﬁrm’s country imply-
ing that CSR investments by local ﬁrms give space for inward FDI by
low-cost multinationals targeting consumers without environmental and
social responsibility consciousness. Policy suggestions are also discussed.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility · Multinational ﬁrms · For-
eign direct investment · Exports · Import tariﬀs
1 Introduction
The core role of multinational enterprises on globalization, mainly through for-
eign direct investments and international trade (United Nations 2014a; 2014b),
gives increasing attention to their practices as well as their resulting market
and societal eﬀects. In parallel with the expansion of multinational enterprises,
stylized facts and evidence suggest that consumers are increasingly aware of the
social and environmental responsibility and footprint of their local ﬁrms (Ioan-
nou and Serafeim 2015). In this spirit, Manasakis et al. (2013) cite evidence
c© The Author(s) 2018
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suggesting that consumers express a willingness to pay a premium for goods
and services produced by socially responsible ﬁrms in manufacturing indus-
tries, tourism services and agriculture. Within a policy context, the promotion
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a top priority in the agenda
for sustainable development in many countries and international organizations.
Interestingly, when CSR started to become more widespread, its further encour-
agement became a central policy objective in both the U.S. and the E.U., aiming
at the promotion of sustainable growth and competitiveness (European Commis-
sion 2001; 2006).1 Despite its importance, the statement of Benabou and Tirole
(2010) according to which “... little is known about the economics of individ-
ual and corporate social responsibility”, is still valid. Kitzmueller and Shimshack
(2012) further suggest that the ﬁeld of international CSR warrants greater atten-
tion while the preferences and politics that motivate CSR diﬀer substantively
across countries.
The present work has been motivated by the apparent interdependence
between the increasing trend to invest in CSR and multinational ﬁrms’ expan-
sion to foreign countries. In this context, we consider two ﬁrms located in two
diﬀerent countries, a home country and a foreign country. The ﬁrm in the home
country plans to become “multinational” and, besides serving its home coun-
try’s market, serve the foreign country’s market too, either through exports or
through foreign direct investment (FDI), i.e. establishing a subsidiary in the for-
eign country. If the multinational ﬁrm exports, the exported quantity is subject
to a tariﬀ set by the foreign country’s government. Alternatively, if the multina-
tional ﬁrm chooses FDI, it incurs a ﬁxed set-up cost. The local ﬁrm in the foreign
country operates under higher unit costs than the multinational ﬁrm, but has
the option to become “socially responsible”. By following such a “doing well by
doing good” -strategy it invests in CSR activities along its value chain (Porter
and Kramer 2006; 2011) and integrates social and environmental concerns in
its business operations “above and beyond” that mandated by its government
(Campbell et al. 2012). This strategy meets the preferences of socially conscious
consumers for responsible goods whose production processes comply with criteria
1 The OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises (OECD 2011) oﬀer government-
backed recommendations covering business conduct in a wide variety of areas, includ-
ing employment and industrial relations, human rights, disclosure of ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial information, environmental issues. The United Nations Global Com-
pact principles (United Nations 2014c) acknowledge the importance of communicat-
ing with stakeholders when supporting a precautionary approach to environmental
challenges and encourage enterprises to develop sustainability indicators and mea-
sure, track, and report progress in incorporating sustainability principles into busi-
ness practices.
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for social and environmental sustainability (Becchetti et al. 2011).2 The prod-
ucts of the local foreign ﬁrm and the multinational home ﬁrm combine horizontal
and vertical diﬀerentiation aspects (Ha¨ckner 2000; Garella and Petrakis 2008).
In particular, socially and environmentally responsible attributes are perceived
by socially conscious consumers as a “quality improvement” (see also Manasakis
et al. 2013; Liu et al. 2015). In this context, our work addresses the following
questions: How do CSR investments by the local ﬁrm aﬀect market and soci-
etal outcomes in both countries under two diﬀerent modes of entry, exports and
FDI? How does consumers’ consciousness for the responsible local ﬁrm’s product
aﬀect the latter outcomes as well as the multinational ﬁrm’s decision to serve
the foreign country through exports or FDI? How does the multinational ﬁrm’s
mode of entry in the foreign country aﬀect consumer surplus and total welfare
in the home country and the foreign country?
Our main ﬁnding is that the local foreign ﬁrm competing against the multina-
tional enterprise seeks to obtain a competitive advantage by strategically engag-
ing in CSR activities that meet the socially conscious consumers’ demands. CSR
investments increase the responsible local ﬁrm’s equilibrium output and proﬁt as
well as consumer surplus and total welfare in its country, while they decrease the
multinational ﬁrm’s equilibrium output and proﬁts. Under exports, CSR invest-
ments reduce total welfare in the multinational ﬁrm’s home country. We also ﬁnd
that the average consumer’s consciousness for the local ﬁrm’s responsible prod-
uct increases the tariﬀ, the local ﬁrm’s CSR eﬀort, output and proﬁt, as well as
consumer surplus and total welfare in the foreign country. Yet, it decreases the
multinational ﬁrm’s output and proﬁt, as well as total welfare in the multina-
tional ﬁrm’s home country. This implies that CSR investments are not welfare-
enhancing per se. Interestingly, the aforementioned consciousness of consumers
reduces the multinational ﬁrm’s maximum aﬀordable set-up cost for FDI in the
foreign country and gives space for attracting inward FDI by low-cost multina-
tionals that target consumers with low preference for environmental and social
responsibility. Moreover, consumer surplus and total welfare in the foreign coun-
try are always higher under FDI than under exports. The opposite holds for total
welfare in the multinational ﬁrm’s home country where consumer surplus is inde-
pendent from the multinational’s mode of entry into the foreign country. Assum-
ing that within each country, the ﬁrm, consumers and the policy maker are the
related stakeholders, our ﬁndings suggest that the stakeholders’ preferences for
the mode of entry of the multinational ﬁrm in the foreign country are not aligned.
The literature on international trade has studied the question of a multina-
tional ﬁrm’s optimal mode of entry and its drivers. For example, Ishikawa and
2 In the terminology of Porter and Kramer (2011), CSR activities connect company
success with social progress and constitute a proﬁt center for ﬁrms while creating
value, and for society, by addressing needs and challenges of the ﬁrm’s stakeholders,
such as its employees (investments in health and safety in the workplace), suppli-
ers (support to local suppliers rather than cheaper alternative sources), and the
environment (reduction on emissions of pollutants; use of environmentally friendly
technologies).
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Horiuchi (2012) and Glass and Saggi (2005) relate it to vertically related mar-
kets and local sourcing respectively. Sinha (2010) demonstrates the impact of
technology licensing on the mode of entry. Mukherjee (2008) and Ma and Zhou
(2016) show that FDI and exports can coexist under certain circumstances. None
of these papers considers the impact of a local foreign ﬁrm’s investment in social
responsibility, which is the main focus of our paper. Graf and Wirl (2014) inves-
tigate if CSR can be used as a strategy to deter entry of a potential competitor.
However, they do not deal with a setting of international competition. More
speciﬁcally, the present work contributes to the scant literature on the interac-
tion between CSR activities and multinational ﬁrms. Wang et al. (2012) extend
Brander and Spencer (1985), where two foreign ﬁrms export a homogenous good
in a third country’s market. Each ﬁrm has the option for a consumer-friendly
initiative which is captured by ﬁrms pursuing a mixed objective that includes
a ﬁrm’s own proﬁt and consumer surplus. Likewise, Chang et al. (2014) extend
Brander and Spencer (1984), where one domestic and one foreign ﬁrm produce a
homogenous product in the domestic market. Becchetti et al. (2011) consider a
standard Hotelling approach where a not-for-proﬁt fair trader enters into a mar-
ket, with heterogeneous consumers regarding their preferences on social respon-
sibility, where a proﬁt-maximizing producer is already active. We depart from
these papers since we formalize the local foreign ﬁrm’s CSR eﬀort as a particular
for-proﬁt investment strategy to compete against a multinational low-cost ﬁrm
that enters the local foreign market.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and in Sect. 3 we analyze the multinational ﬁrm’s possible modes of entry in the
foreign country’s market. Section 4 studies the multinational’s decision between
exports and FDI. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider two ﬁrms, denoted 1 and 2. Firm 1 is based in the home country
h and ﬁrm 2 resides in the foreign country f . Firm 1, besides serving the home
country h, plans to become “multinational” and serve the foreign country f ,
either through exports or by FDI, i.e. through establishing a production facility
in country f . Firm 2 serves country f ’s market solely. We will refer to ﬁrm 1
as the multinational ﬁrm and Firm 2 as the local ﬁrm. If the multinational ﬁrm
1 exports to country f , the exported quantity is subject to a tariﬀ t, set by
the importing country’s government to maximize country f ’s welfare. Following
the terminology of Motta and Norman (1996), t is an inverse measure of “mar-
ket accessibility” and policy changes that increase t “heighten the asymmetry”
between the rival ﬁrms.3 In case of FDI, the multinational ﬁrm 1 incurs a ﬁxed
3 Moreover, the commodity exported is subject to a constant transportation unit cost,
which, following Fumagalli (2003) and without loss of generality, is normalized to
zero. This assumption allows us to economize with the parameters of the model
that create unnecessary analytical complications without qualitatively altering our
results.
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set-up cost T , which contains the transaction and construction costs necessary to
open a subsidiary in the foreign country (Naylor and Santoni 2003). We assume
that the home ﬁrm and the multinational ﬁrm are both endowed with identical
constant returns to scale production technologies. Following Eicher and Kang
(2005), Hao and Lahiri (2009), and Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009) we assume
that the local ﬁrm in country f produces with constant marginal cost denoted
by c. The multinational ﬁrm has a competitive advantage in its production tech-
nology, i.e., it is more cost-eﬃcient, with its marginal cost being c(1 − z), and
0 < z < 1.
We consider that the response of the local ﬁrm in country f to the multi-
national ﬁrm’s entrance into the foreign market is to become “socially respon-
sible”. By following such a “doing well by doing good” strategy, the local ﬁrm
addresses the preferences of socially conscious consumers for responsible produc-
tion in country f ’s market. This strategy is executed by the local ﬁrm through
investing in CSR activities along its value chain (Porter and Kramer 2006; 2011)
and integrating social and environmental concerns in its business operations.
Such concerns include, e.g., purchasing inputs from local suppliers and improv-
ing working conditions for employees and point to activities that are “ above
and beyond” that mandated by government (Campbell et al. 2012; Chambolle
and Giraud-He´raud 2005).
On the demand side, following Ha¨ckner (2000), Garella and Petrakis (2008),
Manasakis et al. (2013) and Liu et al. (2015), the utility function of a represen-
tative consumer in country i for i = h, f is:
Uh = aqh1 −
q2h1
2
+ eh (1)
and
Uf = aqf1 + (a + kfsf )qf2 −
q2f1 + q
2
f2
+ 2γqf1qf2
2
+ ef (2)
where qh1 , qf1 , qf2 represent the quantities of ﬁrms 1 and 2 bought by the
representative consumer in the markets of country h, f . The quantities of the
“composite good” in country h, f are denoted by eh, ef . The composite good’s
quantity and price are normalized to unity. The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1] is a measure
of the degree of substitutability between the products oﬀered in the market in
country f , with γ → 0 (γ = 1) corresponding to the case of almost independent
(homogeneous) goods. Alternatively, γ may be interpreted as the intensity of
market competition with a higher γ representing a higher level of competition.
The variable sf ≥ 0 represents the level of CSR investments undertaken
by the local ﬁrm. Investing sf in CSR are assumed to increase the consumers’
valuation for the responsible product of the local ﬁrm by kfsf , where kf ∈
[0, 1] represents the increase of the average consumer’s willingness to pay for the
product per unit of CSR investment.
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Maximization of (1) and (2) with respect to qIi , gives the inverse demand
functions:
Ph1 = a − qh1 (3)
Pf1 = a − qf1 − γqf2 ; Pf2 = a + kfsf − qf2 − γqf1 .
The local ﬁrm’s CSR investments increase the demand and the average con-
sumer’s valuation for its product. Moreover, the local ﬁrm’s production cost is
given by Cf (qf2 , sf ) = c(1 + s
2
f )qf2 , implying that a higher CSR eﬀort level
increases its marginal cost at an increasing rate (Manasakis et al. 2013).
If the multinational ﬁrm serves the foreign country through exports (e), its
proﬁt function is:
Πe1 = Πh1 + Π
e
f1 = [Ph1 − c(1 − z)] qh1 + [Pf1 − c(1 − z) − t] qf1 . (4)
If the multinational serves the foreign country through FDI (d), its proﬁt
function is:
Πd1 = Πh1 + Π
d
f1 = [Ph1 − c(1 − z)] qh1 + [Pf1 − c(1 − z)] qf1 − T. (5)
The corresponding proﬁt function for the local ﬁrm is given by:
Π2 =
[
Pf2 − c(1 + s2f )
]
qf2 (6)
To guarantee interior solutions under all circumstances, we make the following
assumptions regarding the tariﬀ t set by the foreign country’s government and
the ﬁxed set-up cost T in case of FDI:
Assumption 1: t < tc := (2 − γ) (a − cz) + γk
2
f
4c ,
Assumption 2: T < Tc :=
[4c(γ−2)(a−2cz)+γk2f ]
2
[4c(γ2−4)]2 .
In this context, we consider the following game with observable actions. In
the ﬁrst stage of the game, the government of country f sets the tariﬀ. In the
second stage, the multinational ﬁrm decides whether to serve country f ’s market
through exports or FDI. In the third stage, the local ﬁrm invests in CSR and the
two ﬁrms set their quantities for the markets. We solve the game by backward
induction and employ Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) as a solution
concept.
3 The Multinational Firm’s Modes of Entry
The Multinational Firm Exports to the Foreign Country. We ﬁrst
consider the case where the multinational ﬁrm produces in country h and
exports its product to the foreign country. In the third stage of the game, ﬁrms
choose their quantities qh1 , qf1 , qf2 such that their corresponding proﬁts given
by (4) and (6) are maximized. Simultaneously, the local ﬁrm invests in CSR.
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From the ﬁrst-order conditions, the ﬁrms’ output reaction functions for country
f ’s market can be derived:
Ref1(qf2) =
1
2
[a − c(1 − z) − γqf2 − t] (7)
Ref2(qf1) =
1
2
[a − c + sf (kf − csf ) − γqf1 ] . (8)
The term sf (kf −csf ) in (8) captures the two opposing eﬀects of CSR invest-
ments. On the one hand, investment sf in CSR increases the local ﬁrm’s demand
by kfsf and its unit cost by cs2f . Moreover, as R
e
f2
/∂sf = kf/2 − csf , the local
ﬁrm’s best response output has an inverted U -shaped relation with its CSR
eﬀorts, with the maximum attained at sf = kf/2c. This suggests that the local
ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing level of CSR investments is sf = kf/2c. This level
increases in the average consumer’s willingness to pay for this ﬁrm’s product
as well as in the eﬃciency of the CSR (and output) “production technology”
(captured by a lower c). Intuitively, for a relatively low level of CSR eﬀorts,
the positive demand eﬀect dominates the negative unit cost eﬀect and ReF2shifts
outwards.
Using the optimal level of the local ﬁrm’s CSR investment and solving the
system of ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain the ﬁrm’s outputs in country f :
qef1 =
(a − 2cz) (2 − γ) − γk
2
f
4c − 2t
4 − γ2 (9)
qef2 =
a(2 − γ) − c[2 − γ(1 − z)] + k
2
f
2c + γt
4 − γ2 . (10)
These output levels highlight the impact of ﬁrms’ relative comparative advan-
tages in country f . More speciﬁcally,
dqef1
dz > 0 and
dqef1
dt < 0 suggest that the
multinational ﬁrm’s output increases in its relative technological superiority, i.e.,
as z → 1, and decreases in the tariﬀ rate t. The opposites hold for the local ﬁrm.
Given that the multinational ﬁrm serves the foreign country though exports,
in the ﬁrst stage of the game the foreign country’s government determines its
tariﬀ rate t so as to maximize national total welfare given by the sum of consumer
surplus, the local ﬁrm’s proﬁt, and tariﬀ payments:
TW ef (t) = CS
e
f (t) + Π
e
f2(t) + tq
e
f1(t). (11)
The ﬁrst-order condition determines the socially optimal tariﬀ rate t =
1
3 [a − c(1 − z)]. Note that mf (kfa , ca ) = kf/
√
c(a − c) = (kf/a) /
√
c/a(1 − c/a)
is a measure of the average consumer’s valuation for CSR activities per unit of
market size (adjusted for unit cost relative to market size, ca ). Moreover, mf
is increasing in kfa and it is U-shaped in
c
a reaching its minimum value
2kf
a at
c = a2 . Its maximum value is equal to 1. v = zc/(a − c) is a measure of the
multinational ﬁrm’s cost advantage adjusted with market size minus unit cost.
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Hence, the equilibrium tariﬀ rate is t = 13 (a − c) (1 + v). Using t, we obtain
ﬁrm i’s equilibrium output qefi and proﬁts Π
e
fi
, as well as consumer surplus
CSef and total welfare TW
e
f in the foreign country. The resulting equilibrium
outcomes in the home country are qeh1 , Π
e
h1
, CSeh and TW
e
h . The expressions are
provided in Appendix 1a.
The Multinational Firm Establishes a FDI in the Foreign Country.
We now consider the alternative case where the multinational establishes a sub-
sidiary in the foreign country. In this case, in the third stage of the game, each
ﬁrm chooses its output to maximize its proﬁts given by (5) and (6) respectively
and the local ﬁrm invests in CSR. From the ﬁrst-order conditions, the ﬁrms’
output reaction functions for the market in country f can be obtained:
Rdf1(qf2) =
1
2
[a − c(1 − z) − γqf2 ] (12)
Rdf2(qf1) = a − c + sf (kf − csf ) − γqf1 . (13)
As in the previous case, as long as sf < kf/2c, the positive demand eﬀect of
CSR dominates its negative unit cost eﬀect and the local ﬁrm’s output reaction
function shifts outwards. Using the optimal level of CSR investments, sf =
kf/2c, and solving the system of ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain each ﬁrm’s
output in the foreign country as
qdf1 =
(a − 2cz) (2 − γ) − γk
2
f
4c
4 − γ2 (14)
qdf2 =
a(2 − γ) − c[2 − γ(1 − z)] + k
2
f
2c
4 − γ2 . (15)
Compared to the previous case of exports, if the multinational ﬁrm selects
FDI, its ﬁrm’s cost advantage is further strengthened because it does not face
a tariﬀ. Therefore, in case of FDI market competition in the foreign country is
ﬁercer than under exports. The local ﬁrm’s equilibrium CSR investments are
identical to the case of exports. Using sf , we obtain ﬁrm i’s equilibrium proﬁts
Πdfi , as well as consumer surplus CS
d
f and total welfare TW
d
f in the foreign
country (expressions are provided in Appendix 1b). Regarding the home country,
output and proﬁts are identical to those obtained in case of exports. Consumer
surplus and total welfare in the home country are CSdh and TW
d
h respectively.
4 Comparing FDI and Exports
In this section, we compare the results for the case where the multinational ﬁrm
exports to the foreign country with the results under the assumption that the
multinational ﬁrm chooses FDI. The following Lemma summarizes the market
and societal eﬀects of CSR investments for each mode of entry by the multina-
tional ﬁrm in the foreign country.4
4 Due to space constraints, the full analysis of the benchmark scenario, where no ﬁrm
invests in CSR, is not give here but available from the authors upon request.
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Lemma 1
• Under both modes of entry, exports and FDI, CSR investments: (a) increase
(decrease) the local ﬁrm’s (multinational ﬁrm’s) equilibrium output and proﬁt;
(b) increase consumer surplus and total welfare in the foreign country.
• When the multinational ﬁrm serves the foreign country’s market through
exports (FDI), total welfare in the multinational ﬁrm’s home country is lower
when the local ﬁrm invests in CSR rather than when it does not (is not aﬀected
by the local ﬁrm’s CSR investments).
The following Proposition summarizes the eﬀects of the ﬁrms’ relative com-
parative advantages on the market and societal outcomes for each mode of entry
by the multinational ﬁrm into the market of the foreign country.
Proposition 1
• The average consumer’s willingness to pay for the local ﬁrm’s product (higher
mf ): (a) increases the tariﬀ, the CSR eﬀort, the output and the proﬁt of
the local ﬁrm, as well as consumer surplus and total welfare in the foreign
country; (b) decreases the multinational ﬁrm’s output and proﬁt, as well as
total welfare in the multinational ﬁrm’s home country.
• The extent of the multinational ﬁrm’s cost advantage (higher v) increases the
tariﬀ, the multinational ﬁrm’s output and proﬁt as well as consumer surplus
and total welfare in both countries.
We can also observe that the multinational ﬁrm’s quantity in the foreign
country is always higher in case of FDI than under exports, i.e., qdf1 > q
e
f1
.
Recall that market competition in country f is ﬁercer in case of FDI than under
exports due to the sunk cost character of FDI investments. In the FDI scenario,
the multinational ﬁrm avoids the tariﬀ and, hence, has lower marginal production
costs. As quantities are in our case strategic substitutes, we can conclude that
qef2 > q
d
f2
.
Turning our attention to the second stage of the game, we ﬁnd that the
multinational ﬁrm will choose to serve the foreign country’s market through
FDI if T < T c = [
20(1+v)−3γ(4+m2f )](1+v)(a−c)2
9(4−γ2)2 . Regarding this critical level of
sunk costs, the following observations are in order. First, dT
c
dmf
< 0 suggests
that an increase in consumers’ valuation for the local ﬁrm’s responsible product
reduces the multinational ﬁrm’s output and proﬁt in country f . This, in turn,
reduces the maximum aﬀordable set-up cost that the multinational ﬁrm can pay
for FDI in country f , i.e., such an increase in consumers’ valuation mitigates
the ﬁrm’s incentive for FDI. Interestingly, dT
c
dmf
< 0 further suggests that the
multinational ﬁrm’s maximum aﬀordable set-up cost for FDI in country f is
relatively lower than the corresponding level if the local ﬁrm does not invest in
CSR. Hence, consumers’ consciousness for responsible products gives space for
attracting inward FDI by low-cost multinationals that target consumers with low
willingness to pay for responsible products. Second, dT
c
dv > 0 suggests that the
multinational ﬁrm’s cost advantage increases its maximum aﬀordable set-up cost
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for FDI in country f . Third, we ﬁnd that the local ﬁrm prefers the multinational
ﬁrm to export rather than entering through FDI, i.e., Πef2 > Π
d
f2
always holds.
The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 2
• The multinational ﬁrm will choose to serve the foreign country’s market
through FDI, if and only if the sunk cost for establishing a production plant
in the foreign country is suﬃciently low, i.e., T < T c.
• The multinational ﬁrm’s incentives to serve the foreign country through FDI
are strengthened in this ﬁrm’s cost advantage (higher v or higher z) and
mitigated in the average consumer’s valuation for CSR (higher mf ) in the
foreign country.
Let us now focus on the relative welfare eﬀects of the multinational ﬁrm’s
choice to serve the foreign country’s market. First of all, CSdh = CS
e
h always
holds. That is, the multinational ﬁrm’s mode of entry in country f does not
aﬀect country h’s consumer welfare. Yet, total welfare in country h is always
higher under exports than under FDI, i.e., TW eh > TW
d
h . The reason is that
under FDI the MNE’s proﬁt in the foreign country only counts for the foreign
country’s welfare. This suggests that the home country h’s policy maker could
introduce an industrial policy subsidizing exports.
By contrast, consumer surplus in country f is always higher under FDI, i.e.,
CSdf > CS
e
f always holds. This happens because market competition in the
former case is ﬁercer than in the latter and hence, total quantity and consumer
surplus in country f are relatively higher under FDI. Moreover, total welfare in
country f is also higher under FDI than under exports, i.e., TW ef < TW
d
f always
holds. Intuitively, besides consumer surplus which is relatively higher under FDI,
the multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁt in country f in case of FDI exceed the tariﬀ
revenues in case of exports to this country, i.e., Πdf1 > tq
e
f1
. Although the local
ﬁrm’s proﬁts are always higher in case of exports than under FDI, the above
two positive eﬀects dominate and total welfare in country f is relatively higher
under FDI. This suggests that country f ’s policy maker could take measures to
attract inward FDIs by multinational ﬁrms. That is, country f ’s policy maker can
provide incentives through an industrial policy subsidizing inward FDIs, with the
minimum subsidy being equal to the sunk cost needed for the establishment of
the multinational ﬁrm’s production plant in country f . The following Proposition
summarizes our ﬁndings.
Proposition 3
• Consumer surplus in the multinational ﬁrm’s country is independent of the
multinational ﬁrm’s mode of entry in the foreign country. Total welfare in the
multinational ﬁrm’s country is always higher in case of exports than under
FDI.
• Consumer surplus and total welfare in the foreign country are always higher
in case of FDI than under exports.
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The above analysis leads us to two further observations. First, indepen-
dently of the multinational ﬁrm’s mode of entry in the foreign country, CSR
is welfare-enhancing and policy makers should take measures to promote CSR
activities. The policy of the European Commission (2011) is in line with this
ﬁnding and argues that “...the Commission will step up its cooperation with
Member States, partner countries and relevant international fora to promote
respect for internationally recognised principles and guidelines, and to foster
consistency between them. This approach also requires EU enterprises to renew
their eﬀorts to respect such principles and guidelines.” See also European Union
(2014). Second, it should be noted, however, that the stakeholders’ preferences
for the multinational ﬁrm’s mode of entry in the foreign country are not aligned.
More speciﬁcally, assuming that within each country, the ﬁrm, the consumers,
and the policy maker are the related stakeholders, we ﬁnd that the local ﬁrm and
the multinational country’s policy maker would prefer the multinational ﬁrm to
serve the local ﬁrm’s country through exports. On the contrary, consumers and
the policy maker in the local ﬁrm’s country would always prefer FDI. These
observations reveal that there is space for lobbying over trade and/or industrial
policies aﬀecting the mode of entry of multinational ﬁrms in foreign countries.
5 Conclusion
The present work contributes to the scant literature on the interface between
CSR activities to improve the quality or “ greenness” of products and the mode of
entry of multinational ﬁrms into the markets of foreign countries. In our setting,
a local ﬁrm has the option to become “ responsible” and follow a “doing well by
doing good” strategy through investing in CSR activities along its value chain.
By doing CSR, it tries to achieve a competitive advantage against a multinational
rival ﬁrm that operates with lower unit costs and plans to enter the local ﬁrm’s
market either through exports or through FDI.
We ﬁnd that the average consumer’s consciousness for the local ﬁrm’s respon-
sible product increases the tariﬀ, the local ﬁrm’s CSR eﬀort, output and proﬁt,
as well as consumer surplus and total welfare in the foreign country. Yet, it
decreases the multinational ﬁrm’s output and proﬁt, as well as total welfare
in the multinational ﬁrm’s country. Interestingly, the aforementioned conscious-
ness reduces the multinational ﬁrm’s maximum aﬀordable set-up cost for FDI
in the foreign country and gives space for attracting inward FDI by low-cost
multinationals that target consumers with low willingness to pay for responsible
products.
We also ﬁnd that there is misalignment of preferences between the stakehold-
ers of the two countries over the multinational ﬁrm’s mode of entry in the foreign
country. This leaves space for lobbying about the relevant trade/industrial poli-
cies, an issue that we leave for future research.
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Appendix
1a: The Multinational Firm Exports to the Foreign Country
qeh1 =
1
2
(α − c) (1 + v);Πeh1 =
(
qeh1
)2
qef1 =
[
16(1 + v) − 3γ(4 + m2f )
]
(a − c)
12(4 − γ2) ;Π
e
f1 =
(
qef1
)2
qef2 =
[
3(4 + m2f ) − 4γ(1 + v)
]
(a − c)
6(4 − γ2) ;Π
e
f2 =
(
qef2
)2
CSeh =
1
2
(
qeh1
)2 ;TW eh = CS
e
h + Π
e
h1 + Π
e
f1
CSef =
1
2
[
(qef1)
2 + (qef2)
2 + 2γqef1q
e
f2
]
;TW ef = CS
e
f + Π
e
f2 + tq
e
f1
1b: The Multinational Firm Establishes FDI in the Foreign Country
qdh1 =
1
2
(α − c) (1 + v);Πdh1 =
(
qdh1
)2
qdf1 =
[
8(1 + v) − γ(4 + m2f )
]
(a − c)
4(4 − γ2) ;Π
d
f1 =
(
qdf1
)2 − T
qdf2 =
[
4 + m2F − 2γ(1 + v)
]
(a − c)
2(4 − γ2) ;Π
d
f2 =
(
qdf2
)2
CSdh =
1
2
(
qdh1
)2
;TW dh = CS
d
h + Π
d
h1
CSdf =
1
2
[
(qdf1)
2 + (qdf2)
2 + 2γqdf1q
d
f2
]
;TW df = CS
d
f + Π
d
f1 + Π
d
f2
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Abstract. We introduce an evolutionary two-country model to charac-
terize long run location patterns of the manufacturing activities of com-
peting multinational enterprises. Firms located in country 1 can decide
to oﬀshore their manufacturing activities to country 2. The proﬁtabil-
ity of production in a country depends on several factors: unitary costs
of production, the number of ﬁrms that are located in each country,
within-country spillovers, and cross-border spillovers. Furthermore, prof-
its in country 2 are inﬂuenced by congestion costs. Country 1 is assumed
to be technologically advanced and has an advantage in terms of inter-
nal spillovers. In contrast, country 2 oﬀers lower production unit cost
which, however, may be oﬀset by congestion costs. The ﬁrms’ (re)location
choices are based on a simple comparison of current production costs
obtained in the two countries and the dynamics of switching is mod-
eled by a simple replicator dynamics. The global analysis of the result-
ing one-dimensional dynamical system reveals that a large advantage in
terms of unitary production costs encourages the ﬁrms to oﬀ-shore man-
ufacturing activities to country 2. This oﬀ-shoring process stops when
congestion costs oﬀset this advantage of country 2, even though conges-
tion costs do not cause all manufacturing activities to be re-shored to
country 1. The re-shoring process can be accelerated by an increase of
within-country spillovers in country 1, while cross-border spillovers tend
to favor a geographic dispersion of manufacturing activities and make
location patterns that lead to suboptimal long run outcomes less likely.
Keywords: Long run location patterns · Oﬀ-shoring · Re-shoring ·
Knowledge spillovers · Congestion costs · Exponential replicator dynam-
ics · Global dynamics
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1 Introduction
The oﬀ-shoring of manufacturing activities to emerging economies has oﬀered
an opportunity to reduce manufacturing costs and has therefore been a com-
mon practice for many Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). This phenomenon
has provoked massive changes in the organization of industrial activity and in
the labor market of developed economies. As a consequence, it has attracted
political attention. Governments of the OECD economies have focused on devel-
oping incentive-schemes designed to reduce job losses by providing incentives for
MNEs to re-shore their manufacturing activities. An increase in re-shoring activ-
ity has been observed in recent years, with many MNEs increasingly bringing
manufacturing activity back home. Empirical evidence documents the increase
in re-shoring activity, but also indicates that in comparison to ﬁrms’ oﬀ-shoring
activities the process is still limited, see Backer et al. (2016).
The identiﬁcation of drivers that cause ﬁrms to choose particular locations
for their activities still attracts increasing attention from scholars. The literature
on International Business has identiﬁed a variety of drivers that guide the loca-
tion decision of MNEs and has provided empirical tests. Following the literature
(Alca´cer et al. (2013)), location drivers can be gathered in two broad categories:
endowment drivers and agglomeration drivers. The stream of literature based
on endowment drivers tries to explain the location patterns of manufacturing
activity in terms of location traits such as physical infrastructure, quality of the
labor force, and cultural distance, see, e.g., Coughlin et al. (1991) and Flores
and Aguilera (2007). In more recent studies, focus has been put on institu-
tional features such as contractual hazards and appropriation concerns (Henisz
(2000)) and on the enforcement of property rights (Lee and Mansﬁeld (1996)).
Diﬀerently, the stream of literature based on agglomeration drivers takes into
account positive externalities that derive from the geographical clustering of
manufacturing activities, for example, due to technological spillovers, access to
specialized labor, and access to specialized intermediate inputs, see Marshall
(1982). Then, according to this approach, the presence of knowledge spillovers is
country-speciﬁc, but also depends on the location choice of ﬁrms. In other words,
it has an endogenous component that depends on ﬁrms observing the economic
environment and choosing the location strategically. More recent literature puts
increased attention to strategic interaction between MNEs in oligopolistic mar-
kets and the impact on agglomeration phenomena; see, e.g., Alca´cer and Chung
(2007). These agglomeration economies have been further studied with formal
models, e.g., in David and Rosenbloom (1990), Krugman (1991), Bischi et al.
(2003a) and Bischi et al. (2003b), and have been empirically documented in
global and international settings, see, e.g., Carlton (1983) and Mariotti et al.
(2010).
In the current work, we develop a dynamic model that considers a combi-
nation of endowment drivers and agglomeration drivers. The model describes
the repeated manufacturing location decisions of ﬁrms that choose between oﬀ-
shoring and re-shoring their activities to beneﬁt from a reduction in manufactur-
ing costs taking into account knowledge spillovers between ﬁrms. Firms are based
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in a developed country, called country 1, and have the option to oﬀ-shore manu-
facturing activity to an emerging country, called country 2. The unit costs of pro-
duction in country 1 are higher but are decreased by cost-reducing externalities,
to which we refer as within-country spillovers. These within-country spillovers
depend on the share of manufacturing activity in country 1. More speciﬁcally,
the higher the level of manufacturing activity, the higher are the spillovers and
the cost-reducing externalities. In this case, the level of spillovers co-evolves
over time with the share of manufacturing activity and crucially inﬂuences the
strategic location choices of ﬁrms. Manufacturing costs can also be reduced by
cross-border spillovers that capture the beneﬁt of knowledge developed in coun-
try i that spills over to the other country j and reduces the costs of production
there. In line with empirical evidence which reveals that knowledge spillovers
are geographically localized and that knowledge transfer decreases with distance
even within the same ﬁrm (see, e.g., Adams and Jaﬀe (1996, Rosenthal and
Strange 2003 and Jaﬀe et al. 1993)), we assume that cross-border spillovers per
unit of production are smaller than (or equal to) within-country spillovers. In our
framework, knowledge spillovers can also be developed within country 2, but the
related cost-reducing externalities might diﬀer from country 1. This assumption
is motivated by empirical evidence which highlights that technological spillovers
and innovation activity vary across locations due to diﬀerences in initial endow-
ments, the actions of actors engaged in R&D (governments, universities and
ﬁrms), the links among those actors, and the diﬀerences in educational systems
and regulation, see, e.g., Nelson (1993) and Furman et al. (2002). The eﬀect of
endowment drivers are simply captured by an additional linear cost component
– representing congestion costs – that depends on the level of activity in country
2. Congestion costs measure the level, the quality, and the (in)eﬃciencies of the
infrastructure and facilities that a country can oﬀer. It is an essential feature of
a manufacturing site that has a crucial impact on the location choice of MNEs.
Moreover, this feature is country-speciﬁc as it cannot be easily transferred from
country to country and it cannot be modiﬁed in the short run. It depends on
the level of education, the structural investments undertaken in the past, the
resources invested in research in the last decades and the quality of the institu-
tions. For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, the congestion
costs are assumed to be zero for country 1.
The cost-reducing eﬀect due to internal (within-country) and external (cross-
border) spillovers are modeled as in Bischi et al. (2003a) and Bischi et al. (2003b)
and we adopt their functional form for the unit costs of manufacturing. The novel
element in our model is that we introduce congestion costs. The ﬁrms’ location
decisions are based on the relative performance of producing at home in coun-
try 1 and producing in the foreign country 2. The switching between decisions
is described by a replicator dynamics, see, e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003).
The evolutionary framework proposed in this chapter links ﬁrm’s location choices
with internal and external knowledge spillovers and congestion costs. We illus-
trate how such a highly stylized dynamical model can be used to derive policy
implications. We further shed light on aspects such as the combined impact of
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knowledge spillovers and congestion costs on the long run location patterns of
manufacturing activity. In particular, we try to improve our understanding of
which combinations of within-country spillovers and congestion costs lead to re-
shoring of manufacturing activity, the eﬀects of cross-border spillovers on the
relocation choice, the existence of suboptimal location patterns and the para-
meter settings that lead to optimal (minimum production costs) outcomes. We
also try to identify parameters that have the biggest impact on location patterns
and, hence, might be suitable for economic policy.
As the literature reports that over time oﬀ-shoring of manufacturing has
lead to a substantial increase in production costs in the foreign countries, we
focus our analysis on the eﬀect of congestion costs on the global dynamics of
location patters that result from our evolutionary model. The investigation starts
with the global analysis in absence of cross-border spillovers and considers three
diﬀerent conﬁgurations of unit costs of production. For each conﬁguration, three
cases of diﬀerent within-country spillovers are considered. Hence, our analysis
considers nine diﬀerent scenarios ranging from the benchmark case in which the
two countries diﬀer only in congestion costs to an extreme situation in which
country 2 oﬀers a rather large cost advantage while country 1 oﬀers large cost-
reducing within-country spillovers. Then, the analysis is completed considering
cross-border spillovers and asymmetric cases in which the ﬁrms beneﬁt from
cross-border spillovers only operating in one of the two countries.
The investigation reveals that the particular combination of within-country
and cross-border spillovers crucially shape the spatial distribution of the indus-
trial activities between the two countries. In particular, if there is no diﬀerence
in unit production cost, the manufacturing activity tends to be polarized in one
of the two countries. In this case, congestion costs reduce oﬀ-shoring of manufac-
turing activity to country 2. In contrast, the possibility to beneﬁt from a large
advantage in unit production costs if manufacturing is located in country 2 accel-
erates oﬀ-shoring activities and, for suﬃciently high congestion costs, leads to a
location pattern in which the manufacturing activity is spread between the two
countries. It is worth observing that large congestion costs increase re-shoring
activities, but do not completely eliminate manufacturing activity in country 2.
In fact, depending on the strategic location choices of ﬁrms, congestion costs
are negligible if the level of manufacturing activity in country 2 is low. In this
context, the presence of cross-border spillovers reduces the polarization of the
manufacturing activity in a single country. The optimality of the geographic
allocation of the manufacturing activity in terms of resulting costs of manufac-
turing is another important aspect. Our investigation reveals that congestion
costs and asymmetric within-country spillovers can lead to equilibrium location
patterns that are suboptimal. This occurs if ﬁrms concentrate their manufac-
turing activities in a location that does not ensure the lowest production costs.
The presence of cross-border spillovers reduces the likelihood of long run loca-
tion patterns that lead to such suboptimal situations, while a counter-intuitive
eﬀect is observed in presence of asymmetric cross-border spillovers. In particu-
lar, when ﬁrms can absorb the knowledge spillovers coming from country 2 only,
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a reduction of within-country spillovers in country 2 contributes to an increase
in oﬀ-shoring. This ﬁnding highlights that the conventional wisdom put forward
by the International Business literature that ﬁrms will be attracted to locations
with larger knowledge activity, see, e.g., Alca´cer and Chung (2007), does not
hold in general and, speciﬁcally, does not hold in case of asymmetric outﬂows of
spillovers.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 introduces the two-
country model. Section 3 identiﬁes the equilibria of the model, their local stability
and their optimality. Section 4 investigates the global dynamics of the location
patterns for diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the parameters and studies the eﬀect of
the congestion costs. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Let us consider a population of ﬁrms that manufacture a homogenous product.
There are two countries indexed by i = 1, 2. Total production is sold at a pos-
itive price in a global market characterized by a given demand function. Total
production quantity is normalized to one and we are interested in the share of
total production that is manufactured in country i. The ﬁrms choose whether to
produce in country 1 or to locate production in country 2. At each discrete time
t ∈ N, the ﬁrms’ choices determine the fraction x (t) of production in country
1 and the complementary fraction 1 − x (t) in country 2. The current alloca-
tion determines production costs in each country. In particular, we assume that
producing in country 1 and country 2 implies the following costs,
C1 (x (t)) =
c1
1 + β1x (t) + γ12 (1 − x (t)) and
C2 (x (t)) =
c2
1 + β2 (1 − x (t)) + γ21x (t) + k (1 − x (t)) . (1)
The unit production costs in country i = 1, 2 are denoted by ci and βi is the
coeﬃcient of within-country spillovers in country i. We assume that country 1
is more eﬃcient. In particular, we consider country 1 to be a technology leader
(a developed economy) and country 2 to be a technology laggard (a develop-
ing economy). Since production costs in a technologically advanced country are
typically higher (e.g. due to higher wages) than the costs of production in coun-
try 2 that is a technology laggard, we consider c1 ≥ c2 ≥ 0. The cost-reducing
externalities related to internal spillovers are higher in country 1 than in country
2, β1 ≥ β2. Cross-border spillovers are represented by γji which capture cost-
reducing externalities in country j related to knowledge spillovers coming from
country i = j, see similarly Bischi and Lamantia (2002), Bischi et al. (2003a)
and Bischi et al. (2003b). Knowledge spillovers are geographically constrained,
see, e.g., Rosenthal and Strange (2003) and Jaﬀe et al. (1993), and the bene-
ﬁts of knowledge transfer decreases with distance even within the same ﬁrm,
see Adams and Jaﬀe (1996) and Alca´cer and Chung (2007). It follows that the
beneﬁts from cost-reducing spillovers are assumed to be higher in the country in
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which (manufacturing) know-how is developed. In other words, βi ≥ γji. Finally,
k is a coeﬃcient that measures the eﬀect of congestion, a cost-increasing exter-
nality related to overcrowding which increasingly becomes important if the level
of manufacturing activity in country 2 increases. A ﬁrm operating in country 1
does not suﬀer from congestion costs due to, e.g., better infrastructure. These
arguments yield the following parameter constraints.
Assumption 1. We assume that c1 ≥ c2 > 0, β1 ≥ β2 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ γ12 ≥ 0,
β1 ≥ γ21 ≥ 0, k ≥ 0.
Note that cost function C1 is monotonically decreasing with respect to x, the
fraction of manufacturing activity located in country 1, while the cost function C2
is U-shaped. We assume that the evolution of the share of manufacturing activity
located in country 1, i.e. x (t) ∈ [0, 1], is given by the following exponential
replicator equation (see Cabrales and Sobel (1992)):
xi (t + 1) = T (x(t)) = (1−α)x (t)+αx (t) 1
x (t) + (1 − x (t)) eβ(C1(x(t))−C2(x(t))) .
(2)
This model proposes that the share of manufacturing activity in country 1
increases (decreases) from period t to period t+1 if country 1’s production costs
in period t are lower (higher) than country 2’s production costs. The parameter
β > 0 measures the intensity of switching between the locate-production-at-
home strategy and the oﬀ-shore-production strategy. It determines the fraction
of ﬁrms that move production from one country to the other in their search for
lower costs of production. The ﬁrms are aﬀected by inertia which is related to
diﬃculties in changing the location choice. This inertia is captured by parameter
α ∈ [0, 1]. The replicator Equation (2) captures an evolutionary selection mech-
anism by which better strategies spread in a population of ﬁrms. Diﬀerently
from the classical replicator dynamics, see, e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003)
and references therein, it has the convenient property that the state space [0, 1]
is invariant under the dynamics of (2). Thus, long run location patterns of the
ﬁrms are obtained as the steady states of this evolutionary model.
The goal of our work is to analyze the possible long run location patterns
of the manufacturing activity and to identify the possible measures that a pol-
icymaker can take to inﬂuence these location patterns. In this regard, we are
interested to understand the role that is played by spillovers and congestion
costs if ﬁrms choose to produce in country 2 to take advantage of lower produc-
tion costs and under which circumstances country 1 becomes attractive.
3 Equilibrium Location Patterns: Local Stability
and Eﬃciency
The oﬀ-shoring of the entire manufacturing activity to country 2 represents an
equilibrium of the model (2) as well as concentrating manufacturing in country
1. These are only two of several possible long-run location patterns and the
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possibility to converge to one of these equilibria depends on the initial share of
ﬁrms that manufacture in country 1 and on the particular parameter values. In
the next section, we analyze this aspect by so-called bifurcation diagrams which
show the changes of such equilibria and their basins of attraction as congestion
costs vary. Our analysis is performed for various conﬁgurations of the parameters
of the cost functions. The numerical analysis is supported by and combined
with analytical results which shed some light on the possible long-run location
patterns. In particular, it is possible to prove the following stability properties
for the long-run location patterns.
Theorem 1. The model (2), given assumption 1 holds, has the two border equi-
libria, i.e. x = 1 and x = 0, and at most two more equilibria in (0, 1). Let us
deﬁne
kT1 =
c1
1 + γ12
− c2
1 + β2
and kT2 =
c1
1 + β1
(
β1 − γ12
1 + β1
− γ21 − β2
1 + γ21
)
(3)
Then,
• if C1 (1) < C2 (1), i.e. c1c2 <
1+β1
1+γ21
, equilibria x = 1 and x = 0 are both locally
asymptotically stable and a repellor exists in (0, 1) for k < kT1 ; at k = kT1
equilibrium x = 0 loses stability through either a transcritical or a pitchfork
bifurcation and, for k > kT1 , equilibrium x = 1 is stable while x = 0 is
unstable.
• if C1 (1) > C2 (1), i.e. c1c2 >
1+β1
1+γ21
, x = 1 is unstable and x = 0 is locally
asymptotically stable for k < kT1 , x = 0 loses stability at k = kT1 and for
k > kT1 equilibria x = 1 and x = 0 are both unstable and at least one internal
ﬁxed point exists.
• if C1 (1) = C2 (1), i.e. c1c2 =
1+β1
1+γ21
, x = 0 is local asymptotically stable with
basin of attraction given by B (0) = [0, 1) and x = 1 is unstable, at k = kT2
equilibrium x = 1 becomes stable through a transcritical bifurcation, for kT2 <
k < kT1 both x = 1 and x = 0 are asymptotically stable, at k = kT1 a
transcritical bifurcation occurs and for k > kT1 equilibrium x = 0 is unstable
and equilibrium x = 1 is locally asymptotically stable with B (1) = [0, 1).
The Theorem reveals that it is feasible to produce in the technologically
advanced country 1 if the higher unit costs of production are oﬀset by higher
technological spillovers, while the congestion costs do not aﬀect the stability of
this long-run location pattern. After all, these costs are related to the concentra-
tion of manufacturing activity in the less technologically advanced country and
the cost eﬀect is marginal when production activity is mostly located in coun-
try 1. On the contrary, large congestion costs make oﬀ-shoring of manufacturing
activity infeasible.
Although some insights on the long-run location patterns can be gained from
analytical derivations, the complicated form of the cost functions makes it diﬃ-
cult to identify all equilibria of the model and the type of bifurcations that are
responsible for their existence or stability. Nevertheless, it is possible to consider
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some benchmark cases that allow us to develop insights on the changes in the
more complicated scenarios. We start by abstracting from congestion costs. In
this case, it is possible to prove the following result.
Theorem 2 (No congestion costs). Let k = 0. Then,
• when C1 (0) > C2 (0), i.e. i.e. c1c2 >
1+γ12
1+β2
, and either β1 > γ12 or β2 = γ21,
the long-run location pattern x = 0 is always at least locally stable. Speciﬁcally,
for C1 (1) > C2 (1), we have B (0) = [0, 1), for C1 (1) = C2 (1) a transcritical
bifurcation occurs through which the equilibrium x∗, given by
x∗ =
c1 (1 + β2) − c2 (1 + γ12)
c1 (β2 − γ21) + c2 (β1 − γ12) (4)
merges with the equilibrium x = 1 and becomes feasible, i.e. x∗ ∈ [0, 1]. For
C1 (1) < C2 (1), the equilibria x = 1 and x = 0 are both locally asymptotically
stable with basin of attraction given by B (1) = (x∗, 1] and B (0) = [0, x∗),
respectively. The ﬁxed point x∗ is a repellor. For the special case c1 = c2,
β1 = β2 and γ12 = γ21 = 0, x∗ = 12 , we have that equilibria x = 0 and x = 1
are both asymptotically stable with B (0) =
[
0, 12
)
and B (1) =
(
1
2 , 1
]
.
• when C1 (0) = C2 (0) (which implies β2 = γ12 and c1 = c2 under assumption
1) and either β1 > γ12 or β2 = γ21, it follows that B (1) = (0, 1] for C1 (1) <
C2 (1), the ﬁxed points of model (2) ﬁll the region [0, 1] when C1 (1) = C2 (1)
and B (0) = [0, 1) when C1 (1) > C2 (1).
• in case of total absorption of cross-border spillovers, i.e. β1 = γ12 and
β2 = γ21, when the production costs are symmetric, i.e. c1 = c2, the ﬁxed
points of model (2) ﬁll the region [0, 1], otherwise the long-run outsourcing
location pattern 0 is the only locally stable equilibrium such that B (0) = [0, 1).
The Theorem underlines that in the absence of congestion costs, oﬀ-shoring
of manufacturing represents a stable long-run location pattern which may or
may not coexist with the equilibrium where manufacturing occurs only in the
home country 1. Moreover, if knowledge is transferable between countries with-
out losses (i.e. internal and cross-border spillovers are identical), then it is attrac-
tive to oﬀ-shore manufacturing to country 2. In this case, the absence of con-
gestion cost and the presence of even a small production cost advantage oﬀered
by country 2, makes oﬀ-shoring of manufacturing the unique long-run location
pattern. The scenario changes when production in country 2 implies congestion
costs. Assuming that cost-reducing know-how is perfectly transferable between
countries, it is possible to prove the following results.
Theorem 3. Let β1 = γ21, β2 = γ12 and k > 0. If c1 = c2, then equilibrium
x = 1 is asymptotically stable with basin of attraction given by B (1) = (0, 1],
otherwise equilibrium x = 1 is never asymptotically stable and,
• when β1 > 1 + 2β2 and β1 = β2, for k < kF , where
kF =
4 (β1 − β2) (c1 − c2)
(β1 + 1)
2 + 2β1β2
(5)
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the equilibrium x = 0 is locally stable with basin of attraction given by
B (0) = [0, 1). At k = kF , two ﬁxed points appear through a fold bifurca-
tion:
x∗1,2 =
(1 − β1 + 2β2) k ±
√
k
[
(β1 + 1)
2
k + 2β1β2k + 4 (β2 − β1) (c1 − c2)
]
2k (β2 − β1)
for kF < k < kT1 , where
kT1 =
c1 − c2
1 + β2
, (6)
the ﬁxed point x = 0 is asymptotically stable with basin of attraction given by
B (0) = [0, x∗2), while the ﬁxed point x
∗
1 is either stable with basin of attrac-
tion B (x∗1) = (x
∗
2, 1) or it loses stability through a period doubling bifurcation.
Moreover, at k = kT1 the equilibrium x
∗
2 merges with equilibrium x = 0 which
looses its stability through a transcritical bifurcation. For k > kT1 , both equi-
libria x = 0 and x = 1 are unstable and the internal ﬁxed point is either
stable with basin of attraction B (x∗1) = (0, 1), or it loses stability through a
ﬂip bifurcation.
• when β1 < 1 + 2β2 and β1 = β2, for k < kT1 the ﬁxed point x = 0 is
asymptotically stable with basin of attraction given by B (0) = [0, 1), while at
k = kT1 the ﬁxed point x = 0 loses stability through a transcritical bifurcation
and the internal ﬁxed point, i.e.
x∗ =
(1 − β1 + 2β2) k +
√
(1 − β1 + 2β2)2 k2 + 4k (β1 − β2) (c2 − c1 + (1 + β2) k)
2k (β2 − β1)
(7)
appears which, for k > kT1 , is either locally asymptotically stable, with basin
of attraction B (x∗) = (0, 1), or it looses stability through a ﬂip bifurcation.
• when β1 = β2, for k < c1−c21+β1 the ﬁxed point 0 is locally asymptotically stable
with basin of attraction given by B (0) = [0, 1), while at k = c1−c21+β1 the equilib-
rium looses stability through a transcritical bifurcation and the internal ﬁxed
point
x∗ = 1 − c1 − c2
k (1 + β1)
(8)
appears and for k > c1−c21+β1 it is locally asymptotically stable with basin of
attraction B (x∗) = (0, 1).
This analytical result underlines that if cross-border spillovers equal within-
country spillovers, the ﬁrm will choose not to locate the entire manufacturing
activity in the country that has a production cost disadvantage. Intuitively, the
possibility to beneﬁt from spillovers independently of where know-how is gen-
erated eliminates the unique strength of the technologically advanced country,
i.e. the additional cost reduction due to higher within-country spillovers. Thus,
country 2 beneﬁts from outgoing spillovers and manufacturing in this country
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becomes the unique long-run location pattern. However, Theorem3 also points
out that high congestion costs tend to oﬀset the production cost advantage of
country 2 and makes a mixed-location strategy the unique long-run location
pattern. A deeper investigation for more general scenarios requires a numerical
analysis which is developed in the next section. Before doing that, it is worth
addressing the optimality of the long run location patterns. Indeed, our evo-
lutionary model allows for long-run location patters which are suboptimal (in
terms of manufacturing costs) as speciﬁed in the following Theorem.
Theorem 4. Oﬀ-shoring the entire production volume to country 2 ensures
lower equilibrium production cost whenever k < kˆ, while locating production
in country 1 does so whenever k > kˆ, where
kˆ =
c1 − c2 + c1β2 − c2β1
(1 + β1) (1 + β2)
(9)
Theorem 4 underlines that spreading the production over the two countries
is always a suboptimal choice in terms of production costs. Moreover, it implies
the following result.
Corollary 1. Oﬀ-shoring the entire production volume to country 2 is a subop-
timal equilibrium choice whenever k > kˆ, while locating production in country 1
is so whenever k < kˆ.
4 Location Patterns: The Role of Knowledge Spillovers
and Congestion Costs
The aim of this section is to study the eﬀects that congestion costs and internal
and external knowledge spillovers have on the long run location patters. In order
to do so, we investigate the global dynamics of model (2) by numerical analysis.
In particular, we employ bifurcation diagrams that show the dependence of long
run location patterns, i.e. the long run share of ﬁrms x that locate production
in country 1, if congestion costs, k, vary from a situation of no congestion costs,
k = 0, to k = 2. Bifurcation diagrams are helpful as they illustrate the equilibrium
location patterns and their basins of attraction for each value of the congestion
costs. The investigation is conducted by normalizing unit costs in country, i.e. c1 =
1, and considering three values of unit costs in country 2, c2. The ﬁrst case is c1 =
c2, i.e. no cost advantage from producing in country 2. The second case is c1 = 32c2,
i.e. there is a small cost advantage if ﬁrms produce in country 2. The third case
is c1 = 10c2, i.e. there is a large cost advantage if ﬁrms produce in country 2. For
each of these three cases, three diﬀerent levels of internal spillovers are considered:
symmetric within-country spillovers, i.e. β1 = β2; a small advantage of country
1 regarding internal spillovers, speciﬁcally β1 = 32β2; and a large advantage of
country 1 regarding internal spillovers, i.e. β1 = 2β2.
Our ﬁrst numerical results we report describe the location patterns without
cross-border spillovers (γ12 = γ21 = 0), see Figs. 1 and 2. The bifurcation dia-
grams in Fig. 1 reveal that the congestion costs in country 2 have a signiﬁcant
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impact on the location decisions of ﬁrms. In particular, when the costs of pro-
duction in the two countries are identical, i.e. c1 = c2, and internal spillovers are
identical as well, i.e. β1 = β2, the congestion costs reduce the chances that ﬁrms
locate production in country 2. The yellow region in this ﬁgure represents the
basin of attraction of the ﬁxed point x = 0 (i.e. all production occurs in coun-
try 2), that ﬁrst shrinks and eventually disappears when congestion costs keep
increasing. This highlights that the set of initial allocation of manufacturing
activity which eventually lead to location patterns where the entire manufac-
turing occurs in country 2 shrinks and then disappears. On the contrary, the
dark-green region represents the basin of attraction of the ﬁxed point x = 1 (i.e.
all production occurs in country 1). This region grows and the ﬁxed point 1 even-
tually becomes the only asymptotically stable attractor with basin of attraction
given by B (1) = (0, 1] when congestion costs increase. This eﬀect is further pro-
nounced when ﬁrms that locate production in country 1 also beneﬁt from higher
within-country spillovers, i.e. β1 > β2. This can be seen in the ﬁrst row of Fig. 1
which shows the change in the basins of x = 0 (yellow region) and in the basin
of x = 1 (dark-green region) for increasing internal spillovers. The numerical
ﬁndings conﬁrm the analytical results in Theorem 1 and, in addition, illustrate
that manufacturing activity tends to be polarized in one of the two countries. It
is worth pointing out that the coexistence of the yellow and dark-green regions
indicates that for a range of congestions costs k the long run location pattern is
path dependent, i.e. the long-run outcome of the evolutionary switching process
depends on the initial share x0 of ﬁrms that manufacture in country 1. The
model also admits an internal mixed equilibrium x∗ ∈ (0, 1) which represents
a pattern where parts of the manufacturing activity occurs in country 1 while
the remaining share of ﬁrms manufacture in country 2. Such an equilibrium is a
repellor and lies on the border of the basins of attraction of the two asymptot-
ically stable ﬁxed points x = 0 and x = 1. More formally, B (1) = [0, x∗) and
B (1) = (x∗, 1]. Increasing congestion costs causes the interior ﬁxed point to
merge with the ﬁxed point x = 0 and then to disappear through a transcritical
bifurcation. Due to this bifurcation, the ﬁxed point x = 0 becomes unstable.
Hence, production will not be located in country 2 any longer for suﬃciently
large congestion costs.
Identical unit costs, c1 = c2, do not lead to a long run location pattern with
a positive share of manufacturing occurring in both countries. The only possible
long-run location patterns are that either all manufacturing is done in country
1 or all production is carried out in country 2. A similar result is obtained if
c2 is only slightly lower than c1; see the bifurcation diagrams in the second row
of Fig. 1. Even in this case, as congestion costs increase, production in country
2 becomes less appealing and it shrinks the set of initial conditions which lead
to manufacturing activity solely occurring in country 2 in the long run. For
suﬃciently high congestion costs, all production activity is located in country 1.
The situation is diﬀerent when country 2 oﬀers a large cost advantage. This
situation is arguably akin to the situation MNEs faced when they started oﬀ-
shoring their activities in the 1990s. The last row of Fig. 1 shows a scenario where
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Fig. 1. One-dimensional bifurcation diagrams where congestion costs in country 2,
i.e. k, is the bifurcation parameter and varies between 0 and 2. The bifurcation diagrams
are reported in three diﬀerent rows. In the ﬁrst row, the c1
c2
ratio is equal to 1, which
means that there is no cost advantage in country 2. In the second row, the ration
is 3
2
, which means a relative cost advantage of country 2. In the last row, unit cost of
production (excluding congestion costs and spillovers) in country 1 is ten times the unit
cost in country 2. For each row there are three bifurcation diagrams. The ﬁrst column
represents the situation of no internal spillover advantage, β1 = β2. The second column
represents the situation of small internal spillover advantage, β1
β2
= 3
2
. The last column
represents the situation of a large internal spillover advantage, β1
β2
= 2. The bifurcation
diagram includes the basins of attraction as well. In particular, the basin of attraction
of equilibrium x = 0 is depicted in yellow, the basin of equilibrium x = 1 is depicted
in dark green, and the basin of the stable internal ﬁxed point is in cyan. The values of
the remaining parameters are as follows: c1 = 1, β = 1, β1 = 1, α = 1, γ12 = γ21 = 0.
the cost of production (excluding congestion costs and spillovers) in country 1 is
ten times the cost of production in country 2. Here, a slight change in congestion
costs might trigger a completely diﬀerent location pattern. More speciﬁcally, if
the congestion costs increase and cross the bifurcation value kT1 ≈ 1, the long
run location patterns changes from a situation in which the ﬁrm chooses to pro-
duce solely in country 2 to a scenario in which production only partially occurs in
country 2. Formally, for k = kT1 , see (5), an internal ﬁxed point appears through
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a transcritical bifurcation. This equilibrium is an attractor and is marked in red.
In this scenario, if congestion costs are suﬃciently large, the ﬁrms’ total man-
ufacturing activity is spread geographically between the two countries. In this
case, the internal equilibrium is the only asymptotically stable ﬁxed point and
its basin of attraction is represented by the cyan region. Increasing the inten-
sity of choice, which measures the ﬁrms’ intensity of switching between the two
location strategies, has the only eﬀect of destabilizing the internal equilibrium
for increasing congestion costs. In particular, the internal equilibrium under-
goes a sequence of period-doubling bifurcations which lead to a chaotic long-run
location pattern. See the last row of Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Same parameter setting as in Fig. 1, except β = 10 (higher intensity of
switching).
The evolutionary process of switching between locations in the search for
cost reductions can lead to suboptimal equilibrium allocations of production
activities in the long run. This is the case represented by the left-top bifurcation
diagram in Fig. 1. Here, being kˆ = 0, locating the entire production in country
2 is a suboptimal equilibrium whenever congestion costs are positive, as we
have speciﬁed in Corollary 1. In fact, due to congestion, ﬁrms have to bear
higher costs in country 2 than in country 1. Despite the fact that the ﬁxed
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point x = 0 is a suboptimal equilibrium, it is asymptotically stable and its
basin of attraction (the yellow region) represents a so-called trapping region. The
existence of suboptimal and stable equilibria is typical of evolutionary games
where agents choose the strategy based on best-relative performance as this
might lead to lower absolute proﬁts in the long run; see, e.g., Schaﬀer (1989).
Summarizing, the analysis reveals that in the absence of cross-border (exter-
nal) spillovers and if the two countries are characterized by similar costs of produc-
tion, i.e. c1 is either equal or slightly larger than c2, industrial production tends
to be located either in country 1 or in country 2. In particular, the probability to
locate production in country 2 decreases as congestion costs in country 2 increase.
On the contrary, a huge diﬀerence in production costs, for example if c1 is ten times
c2, may lead to a spread of industrial production between the two countries, see
last row of Fig. 1. This occurs if congestion costs are suﬃciently high.
Cross-border spillovers also have a remarkable impact on the geographic allo-
cation of industrial activities. If we assume that cross-border transfer of know-
how is frictionless, i.e. β1 = γ12 and β2 = γ21, the numerical investigation reveals
that the attractiveness of country 2 decreases. This occurs if country 2 does not
oﬀer a production cost advantage, i.e. c1 = c2. In fact, relocating production
from country 2 to country 1, ﬁrms avoid the costs of congestion and (due to
cross-border spillovers) ﬁrms beneﬁt from cost reduction gained by manufactur-
ing activity in country 2. Hence, ﬁrms do not have an incentive to locate its
production in country 2. In terms of policy implications, it follows that it is
in the interest of the policy maker of country 1 that ﬁrms try to develop the
capability to exploit inter-country ﬂows of know-how due to external spillovers.
On the contrary, the policy maker of country 2 where congestion costs matter,
does not ﬁnd it equally beneﬁcial that ﬁrms can transfer know-how between
countries. To increase the rate of industrial activity in its country 2, the policy
maker has to aim at reducing the costs of congestion. Moreover, comparing the
ﬁrst row of Fig. 1, which shows the location patterns when there are no external
spillovers (γ12 = γ21 = 0), with the ﬁrst row of Fig. 3, which shows the location
patterns when there are external spillovers, it also becomes apparent that exter-
nal spillovers eliminate the occurrence of ineﬃcient oﬀ-shoring of manufacturing
activity that may occur when unit production costs are identical, i.e. c1 = c2.
Indeed, the comparison shows that the set of initial conditions that leads to loca-
tion patters with ineﬃcient oﬀ-shoring of manufacturing to country 2 (see the
yellow region in Fig. 1) disappears if there are cross-border spillovers. In other
words, the presence of cross-border spillovers contributes to eliminate ineﬃcient
location patterns and favor the location of manufacturing activity in country 1
if congestion costs arise only in country 2. Hence, the policy maker of country 2
which is a suboptimal manufacturing location has an incentive to limit external
spillovers. In contrast, the policy maker of country 1 which is the more eﬃcient
manufacturing location has an incentive to boost external spillovers since in this
case ﬁrms move their manufacturing activity to the most eﬃcient country with-
out losing the cost reduction due to know-how developed in the less eﬃcient
country.
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The situation changes signiﬁcantly when country 2 has an advantage in terms
of unit costs, i.e. c2 < c1; see the second and third row of Fig. 3. In this case,
ﬁrms that manufacture in country 2 beneﬁt from both smaller unit costs of pro-
duction and cross-border spillovers coming from country 1. Nevertheless, when
congestion costs increase, the competitive advantage from producing in country
2 due to the smaller unit costs of production is diminished by an increasing
congestion eﬀect and, consequently, country 1 becomes increasingly attractive.
Notwithstanding, keeping some production activity in country 2 is still beneﬁ-
cial. In fact, in this case the eﬀect of the congestion costs is reduced since the
concentration of production activity in country 2 is decreased. The evolutionary
process of location choice leads to a situation where part of the manufacturing
activity occurs in country 1 and the remaining part is carried out in the oﬀ-shore
country 2. Mathematically, this is reﬂected by the presence of the asymptotically
stable internal ﬁxed point x∗ ∈ (0, 1), which is marked in red in the second row of
Fig. 3. The presence of asymmetric unit costs results in location patterns that are
represented by a suboptimal equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, the asymptotically stable
ﬁxed point x∗ is never an optimal equilibrium as speciﬁed in Theorem4. Then, in
case of a limited cost advantage for country 2, the economic policy implications
related to external spillovers change.
Comparing the second row of Fig. 1 and the second row of Fig. 3, we observe
that for country 2 it is advantageous if external spillovers exist, while it is not
beneﬁcial for country 1. Indeed, as long as congestion costs are small, the pres-
ence of external spillovers drives ﬁrms to oﬀ-shore the entire production activity
to country 2. In fact, the ﬁxed point x = 0 is the only locally asymptotically sta-
ble equilibrium as indicated by the yellow region in Fig. 3. Moreover, if congestion
costs increase, country 2 loses its attractiveness but the ﬁrms still beneﬁt from
having some part of the production activity there. However, there is a trade-oﬀ
between external spillovers and local unit costs of production. In fact, if country
2 has much smaller unit costs of production (excluding internal and external
spillovers) than country 1, for example c1 is ten times c2, then the cost reduc-
tion due to internal and external spillovers is limited in country 2 since the base
unit costs are already relatively low compared to country 1. In this situation,
country 1 beneﬁts more from external spillovers. This eﬀect becomes obvious by
comparing the last row in Fig. 3 and the last row of Fig. 1. A similar scenario is
observable if the capability of ﬁrms to absorb external spillovers reduces.
In case of asymmetries between internal and external spillovers, the loca-
tion patterns and the economic implications are diﬀerent. We start the analysis
by considering a situation where know-how developed in country 1 can be per-
fectly transferred to reduce costs in country 2. Conversely, know-how developed
in country 2 cannot (or can only be partially) transferred to country 1. Such
asymmetric external spillovers obviously favor oﬀ-shoring manufacturing activ-
ity to country 2. Figure 4 depicts a scenario where a ﬁrm producing in country
2 beneﬁts from external spillovers while a ﬁrm producing in country 1 does not
(γ12 = 0 while γ21 = β1). Comparing it with Figs. 1 and 3, we observe that
the eﬀect of such asymmetric external spillovers is to increase the yellow region,
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Fig. 3. Parameter setting as in Fig. 1, except γ21 = β1 and γ12 = β2.
i.e. the set of initial conditions that lead to long run oﬀ-shoring of production
to country 2. The expansion of the yellow region occurs even when k > kˆ, i.e.
when oﬀ-shoring the production to country 2 is a suboptimal location strategy
as speciﬁed in Corollary 1.
Hence, it is possible to conclude that asymmetric external spillovers that
favor oﬀ-shoring to country 2 cause long run suboptimal location patterns. It is
also worth highlighting that the eﬀects of these asymmetric external spillovers
vanish when country 2 has a large cost advantage in comparison to country 1.
In this case, country 2’s cost advantage is further increased by cost-reducing
externalities coming from cross-border spillovers. In this case, the location pat-
terns are mainly aﬀected by the congestion costs rather than by the production
costs. Comparing the bifurcation diagrams in Figs. 4 and 3, we observe that the
presence of an asymmetry between internal and external spillovers in country
2 gives rise to a qualitative change of the bifurcation structure of the location
patterns. Here, when congestion costs increase and the value of k crosses the
bifurcation value kF ≈ 1, we move from a situation in which the ﬁrm chooses
to oﬀ-shore production to country 2 to a scenario in which the production is
only partially oﬀ-shored to country 2. In particular, for k = kF , see (5), two
internal ﬁxed points appear through a fold bifurcation. One of these two equi-
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Fig. 4. Parameter setting as in Fig. 1, except γ12 = 0 and γ21 = β1.
libria is a repellor and is marked in blue, while the other one is an attractor
and is marked in red. The repellor lies at the border of the basins of attrac-
tion of the ﬁxed point x = 0 and of the other internal ﬁxed point x∗. In this
case, production will be oﬀ-shored to country 2 only if the majority of ﬁrms have
already oﬀ-shored their production activity. Otherwise, total production activity
will be spread between the two countries in the long run. Although the dynamic
scenario just described is interesting as it is characterized by bi-stability and,
hence, path dependence, it is, however, not robust with regard to variations in
congestion costs. More precisely, immediately after the value for k (representing
congestion costs) crosses the threshold value where the fold bifurcation occurs, it
crosses another bifurcation value, namely the transcritical bifurcation value kT1 .
Through this bifurcation, the unstable internal ﬁxed point merges with the ﬁxed
point x = 0 and disappears while the ﬁxed point x = 0 becomes unstable. For
further increasing congestion costs, total production activity is spread between
the two countries and the internal equilibrium is the only asymptotically stable
ﬁxed point. Its basin of attraction is represented by the cyan region. Numerical
simulations, which are not reported here, reveal that the qualitative eﬀect of
asymmetric external spillovers in favor of country 2 is the same as the one just
described whatever the magnitude of the asymmetry.
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An interesting eﬀect can be observed when know-how can be transferred
from country 2 to country 1, but cannot be transferred (or at least can only be
partially transferred) from country 1 to country 2 (γ12 = β2 and γ21 = 0). In the
presence of such asymmetric external spillovers that work in favor of country 1
and whenever country 2 has a cost advantage over country 1, the attractiveness
of country 2 increases when the internal spillovers β2 in country 2 decreases.
This argument can be understood by observing the changes in the yellow region
depicted in the second and third rows of Figs. 5 and 6. Moving from the left
column (where β2 = β1 = 1 to the right column (where β2 = β1/2 = 1/2)
shows that the yellow region increases when β2 decreases. As a consequence,
in terms of implications for economic policy, the policy maker of country 2 can
decrease internal spillovers in its territory to increase the likelihood of attracting
industrial production.
Fig. 5. Same parameter setting as in Fig. 1, except γ12 = β2 and γ21 = 0. (Asymmetric
spillovers in favor of country 1)
To conclude our analysis, we point out that our investigation revealed that
whenever country 2 has an advantage in terms of unit production cost over coun-
try 1, congestion costs make production in country 2 less proﬁtable and reduce
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Fig. 6. Same parameter setting as in Fig. 1, except γ12 = β2 and γ21 =
1
2
β1. (Asym-
metric spillovers in favor of country 1)
the oﬀ-shoring activities of ﬁrms. Our analysis also shows, however, that the
presence of congestion costs does not eliminate oﬀ-shoring activity completely.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, an evolutionary mechanism for choosing the location of man-
ufacturing is proposed. The model is employed to study the question how the
long-run oﬀ-shoring and back-shoring patterns of a population of ﬁrms is aﬀected
by diﬀerences in unit production costs, within-country spillovers, cross-border
spillovers, and congestion costs. The investigation reveals that a manufacturing
site that oﬀers lower unit production costs becomes more attractive and causes
an oﬀ-shoring wave. This competitive advantage can be eroded by asymmetric
cross-border spillovers, by positive congestion costs, or by a combination of the
two. Although these factors inﬂuence oﬀ-shoring decisions, they rarely lead to
total re-shoring of production activities to the home country if it suﬀers a rather
large disadvantage in terms of unit production costs. This underlines that unit
production costs are indeed a key factor which drives location choices for MNEs.
A fundamental role is played by cross-border spillovers as well. These spillovers
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tend to reduce the occurrence of location patterns that lead to suboptimal equi-
libria and favor the geographic dispersion of manufacturing activity.
These ﬁndings are obtained by analyzing the endogenous location patterns
that emerge in the long run if a population of ﬁrms choose manufacturing loca-
tions based on relative production costs. The logic of the process that governs the
dynamic evolution of location choices of ﬁrms is intentionally simple: if a location
currently oﬀers a production cost advantage, then the share of ﬁrms which move
production activities to this country will increase. We also took into account that
there might be some inertia in this process of switching between manufacturing
sites as moving production activities from one country to another is costly and
takes time. What we do not take into account in our model is that MNEs are
typically active in oligopolistic markets and, therefore, strategic interactions and
intertemporal objectives play a crucial role. Further, MNEs are interconnected
through the supply side as they share common suppliers which is a further source
for strategic linkages. In this respect, our contribution diﬀers from Alca´cer and
Chung (2007) and Alcacer et al. (2015), where the location choices of ﬁrms are
analyzed assuming an oligopolistic industry. Papers along this promising line
of research explore how rivalry and diﬀerential knowledge accumulation among
competitors is aﬀected by the multinational enterprises’ geographic expansion
across countries. The location choice of the ﬁrms impacts the accessibility of cer-
tain markets and ﬁrms take location decisions also to enhance and protect their
relative competitive positions. The analysis focuses on how rivalry and compe-
tition inﬂuences the location decisions of multinational enterprises. In this way,
these contributions integrate rivalry and location choices in multi-stage, dynamic
settings. Another aspect we do not pursue in our contribution is the location of
research and development activities of ﬁrms. This aspect has been investigated in
the International Business literature, see, e.g., Belderbos et al. (2008). These ele-
ments, as well as the introduction of an outside option as in Bischi et al. (2003a),
are key elements that can have a strong impact on the oﬀ-shoring process. The
introduction of these further elements in our setup is left for future research.
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Appendix
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). The ﬁxed points of model (2) solve the equation
x∗ = (1 − α)x∗ + αx∗ 1
x∗ + (1 − x∗)eβ(C1(x∗)−C2(x∗)) ⇔
⎧⎨
⎩
x∗ = 0
x∗ = 1
C1 (x∗) = C2 (x∗)
Thus, the equilibria of the model are 0, 1 and the roots, in (0, 1), of the following
polynomial
p (x) = C1 (x) − C2 (x) (10)
where C1(x) − C2(x) are decreasing and convex functions in [0,1], hence they
have at most two intersections in [0,1]. The numerator of p(x) is a third degree
polynomial.
which are at most three. The eigenvalue associated to model (2) is
λ (x) = 1 − α + α 1
x + (1 − x)eβp(x) − αx
1 − eβp(x) + (1 − x)β ∂p(x)∂x eβp(x)(
x + (1 − x) eβp(x))2 (11)
It follows that the eigenvalue associated to equilibrium x = 0 and the one asso-
ciated to equilibrium x = 1 are, respectively
λ (0) = 1 − α + αeβ(k−kT1) and λ (1) = 1 − α + αeβ
c1−c2+c1γ21−c2β1
(1+β1)(1+γ21) (12)
where kT1 is given in (3). Then, since λ (0) , λ (1) > 0, imposing the classical
stability conditions, we have that the ﬁxed point x∗ = 0 is locally asymptotically
stable when k < kT1 , it undergoes a bifurcation of eigenvalue 1 at k = kT1 , and it
is unstable for k > kT1 . Similarly, the ﬁxed point x
∗ = 1 is locally asymptotically
stable when c1c2 <
1+β1
1+γ21
, it undergoes a bifurcation of eigenvalue 1 at c1c2 =
1+β1
1+γ21
,
and it is unstable for c1c2 >
1+β1
1+γ21
. Being [0, 1] an invariant region for model (2),
when ﬁxed points 0 and 1 are both either stable or unstable at least an internal
ﬁxed point has to exist.
For c1c2 =
1+β1
1+γ21
, one root of p (x) is 1, i.e. p (x) = (x − 1) g (x), λ (1) = 1
and T
′′
(1) = αβ (k − kT2). By imposing T
′′
(1) > 0, we have that x = 1 is semi-
asymptotically stable from the left when k > kT2 . Analyzing the dynamics of the
model w.r.t. the invariant region [0, 1], the condition k > kT2 implies the local
stability of x = 1. The remainder of the Theorem follows by classical eigenvalue
analysis.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 2). For k = 0, C1 (0) > C2 (0), and either β1 > γ12
or β2 = γ21, the numerator of p (x) becomes a polynomial of degree one since
A = B = 0. Its unique root is x∗ as given in (4), which is then the unique
possible equilibrium of the model in (0, 1). By straightforward algebra it follows
that 0 < x∗ < 1 if and only if C1 (1) < C2 (1). Since p (x) = C1 (x) − C2 (x)
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is a polynomial of degree one with its root x∗ in (0, 1) for C1 (1) < C2 (1), it
follows that C1 (x) < C2 (x) for x ∈ (x∗, 1] and C1 (x) > C2 (x) for x ∈ [0, x∗).
From which it follows that x∗ ∈ (0, 1) is always a repellor. Imposing the classical
stability condition to eigenvalues in (12), the ﬁrst part of the Theorem follows.
For k = 0, C1 (0) = C2 (0), and either β1 > γ12 or β2 = γ21, let us note that
∀x it holds p (x) > 0 when C1 (1) > C2 (1), the numerator of p (x) = 0 when
C1 (1) = C2 (1) and p (x) < 0 when C1 (1) < C2 (1). Then, the second part of
the Theorem follows. Let k = 0, β1 = γ12, β2 = γ21, β1 = β2. Then p (x) = 0 ∀x
when c1 = c2 and p (x) > 0 when c1 > c2. Thus the third part of the Theorem
follows.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). For β1 = γ21, β2 = γ12 and c1 = c2, we have
p (x) < 0 ∀x ∈ (0, 1), thus B (1) = (0, 1]. For β1 = γ21, β2 = γ12 and c1 > c2, it
becomes a polynomial of degree less than three. In particular, for β1 = β2, p (x)
becomes a polynomial of degree two, the roots of which are given by:
x∗1,2 =
(1 − β1 + 2β2) k ±
√
(1 − β1 + 2β2)2 k2 + 4k (β1 − β2) (c2 − c1 + (1 + β2) k)
2k (β2 − β1)
(13)
Since 0 < (1−β1+2β2)2(β2−β1) < 1 if and only if β1 > 1 + 2β2 and Δ = 0 if and only if
k = kF , where kF is given in (5), it follows that, for β1 > 1+2β2, at k = kF two
internal ﬁxed points, i.e. x∗1,2 in (13), appear through a fold bifurcation. Since
p (1) = C1 (1) − C2 (1) > 0, by continuity of p it has to be p (x) = C1 (x) −
C2 (x) > 0 for x ∈ (x∗1, 1), p (x) < 0 for x ∈ (x∗2, x∗1) and p (x) > 0 for x ∈ (0, x∗2).
Moreover, since the function that deﬁnes the dynamics of the model is increasing
when p (x) < 0 and vice versa, it follows that x∗1 is either stable or loses stability
through a period-doubling bifurcation and x∗2 is locally unstable. Moreover, we
have that x∗1 increases as k increases but it never reaches the value 1, while x
∗
2
decreases as k increases and it undergoes a transcritical bifurcation, it merges
with equilibrium 0, for k = kT1 > kF . For k > kT1 , the ﬁxed point 0 is unstable
and x∗2 becomes unfeasible (it exits the invariant region [0, 1]).
On the contrary, for β1 < 1 + 2β2, we have
(1−β1+2β2)
2(β2−β1) < 0 and the internal
ﬁxed point can be at most one, i.e.
x∗ =
(1 − β1 + 2β2) k +
√
(1 − β1 + 2β2)2 k2 + 4k (β1 − β2) (c2 − c1 + (1 + β2) k)
2k (β2 − β1)
(14)
For, β1 = β2, then there is at most one internal ﬁxed point
x∗ = 1 − c1 − c2
k (1 + β1)
(15)
which is locally asymptotically stable. It appears through transcritical bifurca-
tion at k = c1−c21+β1 .
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Proof (Proof of Theorem 4). Since C1 (1) = c11+β1 and C2 (0) =
c2
1+β2
+ k, it
follows that C1 (1) ≶ C2 (0) if and only if k ≷ kˆ. Moreover, setting φ = γ12 −β1,
by assumption 1 φ < 0 from which C1 (x∗) = c11+β1+φ(1−x∗) = C2 (x
∗) > C1 (1)
whenever x∗ ∈ (0, 1) is a general internal equilibrium. Then, being 0 and 1 two
equilibria always, the statement of the Theorem follows.
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Abstract. In the past decades, manufacturing ﬁrms have increasingly
oﬀ-shored main activities along their value chain to emerging economies
in order to take advantage of lower costs. More recently, however, the
trend of re-shoring has gained increasing attention. We argue that more
research is needed to fully understand ﬁrms’ motives for bringing their
activities back home. Furthermore, multinational ﬁrms need to evaluate
their activities along environmental, social and governance dimensions.
Research on corporate social responsibility strategies of multinational
enterprises and their global value chains is still scarce, however.
Keywords: Oﬀ-shoring · Re-shoring · Corporate social responsibility
1 Conclusions and Future Challenges
For the European Union (EU), the uneven geographical distribution of eco-
nomic activity among and even within member countries is a huge challenge.
These spatial inequalities evolve over time and follow complex patterns which
are inﬂuenced by economic, geographic, institutional and social factors. The
main question that arises is “What are the drivers for such empirically observed
heterogeneity of economic activity?” Clustering might take place for a variety
of reasons, such as to be closer to large markets, to exploit scale economies and
knowledge spillovers, and to beneﬁt from lower transportation costs. Institutions
at diﬀerent territorial levels (e.g. at the EU, national, regional or local level) obvi-
ously have a strong impact as they set the regulatory framework that guides the
decisions of economic actors and, thereby, foster growth and reduce regional dis-
parities. Consequently, it is important to increase the quality of governance and
to develop a better understanding of the linkages and the coordination issues
between central and local governments.
The European market oﬀers a wide array of examples of geographic areas
where groups of ﬁrms are interconnected by horizontal and vertical relations
and locate and interact. The International Business literature groups the drivers
for location decisions into two broad categories (e.g. Alca´cer et al. 2013). First,
endowment drivers include location traits such as physical infrastructure, labor
c© The Author(s) 2018
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force quality, cultural distance, and institutional features like political risk and
the enforcement of property rights. Second, agglomeration drivers include inter-
ﬁrm technological spillovers and access to specialized labor and specialized inter-
mediate inputs. In addition to these two established categories, McIvor (2013)
argues more recently that an analysis based on the Transaction Cost approach
and the Capability perspective can contribute to an improved understanding
of what drives ﬁrms’ location activities. Finally, a growing stream of papers
has demonstrated that the behavior of MNEs – which are typically active in
oligopolistic markets – is crucially inﬂuenced by strategic interaction with var-
ious stakeholders like rival ﬁrms, input suppliers, and regulators (e.g. Kopel
et al. 2015; Head et al. 2002; Leahy and Pavelin 2008; Leahy and Montagna
2009; Alca´cer et al. 2013, 2015; Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers 2007; Belderbos
et al. 2008; Wu and Zhang 2014).
The objective of the working group on social and industrial interactions was
to improve our understanding of the emergence of (behavioral) heterogeneity
in the European Union by looking at the EU as a complex, multi-level, evolv-
ing geographical system and by taking into account the dynamic processes that
occur within such a system. The main focus of the working group was on the
role of economic agents at the micro-level (e.g. ﬁrms, suppliers, consumers) in
spatial economic systems. In particular, multinational enterprises (MNEs) fre-
quently have to make vital decisions concerning the geographic location of activ-
ities along their value chain such as retail, production, research & development
(R&D), distribution, and services. These location choices of ﬁrms interact with
and are crucially inﬂuenced by their market, social, and institutional environ-
ment. Hence, emphasis was also given to the development of improved strategies
for EU regional policies. The majority of research carried out by the working
group on social and industrial interactions is representative of the game-theoretic
approach. Hence, the common element is the assumption that players in the game
(e.g. ﬁrms, suppliers, regulators) are taking into account that they are interact-
ing with rational players and, hence, that all players are reacting strategically
to the choices taken by the other players. From the work that has been done
by this group of researchers over the last years, several open issues have been
identiﬁed that are promising for future research activities. We expect that pur-
suing these topics will improve our knowledge about the drivers of homogeneity
or heterogeneity of ﬁrms’ (location) choices.
With regard to future research, we notice that the dynamics of ﬁrms’ strate-
gies are evident. Trade liberalization and innovations in information and com-
munication technologies have provided incentives for MNEs to move their pro-
duction abroad in order to exploit cost advantages. These oﬀ-shoring and out-
sourcing activities were oftentimes solely based on the lower cost of labor in for-
eign developing countries. However, more recently ﬁrms are reconsidering their
previous decisions and are starting to ‘re-shore’ or ‘near-shore’ their activities
(Ellram 2013; Porter and Rivkin 2012). Accounting for the hidden costs of out-
sourcing and oﬀ-shoring, three reasons are advanced for explaining this trend
(e.g. Booth 2013; Barbieri and Stentoft 2016; Stentoft et al. 2016; de Treville
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and Trigeorgis 2010). First, the labor cost advantage of foreign locations in devel-
oping countries has been signiﬁcantly reduced and the costs of transportation
are rising sharply. Instead of cheap labor, multinationals are now considering
direct investments abroad to take an advantageous position in conquering fast
growing foreign markets like China. Second, ﬁrms are realizing that keeping
activities like manufacturing and R&D at distant locations can have negative
consequences on innovation and quality since knowledge spillovers are localized.
Moreover, large distances disproportionately increase the risk of supply chain dis-
ruptions. Given such a globalized channel structure, ﬁrms might damage their
reputation as they are increasingly held responsible if their foreign suppliers
disregard national codes of conduct or norms. Third and ﬁnally, companies are
starting to re-shore to be able to customize their products to preferences in local
markets and to be able to respond to customs and preferences quickly. Although
some work on strategic re-location and near-shoring decisions of multinational
ﬁrms has been done, we believe that more research is needed to understand
the strategic motives of MNEs for choosing particular channel structures and
locations.
Location decisions and the choice of channel structures and their interac-
tion with the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies of multinational
enterprises also deserve more attention. According to Kitzmu¨ller and Shimshack
(2012), the ﬁeld of international trade and CSR policies is still under-researched.
With the introduction of Directive 2014/95/EU on the disclosure of non-ﬁnancial
and diversity information, the European Commission expressed its view on CSR
as an extended corporate governance policy. The Directive introduces enhanced
reporting requirements on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues.
It aﬀects not only corporate reporting, but also measurement of performance on
ESG dimensions. As a consequence, it is expected to have an impact on internal
ﬁrm processes, compensation issues, and incentives of top management. Relating
to the reputation loss of manufacturers mentioned above, if their suppliers do
not meet CSR standards the question arises how MNEs can control their global
supply chains and ensure compliance of their partners. Additionally, an MNE’s
mode of entry into a foreign country might crucially interact with its investments
in corporate social responsibility (see, e.g., Manasakis et al. 2017). During the
process of the development of Directive 2014/95/EU, concerns were raised that
due to this new regulation European ﬁrms will have a competitive disadvan-
tage against their international rivals. An important issue is, therefore, if CSR
enhances or diminishes the competitiveness of European ﬁrms against their inter-
national rivals. Furthermore, the question might be raised whether investments
in CSR threaten the long run survival of MNEs and lead to the dominance of
ﬁrms that only narrowly seek to achieve proﬁts. Again, some preliminary work
on the impact of social and environmental objectives in oligopolistic markets has
been done, but we need more research to fully understand the conditions that
make it possible for ﬁrms to consider non-proﬁt objectives and still do well. Taken
together, the brief review hopefully demonstrates that there are ample research
opportunities that might lead to novel insights on the drivers that motivate
multinational ﬁrms’ decisions under competition and strategic interaction.
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